BOSTON UNIVERSITY

GRADUATE SCHOOL

Dissertation

THE BODY-MIND PROBLEM IN JAMES WARD'S PHILOSOPHY

by

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(B.S., University of Pennsylvania, 1919;
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submitted in partial fulfilment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

1936

THE BODY-MIND PROBLEM
IN JAMES WARD'S PHILOSOPHY

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PREFACE

In the concluding paragraph of his Metaphysics, Borden Parker Bowne remarks that, "According to an Oriental proverb, God knows it better." No doubt that will always be true of the solution to the problem of this dissertation; but many times in the course of these years I have felt that doubtless (so far as I was concerned, at least) God was the only one who would ever know anything worth saying about the complexities of body-mind relations! Over these many rough places assistance has been rendered by several members of the Faculties of Philosophy and Psychology of Boston, Yale and Brown Universities.

Foremost among the few who should be named specifically is Dr. Edgar S. Brightman, without whose constant encouragement and numerous counsels this would never have been written. Dr. Edmund B. Delabarre, of Brown University, has given invaluable help, particularly in achieving orientation in the problem in general. Professors F. S. C. Northrop, of Yale University, and Arthur E. Murphy, of Brown University, have rendered much assistance, especially in dealing with the problems of organism and freedom.

Grateful acknowledgement is made here of the courteous and willing service rendered by the staff of the Library of each of the above-named schools, also.

The conclusion of the citation from Bowne applies to this dissertation, too: "Yet so it seems to me; and I have set it down in the hope that so it may seem to others also."

J. S. P.

THE BODY-MIND PROBLEM
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INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER ONE
THE PROBLEM, AIMS AND SOURCES OF THE DISSERTATION

A. The Problem

This dissertation is concerned with the problem of describing and explaining the relationship which exists between body and mind, in the life of the human individual. In particular, it is limited for the most part to an exposition, analysis and critical evaluation of the contributions made in the writings of James Ward, toward a solution of that very difficult problem.

James Ward was an English personalistic psychologist and philosopher. He was born January 27, 1843, at Hull, England, and died at Cambridge, March 4, 1925, in his eighty-third year. Forty years of his life were spent in academic pursuits, chiefly in connection with Cambridge University, first as Fellow and Tutor in Trinity College, and later as Professor of Mental Philosophy. His long life and unusual character held a curious mixture of poverty and riches, illness and

health, suffering and honors, loneliness and social achievement. Sensitive, painfully conscientious and self-critical, he yet reveals a depth of insight, and a felicity of style that have assured him an enduring place in the world of thought. Ward was thoroughly scientific: a first-rate biologist, and one of England's greatest psychologists. At the same time, he was a true philosopher. His restless and adventurous spirit could not stay content among the facts and laws and disconnected hypotheses of science. He must be ever pushing out into the deeps of metaphysics and epistemology, exploring implications, meanings and explanations, seeking connections, and the wider view of a coherent philosophy, a true Weltanschauung. Hence his great importance to those interested in a problem like that of body-mind relations, which clearly spans the fields both of science and philosophy.

B. The Aims

The relation of body and mind is, without doubt, one of the most persistent and difficult problems in the whole compass of philosophy. Furthermore, it is also one of the most fertile, leading the investigator and student out into all manner of secondary problems and questions. James Ward was fully alive to the importance of these secondary and supporting considerations, and he was peculiarly well-fitted

to deal with them: particularly with such as had psychological implications.

It shall be my aim, therefore, first of all to understand and set forth Ward's solution of the age-long riddle of body-mind relationship. In the second place, I shall seek to make clear what seem to me to be the meaning and value of his thought concerning some of the most important secondary problems that arise. And, finally, it shall be my aim throughout to see Ward's thought in its true perspective, so far as I am able, and rightly to evaluate his conclusions.

C. The Primary Sources

1. The Writings of James Ward

Naturally, the principal source for this dissertation is the writings of James Ward. I shall endeavor to examine every available published word that Ward wrote, in order to glean everything which may have any bearing on our problem. But most important for our purpose are the following:

Naturalism and Agnosticism, 1899

The Realm of Ends, 1911

Psychological Principles, 1918

and the posthumously published collection of essays and articles,

Essays in Philosophy, 1927

Special mention should be made, also, of the article, "Psychology," written originally in the 1880's, and appearing in 1885, in the Encyclopedia Brittanica. It was republished, with additions and omissions, in succeeding editions down to 1911. Although, for the most part, it is embodied in Psychological Principles, there are some portions of it - particularly the section on Body and Mind - which are of importance, and are not included in his great text-book.[1]

2. Dr. J. S. Marshall's Dissertation

Another important source for this study is the dissertation offered to Boston University in 1926, by Dr. John Sedberry Marshall, entitled, The Continuum in James Ward's Psychology. As a study of the continuum itself, Dr. Marshall's work will surely stand unchallenged as a monumental piece of research. This has been of some value in helping toward a grasp of Ward's teachings. But we shall be interested, also, in considering and criticizing Marshall's interpretation of the metaphysical meaning and bearing of the continuum. This is of vital significance in relation to the solution of the body-mind problem. As I understand the situation, if Marshall is right in his interpretation, then

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1. See Ward, PP, the Preface, pages v to vii.

logically we ought to regard Ward as but one of that group of thinkers who attempt a monistic solution. This, it seems to me, is a very questionable position, and must be considered carefully. Hence the importance of Dr. Marshall's dissertation as source material.

3. The Writings of Other Psychologists and Philosophers

And naturally, also, the published work of a number of other thinkers, from Aristotle on down to the present day, will be used as source material. While Ward was quite thorough in his exposition of the historical background, nevertheless, it is necessary to go to the authors themselves, that we may acquire and preserve right perspective. These shall be noted in the proper places of reference, as we have occasion.

CHAPTER TWO
THE LOGICAL BACKGROUND OF THE PROBLEM

A. The Nature of the Body-Mind Problem

1. Its Psychological Basis

In order to approach intelligently a problem as complicated as that of body-mind relations, a preliminary survey of the nature and logical relations of the problem is indispensable. By means of such a survey (which is attempted in this chapter and the one following) we may hope to "get our bearings," and to avoid certain confusions and misunderstandings, which might otherwise be inevitable.

Let us begin with the statement and application of a general principle: Every investigation in science or philosophy should start by asking, What are the facts as critically determined? This means that any study of the body-mind problem must begin in the field of psychology. Obvious though this seems, it is important to set it down clearly, here at the very beginning of our discussion of Ward's thought. For, as we shall see, it was his conviction that the psychology (and most of the philosophy) of his day was infected by the taint of Descartes' rationalistic and dualistic analysis. Therefore, he did not consider the psychological, factual basis as finally and correctly

determined. Rather, this was his first, and in some respects his most important point of attack. Little or no sound progress can be hoped for in the speculative aspects of the problem, until the factual basis is scientifically ascertained and logically interpreted.

2. The Limits of Scientific Investigation

Important as it is, however, in any discussion of body-mind relationship, to make sure of the scientific basis in so far as we can, we may not stop there. In the first place, a great deal of the factual background of this problem is beyond direct observation, either objective or introspective. Although psychologists and physiologists have learned how to investigate part of this obscure background by studying indirectly many of the muscular, nervous and cerebral processes and events, and their correlation with mental processes, yet many other critically important facts still defy investigation. It may well be that many of these latter will always continue to lie beyond scientific observation and systematization.

By way of example, consider the vital question as to temporal sequence of brain-event and sensational or volitional experience. Conceivably - but quite improbably - it might become possible to locate cerebrally the particular brain-events with exactness, and even to time them with great

accuracy. For other objective physical events can be located and measured, and timed, to the millionth of an inch and the quadrillionth of a second, by indirect methods. Of what use would this be, however, in view of the crudeness of our time-sense with respect to experiences? We know, experimentally, e.g., that sounds and colors experienced at the rate of fifteen per second cannot be distinguished, but merge into one continuous tone or shade. It is difficult, therefore, to see how it will ever be possible to locate temporally with any accuracy, sensations (or volitions, either), within more than the tenth of a second. It would seem, therefore, that the question of temporal sequence must remain scientifically unsettled; and the important considerations within the scope of the body-mind problem which hinge upon it must be determined, if at all, extra-scientifically.

3. The Necessity of Metaphysics

But deeper still, the very distinction between body and mind must, itself, be examined and criticized. Psychology, in the beginning (and continuously for practical purposes) quite naturally accepts that distinction, on the basis of common sense realism. Upon that realistic basis, as an unconscious philosophical presupposition, <u>all</u> science proceeds. When, however, science finds itself in a deadlock, or when plainly contradictory theses seem both to be

scientifically correct, then it is necessary to reexamine the presuppositions of science. It is thus that we are driven, often, to deal with questions of metaphysics. James Ward is of the opinion that this is the situation in psychology, particularly with respect to the problem of body and mind. In his Britannica article (embodied later in PP) he proceeds to that reanalysis of experience (referred to above[1]) which is, in effect, a reanalysis of the psychological, factual basis of the body-mind problem. But such a reanalysis, even though it be regarded as thoroughly scientific and sound, can be completely understood and coherently justified only on the basis of a different metaphysics than that underlying the Associationism of his predecessors.[2] It is to the working out of this metaphysics, after a refutation of the systems of naturalism and agnosticism in the earlier lectures, that Ward devoted himself in the later Gifford Lectures, The Realm of Ends.

4. Relation to Other Philosophical Problems

Thus, we see, the body-mind problem is of such a nature as to demand the resources of both science and metaphysics

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1. Supra, pages 1, 2.

2. See, on this point, e.g., Ward, PP, 412, n.1; 428. Cf. below, Chapter Three.

for its treatment. Yet even this is not the whole story, for the body-mind problem is, further, the meeting-point of a host of other problems. This has been well stated by Professor C. A. Strong:

> Thus a whole series of scientific and philosophical conceptions of the first order - the principle of the conservation of energy, the mechanical theory of life, the biological doctrine of evolution, the fundamental postulates of brain-physiology and mental pathology, the philosophical conceptions of mechanism, efficiency and free-will - all converge and come to a focus in the problem of the relation of mind and body.[1]

In particular, it is important to note that there is a peculiarly close relationship between the body-mind problem and the problems of freedom and determinism, and of mechanism and teleology. So close, in fact, are these problems seen to be to one another, as we study James Ward's treatment, that it is practically impossible to deal with one without dealing with the others, and the solution of one is seen to involve, almost inevitably, the solution of the others.

B. The Logic of the Problem

1. The Tentative Nature of Any Solution

It remains, now, before turning to the question of the relations of science and metaphysics, to draw certain

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1. WMB, 7.

logical inferences from the nature of the body-mind problem. In the first place, it is clearly evident that so far as the details of the problem are concerned, any solution must be purely tentative at many points. It must be always open to revision in the light of new scientific facts or reasonable interpretation thereof, or in the light of new and more coherent philosophical insights. We have a good illustration of this tentativeness, for example, in Ward's own thought, where he discusses at length occasionalism and "pampsychic" realism,[1] and decides in favor of the latter, while freely admitting that neither can be empirically proved, and that occasionalism is defensible from his own point of view of theistic personalism.

2. The Determinative Relation of Metaphysical Standpoint

But there is a deeper sense in which any discussion of the body-mind problem must remain tentative, or at least, remain always conditioned: After all, important as it is, body-mind relation is but one of a number of very important and very difficult problems in metaphysics and epistemology. One's total philosophy or Weltanschauung, and one's metaphysical credenda must rest upon and must deal coherently with all of these problems and their solutions. Metaphysical standpoint, therefore, is very apt to be determined by other

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1. ROE, 248-269. Note Ward's spelling: "pampsychic."

considerations than body-mind relationship, and is very likely to be strongly determinative in dealing with the body-mind problem. If, for example, one is convinced on other grounds of the truth of naturalistic, or certain types of idealistic metaphysics, he will find little light, indeed, in Ward's treatment of the body-mind problem, per se, and his own solution of that problem will almost certainly be predetermined on other lines than those of Ward.

Or, to look at these considerations from a less general point of view: It is a matter of fact that the interactionist is almost always an indeterminist; that the parallelist is just as often a determinist; and that the automatist in body-mind theory is certain to be a determinist. This does not happen by accident. Metaphysical conviction as to determinism or indeterminism, and as to the so-called efficiency or lack of efficiency of mind forms a standpoint from which the body-mind problem is almost certain to be viewed in one way or the other. Theoretically, it would seem that one's conclusion regarding body-mind relations should be just as determinative in the other direction. But in reality this problem is so difficult, and so deep in the underbrush of preliminary problems, that it is practically impossible to solve it independently and then use its solution as a standpoint. At most, it seems increasingly clear that its solution must go hand in hand with that of freedom and

determinism: that the two problems cannot be satisfactorily solved or dealt with independently.

In criticizing any solution of the body-mind problem, then, it is important to keep in mind the metaphysical standpoint from which the solution was attempted, and, also, the standpoint from which it is to be criticized. A difference of standpoint will invalidate almost any criticism.

3. The Possible Relations of Body and Mind

One more group of inferences we must note: the various relations between body and mind which are logically possible, considering the nature of body, mind, and the world in which they are related. These relations may be considered under three heads: a. As to substantial reality; b. As to temporal sequence; c. As to causal efficiency.

a. As to Substantial Reality

The temporal and causal relations of body and mind depend to a considerable extent upon the ontological nature of the two factors (body and mind). It is well, therefore, to ask, first of all, What are the possible conceptions of these elements in our problem, which common sense take to be independently real, and capable of interaction, one with the other, but which many philosophers, and even some scientists interpret quite otherwise?

(1) In the first place, both body and mind may be held to have independent, ontological reality, and really to interact. In this case their relation would be that of distinct and disparate substances. Philosophically, this would demand an explanation or interpretation of the assumed causal interrelations.

(2) Body (i.e., as composed of matter) may be considered to be the only real substance. In such case, mind becomes epiphenomenal, or else it must be granted some other status in reality: e.g., as having a purely functional relation and meaning. On such a hypothesis it is difficult to see how the relation of mind to body can be other than that of dependence.

(3) Neither body nor mind, per se may be regarded as independently real. In this case their relation to each other will depend upon the type of metaphysical conception which is posited. In particular, if a monistic metaphysics is assumed, both will be regarded as aspects of some underlying reality. If a neo-realistic conception is adopted, both will be regarded as composed of neutral entities in certain complicated arrangements. The distinction between them vanishes, and the problem becomes one of explaining the complicated arrangements and their changes.

(4) Or, finally, it is conceivable that mind alone may possess independent reality, in each particular case of

body-mind relationship. The body may be regarded, from this point of view, as purely illusory, or as having only a phenomenal, not an independent, existential reality. This type of theory is not to be confused with those systems of idealism and realism which do not deny the independent reality of body, but which conceive it as psychic in nature. If pluralistic, such systems belong under (1), above. If monistic, under (3).

b. As to Temporal Sequence

Coming now to the possibilities of temporal relation of body and mind, we may note first of all that there are several logically possible relations which have seldom or never been seriously entertained, at least by systematic thinkers. For instance, it is logically possible that there is no law of temporal relationship. Also, it is logically possible that the mental event always precedes the brain-event. Some such notion as this latter seems to be at the basis of Christian Science, but is certainly not entertained by any scientific investigator or systematic philosopher, so far as I can find. The logical possibilities commonly adopted would seem to be limited to these three:

(1) The mental event may sometimes precede the brain-event (e.g., in so-called volition) and may sometimes follow (e.g., in so-called sensational experience).

(2) The mental event may be regarded as always following the physical event.

(3) They may be regarded as always taking place simultaneously.

c. As to Causal Efficiency

The third and last group of possible body-mind relations has to do with the conception of causality. We may note in passing that scientists and philosophers are not agreed as to the meaning of causality. What is meant by scientific causality, strictly speaking, is uniform temporal succession. The factor known as the cause always precedes the effect, and is presumably always followed by the effect. There is assumed to be no cause without an effect, and no effect without a cause. Furthermore, according to the ideal of modern science, causes and effects form unbroken chains. There are no scientifically demonstrable "first causes," or "final effects." This conception of causal continuity is closely allied to the law of the conservation of energy, according to which no physical energy is ever lost or created within the system of the universe. Over against the scientific conception of cause, are the popular and what is sometimes called the philosophical conceptions of causality. According to these, the cause is a real agent, and not merely the uniform predecessor of the effect.

However, we are not here concerned with the conceptions of causality, except to note the disagreement, and that the conception of causality entertained may influence the choice of the theory of causal relationship, in individual cases.[1] We should also note that the question of temporal sequence is closely bound up with the problem of causal relations.

We may distinguish three possible types of theory which have been commonly held, and one logical possibility seldom if ever embraced:

(1) Mind and body may causally interact on one another. This is the conception of interactionist theories.

(2) The physical side may be the cause of the mental, but not vice versa. This is what Ward calls psychical epiphenomenalism - a better term than automatism, for the latter may be conceived parallelistically.

(3) Physical and mental events may occur concomitantly, without there being any causal relation between them. This is known as parallelism.

(4) And it is possible to conceive of the mental factor as the only causal one: a sort of physical epiphenomenalism. A completely idealistic panpsychism, in which the apparent, scientific parallelism breaks down philosophically because the body side is held to be really only phenomenal, would

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1. On causal conceptions see Ward, ROE, 273-277, and the references there cited.

illustrate this type. This is probably the position of Prof. Strong, in his earlier work, Why the Mind has a Body.

Before closing this brief survey of causal relations, we should give attention, also, to the possibility that some mental events, at least, may exist without a physical correlate. While not frequently held, at least in modern science and philosophy, it is true that at least one first-rate thinker in recent times has embraced this possibility: Henri Bergson, in Matter and Memory.

CHAPTER THREE
THE SCIENTIFIC AND METAPHYSICAL BACKGROUND OF THE PROBLEM

A. The Relations of Science and Metaphysics Involved:

1. By the Nature of the Body-Mind Problem

The problem of the relation of body and mind involves both metaphysics and science, as we have noted in the preceding Chapter. It is true, of course, that one can consider the problem from the point of view of science alone. The attempt to do so has been made more than once, and, doubtless, will be made again. Yet even superficial examination should convince one of the futility of such a one-sided attack. As we have pointed out, the scientific facts are patently insufficient for a full and satisfactory solution. The mechanics of the brain is but slightly understood, and many of the factors involved in the body-mind relation are such as to defy empirical observation, probably for all time to come. Furthermore, such facts as are indisputably available do not thus far admit of a purely scientific hypothesis, without resort to metaphysical presuppositions. So far as we may judge, this must continue indefinitely to be the situation.

We must hold, therefore, in spite of Huxley and the more

recent behaviorists, that the investigation of body-mind relations is not a strictly scientific problem. For even a tentative or hypothetical solution, metaphysics must be brought to bear. Its attempted exorcism, through the use of the label "scientific," is all too familiar, and completely unsuccessful; as indeed it must be, in the nature of the case. Consequently, it is of much importance to set forth clearly, in the introduction, that conception of the relations of science to metaphysics which is to govern our procedure and judgments throughout this study. Confusion or uncertainty at this point is sure to result in distortion and misjudgment.

2. By Criticisms of Marshall's Dissertation

But more specifically, the relations of science to metaphysics are important in view of our criticisms of Dr. Marshall's dissertation. These criticisms, as we shall see later, turn largely about his apparent failure to distinguish the two standpoints in the work of James Ward; whereas, on the other hand, so far as I am able to judge, Ward himself was never oblivious to the distinction, nor to its fundamental importance.

3. By the Discussion of Secondary Problems

Furthermore, as we take up for critical discussion and evaluation certain problems which crop out as we examine

Ward's body-mind theory, it is essential that we keep in mind the clear distinction between the scientific and metaphysical standpoints. If we do not, we shall be in constant danger of misjudging their speculative or practical significance.

B. Scientific Contributions to Metaphysics

1. The Empirical Basis of Metaphysics

To those of us who live in the modern world - let us say, since the time of Hegel and the English naturalists - it seems perfectly obvious that an empirical knowledge of reality must always precede and underlie metaphysics. The day when men may spin their philosophy out of their own inner consciousness seems gone forever: if, in truth, there ever was such a day! In this sense, then, all modern philosophy is inductive, not purely deductive; and the first fact to recognize, in considering the relation of science to metaphysics, in modern thought, is that a scientific understanding of the world must be the basis for metaphysical systematizing. This is not to deny, of course, that such "a scientific understanding of the world" will, itself, involve metaphysical viewpoint and presuppositions, which must, in their turn, be critically considered.[1] But the important distinction (for our problem)

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1. See below, Sections B, 3, p. 23, and C, 2, p. 24 f.

is that science is strictly limited by the empirical facts, and, in general, must proceed purely inductively. Metaphysics, however, while it must start inductively, from the scientifically ascertained facts, is not so limited, but may build the wider generalizations of its rational systems inductively or deductively, so long as it does not contradict the facts.

2. The Necessity of Complete Accord

But we may go further than we have in the last paragraph. At the basis of all human thinking is the principle of consistency: Hegelians would say, of coherence, or systematic consistency. Consistency, at least, we may regard as a necessary presupposition of reason. If, therefore, we find any contradiction between our science and our metaphysics, we may depend upon it that either our science is faulty or our reasoning is illogical.[1] The second fact upon which we must insist, then, in seeking to understand the relations of science and metaphysics, is that they must, of necessity, be in complete accord. If they disagree, it may be either one or the other that is in error, but, granted that we have a valid reading of experience in our science, then our metaphysics must adjust itself to those facts of experience. This is the important point. As James Ward has well said: "Philosophy is not directly concerned with matters-of-fact: it cannot, of course, contradict experience.[2]"

1. Cf. Brightman, IP, II, 12: p. 58 f.
2. Muirhead, CBP, II, 47. See also Ward's essay "The Progress of Philosophy," EIP, 113-140.

3. The Difficulty of Determining Limits

Taken abstractly, it is easy enough to differentiate science from metaphysics. Practically, however, it is a very difficult matter to draw a sharp line between their respective fields. It is of importance, also, to recognize that a number of practical and vital problems extend into both fields, inevitably. Their solution can be attempted with some hope of success only as this dual nature is kept constantly in mind. The body-mind problem is unquestionably one of those which demand both science and metaphysics in their treatment, as we have pointed out above.[1] Of course, in any case, both <u>will</u> be involved. It is the clear and conscious recognition and distinction of the respective parts which science and metaphysics play in the attempted solution, which is demanded. Confusion in this matter, as we shall see, leads in Marshall's case, at least, to the transmutation of a scientific hypothesis of limited application, into a metaphysical conclusion involving a general principle, of wide implication, with serious consequences for our problem.

C. Metaphysical Presuppositions of Science

1. The Common Failure to Recognize Them

In the sections immediately preceding we have been

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1. <u>Supra</u>, pages 6-8, 21. Cf. 24-25, 134, below.

looking at the problem of the relations of science and metaphysics largely from the ordinary and practical point of view. It is well further to orient ourselves by recognizing that science itself rests back upon certain philosophical presuppositions,having to do with the reality and nature of the physical world, with the knowledge process, with relationships, logic, et cetera. Many, perhaps most, workers in the fields of science are comfortably unconscious of these presuppositions; some go so far, even, as to deny their very existence! The usual point of view of the scientist is that of a refined common sense realism; and so long as he stays strictly within his own field, there is little or no need for him to raise questions about its philosophical substratum. It is only when he attempts to erect his science into an explanation of the universe, and so becomes, in the words of James Ward, "a man of science off his beat, like Haeckel for example,"[1] that the ignoring or denial of his presuppositions is apt to lead the scientist into grave difficulties.

2. Such Presuppositions Often Inescapable

A worker like James Ward in the field of psychology, however, could not rest content with ignoring these more fundamental questions. For he saw clearly that if he did so, there must always remain large and embarrassing gaps in his thinking. And Ward, first-rate scientist though he was, was also too much

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1. ROE, 1.

of a philosopher, and too deeply influenced by Hegelian ways of thinking, permanently to endure such gaps. It is to be put down to his credit, not only that he saw this situation, but that he also very carefully refrained from cluttering up his psychology with metaphysical discussions; and that, further, he did fearlessly and consistently follow out their meaning and bearing in his Gifford Lectures, working out there a coherent philosophy.

Now we noted above that certain problems, like that of the relation of body and mind, cannot be solved by science alone, for they inevitably involve metaphysical considerations. One may borrow, so to speak, from metaphysics, in order to complement or supplement the contributions which science makes toward their solution. Such, in brief, is the attempt at solution made by many students of the body-mind relationship. James Ward does not believe that it is sufficient. He attempts to do more than complement the work of empirical science. His efforts to solve the body-mind problem amount to a critique of all previous and contemporaneous attacks on the problem, and an approach based on a different fundamental metaphysics. This critique and new approach go hand in hand with a strikingly similar critique and new approach to the psychological interpretation of experience. The one seems logically impossible without the other - at least if one is to have a coherent view of human nature and experience. Furthermore, both tie in with Ward's total philosophy, his Weltanschauung and his Naturphilosophie.

D. The Body-Mind Problem and These Relationships

1. Metaphysical Presuppositions of Most Dualisms

The significance of all this discussion of the relations of science and metaphysics may be brought out still more specifically, perhaps, by reference, in a general way, to previous and current attempts to solve the body-mind problem. Almost without exception they fall into one of two classes: (i) those which adopt a dualistic metaphysics, and (ii) those which veer toward metaphysical monism of the singularistic type.

Concerning the dualistic solutions, it is to be noted that in a broad and general way, they depend upon consciously or unconsciously assumed presuppositions. All too often these are adopted or assumed uncritically. James Ward is most thorough and merciless in exposing the short-comings and inadequacies of this type of solution. Here he is indeed at his best.

2. Monism Seems to Ignore Scientific Data

On the other hand, those solutions based upon an underlying singularistic monism seem (speaking again in a broad and general way) to ignore the genuine reality of the plain facts of human experience and the reasonable hypotheses derived from those data. Although, in some respects, more closely related to such attempts, Ward is just as thoroughly critical of these theories, and on just as solid ground in

his criticisms of them.

3. The Necessity for Clear Distinctions

The conclusion of this introductory discussion of the scientific and metaphysical background of the body-mind problem would seem to be this: It is of supreme importance, as we proceed to study the body-mind problem in the thought of James Ward, to "sterilize our verbal instruments by careful definition before we begin;"[1] for much confusion and futility seems to have resulted, historically, from failure to distinguish carefully and to handle properly the scientific and metaphysical factors involved.[2] In particular, we cannot hope to understand the meaning and the bearing of Ward's work, if we fail to see it against the background of this historic confusion and futility.

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1. Bowne, MET, 102.
2. Cf. Ward, in Muirhead, CBP, II, 47.

PART ONE
THE BODY-MIND PROBLEM

CHAPTER FOUR
THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE PROBLEM

A. Body and Soul in the Thought of Aristotle

1. Aristotle's Psychological Viewpoint

In this chapter, it is hardly necessary to say, no attempt is being made to present, even in outline, a complete or comprehensive history of the hundreds of treatments of the body-mind problem by scientists and philosophers from earliest times down to the present. All that we can hope to do is to select a few of the more important and distinctive treatments, particularly those directly influencing Ward's, by way of illustration of the scope of his historical background. We can do no better than to begin where most investigations of Western thought are apt to start: with the work of Aristotle, the great master of ancient scientific philosophy.

Aristotle's point of view in his study of the individual,

De Anima, which is usually regarded as the first scientific treatise on psychology, was primarily objective. He approached the study of mind from the side of the body, and divided bodies into those with and those without life.[1] As might be expected, his psychology is closely related to biology. But it is not biology in the modern sense of the word: Aristotle did not abstract from the aspects of purpose and end, and so the teleological coloring is strong in his work.

2. How Soul and Body are Related

Consequent upon this point of view, we find body and soul as inseparable correlatives. There is no clear recognition of consciousness as the central psychological factor. To understand the meaning of soul we must keep in mind the teleological factor just referred to. Reality, for him, was a teleological process in which potentiality, or matter, is united with determinate form to produce the natural world of animate and inanimate things and persons as we know them. "Nature, like reason," he says, "acts with purpose, and this purpose is its end."[2] Consequently, his conception of soul is somewhat similar to the modern notion of psychological function, yet it includes, also, the metaphysical functions

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1. Ward, PP, 2. Ward has an excellent summary of "Aristotle's Psychology of the Living Organism," PP, 1-6.
2. De Anima, 415b-6.

of form and determination. He tells us that "it is the form (or entelechy) of a natural body endowed with the capacity of life."[1] That it is "an entity which realizes an idea,"[2] or, as Hicks translates the same phrase, "Substance as notion or form." Again, "It is the essential notion which we ascribe to a body of a given kind" - i. e., the "being what it was" or "quidity" (Hicks) of a body. (Greek: τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, a timeless aorist.)[3] ("Quidity" is a scholastic term.)

As to the inseparable relation of this formal soul to body, he leaves us in no doubt:

> Inasmuch as it is the composite which is the animate creature, body cannot be regarded as the complete realization of the soul, but the soul is the realization of a given body...The soul is not itself body, but it is a certain aspect [literally, "something"] of body, and is consequently found in a body, and furthermore in a body of such and such a kind...The soul is a kind of realization and expressed idea of a determinate potentiality.[4]

3. Causal Relationships Involved

We must not, however, suppose that Aristotle's soul is anything purely passive or inefficient. Rather it is to be regarded as an immanent influence, or, to use his own expression, as "the causal principle of the aforesaid (life-) phenomena and is defined in terms of them, I mean, in terms

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1. De Anima, 412a-4, 6.
2. De Anima, 412b-8.
3. Ibid.
4. De Anima, 414a-15-17. (Tr.: Hammond, APS)

of nutrition, sensation, reason, motion."[1] From the point of view of his famous doctrine of the four types of causation, we note that "soul" covers three of them:

> The soul is the cause and principle of a living body. These terms are used in several senses. Corresponding to these differences, the soul is referred to as cause in three distinct meanings; for it is cause in the sense of the source of movement [efficient cause], of final cause, and as the real substance of animate bodies [formal cause.][2]

4. Aristotle on the Intellect

Thus, for Aristotle, there was no separate or disparate "mind" over against body. Mind, as conscious, was apparently one of the factors or elements, in terms of which soul was to be defined. In discussing νοῦς, or intellect, he recognized no organ of intellect, as such. Curiously enough, he looked upon the brain as primarily an organ of refrigeration![3] He distinguished two kinds of reason, active or creative, ὁ ποιητικὸς νοῦς, and receptive or passive, ὁ παθητικὸς νοῦς, but it is questionable as to just what he meant by the distinction. Only in one short chapter[4] is this distinction brought out, and only once does he depart from the use of the simple term, νοῦς. He, himself, nowhere uses the term "the active intellect." So Hicks concludes that it appears "as if he ac-

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1. De Anima, 413b-8.
2. De Anima, 415b-5.
3. De Somno, Chap. III.
4. De Anima, Book III, Chap. V

cepted the essential unity of intellect."[1] And Ward holds that his doctrine of the active intellect is theological rather than psychological.[2] It is important to note that, as psychological, intellect is, for Aristotle, continuous with the lower processes, sensation, imagination and memory, which depend directly on the organism.[3]

B. The Cartesian Dualism

1. Complete Separation of Mind and Matter

The direct antithesis, in many respects, of Aristotle's objective psychology is that of Rene Descartes (1596-1650 A.D.). His method may be described as rationalistic and analytic. In Ward's figure, Descartes was "unmistakably inside the circle which Aristotle regarded mainly from without, and the central unity which we missed in his (Aristotle's) exposition is now clearly indicated."[4] That unity centers in conscious mind. Cogito, ergo sum was the cornerstone of Cartesian thought. The notion of conscious mind precedes that of things, and is more certain. It is entirely distinct and separate from the notion of corporeal things; and it, "as such, could only be

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1. ADA, 498.
2. PP, 4.
3. See, e.g., De Anima, Book II, Chap. III, Cf Ward, PP, 5.
4. PP, 7. Ward has an excellent summary of Descartes's psychology, PP, 6-12.

occupied with eternal truths or 'innate ideas' and with whatever other ideas it might itself frame from these."[1] It was thus immune from all empirical infection. It was pure *res cogitans*.

Over against this *res cogitans* stands an even more impossible analytic concept: that of *res extensa*. Material substance was conceived as having only the nature of extension. All sensible qualities were held as not pertaining to matter, *per se*. Dynamical concepts had to be "smuggled without clear definition or derivation into a physics that professed to be 'nothing but geometry'."[2] Animals were mere machines without souls, and the human body itself, *per se*, was nothing but a machine.[3] Thus Descartes's new definitions of matter and mind bifurcated the world of experience, and foisted upon modern philosophy the dualism which was to make the problems of body-mind and external perception so impossible of solution through the three centuries that followed.

Yet we must be fair to Descartes. His new definitions gave renewed life to both mental and physical sciences. They cleared the intellectual atmosphere. They freed the concept of consciousness from the hazy materialism, and the concept

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1. Ward, PP, 8.
2. Ward, PP, 9.
3. Ibid, where references are given.

of matter from the animism of occult qualities, which had held sway during the middle ages. Furthermore, Descartes, himself, was not blind to the difficulties of his dualism, nor to the unity within experience.

2. Body and Soul a Substantial Unity

But reason, he frankly admitted - even his own method of philosophizing - could not make the duality and unity compatible.

> To me it seems impossible that the human mind should, distinctly and at the same time, conceive the distinctness of body and soul and likewise their union; for so to do, it must conceive them as a single thing while yet conceiving them as two, which is self-repugnant.[1]

Could any one state more clearly the complete impasse of dualism? Yet at the same time he contends that soul and body do become a substantial unity - "ut unum quid cum illo componam" - and, further, he argues that we should have no doubt about the truth of the presentations of other bodies surrounding our own.[2]

3. The Resolution of the Contradictions

Descartes, then, is in the curious position of clearly recognizing that his reasoning is in flat contradiction to

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1. Letter to the Princess Elizabeth, June, 1643. Quoted by Ward, PP, 10.
2. See Ward, PP, 10 for quotations and references.

plain fact, yet still contending that his reasoning is both right and necessary to the true understanding of facts. In such a pass, there was only one recourse, and, naturally - since it was available to him, if not to later generations - he took it. He appealed to the divine omnipotence and veracity, to bring about, in human nature, the unity of complete duality that lay beyond human reason to grasp, and to "guarantee the reality of the material world in human experience."[1] On the basis of this suggestion of Descartes, his disciples, particularly Geulincx and Malebranche, worked out the doctrine of Occasionalism.[2] According to this doctrine, on the occasion of the mental act God produces the physical effect by a direct act of intervention. Thus interaction is accounted for.

C. Dualism after Descartes

1. Locke's Sensation and Reflection

The substantial dualism of Descartes and his disciples was soon metaphysically disowned. Within the next two generations Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677) and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) set the whole course of ontological reasoning in

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1. Ward, PP, 12.
2. Cf. the parallelism of Spinoza, et al., pages 45-48, below.

different channels. But in spite of that, Descartes's influence persisted, particularly upon the epistemological and psychological aspects of philosophy, aided and abetted by the rapid rise of scientific realism. We must now attempt to trace, very briefly, something of this post-Cartesian development of dualism, guided, still, by the suggestions of James Ward, himself.[1]

John Locke (1632-1704), the father of British empirical philosophy and psychology, distinguishes two sources of the ideas which, for him, constitute experience. These he called sensation and reflection. By the former he meant the deliverances of the senses, which, he says, "do convey into the mind several distinct perceptions of things, according to those various ways wherein those [particular sensible] objects do affect them."[2] The latter, "reflection," he defines as "the perception of the operations of our own minds within us, as it is employed about the ideas it has got."[3] He says, further, that though reflection is not sense, "as having nothing to do with external objects, yet it is very like it, and might properly enough be called internal sense."[4]

Note that, although Locke is not concerned primarily

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1. PP, 12-21.
2. Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Bk. II, Chap. 1, Sec. 3
3. Op. cit., II, 1, 4.
4. Op. cit., II, 1, 4.

with metaphysics, and disavows any clear and distinct meaning for the word "substance" as generally used,[1] yet he did not mean at all to deny dualism. He insists that

> We have as clear a notion of the substance of spirit as we have of body...[it is] the substratum to those operations which we experiment in ourselves within...we can no more conclude its nonexistence than we can, for the same reason, deny the existence of body.[2]

2. Kant's External and Internal Senses

The suggestion concerning internal sense which Locke made, but never followed up, was taken over unequivocally by Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). Kant recognized an internal sense as well as an external sense,[3] throughout most of his writings. According to this doctrine, the subject or Ego knows itself as it knows other objects, phenomenally, that is to say. At the same time, Kant holds to the noumenal reality of the self. But the noumena are always, for him, unknowable. Here, indeed, is a most interesting and difficult problem: how "to hold fast to the reality of the self without at the same time repudiating the doctrine of transcendental idealism, i. e. that the self is only 'given' by an inner sense and so

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1. Op. cit., I, 4, 19.
2. Op. cit., II, 23, 5.
3. KrV, A-38, B-68, 69, 152-160, etc. See Ward, SOK, 139-174, for a careful study, fully documented, of the Inner Sense and Subject in Kant.

is phenomenal."[1] In a lengthy passage in Paragraphs 24 and 25 of the Second Edition of the Kritik der reinen Vernunft[2] Kant attempts vainly to solve this riddle.

The whole problem is one of exceeding difficulty, and largely outside of the scope of the body-mind problem. In relation to the latter we should note these two facts: first, that Kant was still, for the most part, on the level of dualism and his epistemological difficulties root back in that, to a large extent. Secondly, however, he did attain to the recognition of the universal subject-object duality of experience, which, for Ward,[3] becomes the key to the whole problem.

3. Dualism of Phenomena, as in Hamilton

This "dualism of phenomena"[4] represented in Kant's external and inner sense doctrine, had its counterpart in the thought of the Scottish philosophers of common sense. Less cautious here than Kant, they did not hesitate to draw the logical metaphysical conclusions. This Scottish school strongly influenced British thought of the last century, and it was, in part, in contradiction to their dualistic strain

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1. Ward, SOK, 163.
2. KrV, B-152-160, Meiklejohn's translation, pages 88-91.
3. See SOK, 151-152, 156. Cf. PP, 14-16.
4. Ward, PP, 14.

that Ward developed his pluralistic monism. The inherent dualism is clear, e. g., in the following passage from the Metaphysics of Sir William Hamilton (1788-1856),

> Mind and matter, as known and knowable, are only two different series of phenomena or qualities; mind and matter as unknown and unknowable, are the two substances in which these two different series of qualities are supposed to inhere. The existence of an unknown substance is only an inference we are compelled to make, from the existence of known phenomena; and the distinction of two substances is only inferred from the seeming incompatability of the two series of phenomena to coinhere in one.[1]

In passing we should note also that this common sense philosophy lay back of much of the British naturalism which Ward is attempting to controvert in the first volume of his Naturalism and Agnosticism.

4. Dualism in Experience, as in Bain

One of the leading psychologists of the generation preceding that of James Ward was Alexander Bain (1818-1903), who for many years was Professor of Logic and English at the University of Aberdeen. Although associated, therefore, with the Scottish philosophers, he represents a long step away from common sense realism. His dualism is no longer that of substances, nor even of phenomena as implying substances. "The arguments for the two substances," he contends, "have... now entirely lost their validity."[2] He continues,

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1. Hamilton, LOM, I, 138. Quoted by Ward, PP, 14, n. 2.
2. Bain, MAB, last paragraph.

> The one substance, with two sets of properties, two sides, the physical and the mental - a double-faced unity - would appear to comply with all the exigencies of the case...and the momentary glimpse of Aristotle is at last converted into a clear and steady vision.[1]

Instead of the metaphysical monism we might expect from this statement, however, Bain's "one substance" turns out to be conscious existence, states of mind, experience in the cognitive sense. There is both the phenomenalism and the positivism of Hume in his thought:

> There is no possible knowledge of the world except in reference to our minds. Knowledge means a state of mind; the notion of material things is a mental thing. We are incapable of discussing the existence of an independent material world; the very act is a contradiction.[2]

Yet, nevertheless, he finds within this total mental life a definite and inescapable division into "a something knowing and a something known," or "the subject consciousness" and "the object consciousness." Both are "modes of self" in the largest sense of that term, but the object consciousness "is our external world, our non-ego," the subject consciousness "is our ego, or mind proper."[3] Although completely disparate - "between the world and mind there is no comparison, the things are not homogeneous"[4] - they are yet, for him,

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1. Loc. cit.
2. Bain, SAI, 378.
3. Bain, SAI, 378, 379, 381, 385.
4. Op. cit., 383.

nothing but different states of consciousness: "The only adequate expression," he tells us, "is a CHANGE OF STATE: a change from the state of the extended cognition to a state of unextended cognition."[1] The distinction is clear, for example, if we contrast the experience of a hot stove with that of pain. This distinction, this dualism within experience, is the final word and can never be transcended. As might be expected, presentationism of this Humian sort necessarily results in a flat denial of any metaphysical self or subject of experience: the objective-subjective dualism is entirely <u>within</u> experience, ultimate though Bain regards that dualism.[2]

D. Naturalism and Agnostic Monism

1. Ward's Analysis of Naturalism

In the associationism, or (as Ward calls it[3]) the presentationism of Alexander Bain, we have one of the contemporary elements in the historical background of Ward's thought. Another contemporary factor in that background we may call naturalistic agnostic monism. It was represented by such philosophers as Thomas Henry Huxley (1825-1895) and Herbert Spencer (1820-1903). The long battle between these thinkers

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1. Bain, MAB, 137.
2. See Bain, EAW, 492. Cf. Ward, ROE, 289-291.
3. PP, 70; ROE, 290; etc.

and their idealistic opponents forms an interesting chapter in the history of human thought. Not the least on the side of idealism were the personalists, Borden P. Bowne and James Ward. Again, however, to deal with this struggle adequately would take us far afield. Suffice it here to note, first, Ward's analysis of naturalism as he found it, and, secondly, the relation of this scientific and philosophical creed to the body-mind problem.

Ward finds that the naturalism of the 19th Century, expressed in the writings of Huxley, Spencer, and the scientists of that day, rests back upon three fundamental theories, the combined constituent principles of which were supposed to account fully for the unity, completeness and reality of nature as revealed by science.[1] Let us glance at each of these in turn:

(i) The theory of the mechanical explanation of all reality holds that the universe is, in the last analysis, a vast mechanism, and that all reality could be accounted for on the basis of masses in motion and natural laws, if only we knew enough. The science of abstract dynamics is at the basis of this theory.

(ii) The theory of evolution, on the basis of the law of the survival of the fittest and natural selection, is held

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1. NAA, I, p. ix, 40, etc.

to be sufficient to account for all the phenomena of living organisms.

(iii) The theory of psychical epiphenomena is held to account for the phenomena called mental. According to this theory mental events are the non-effective correlatives of certain physical events.

2. Naturalism and Monism

The earlier naturalists, in so far as they were more than scientists, were dualistic in their philosophy. But as the difficulties and inconsistencies of this naturalistic counterpart of the old Cartesian dualism became apparent, naturalism was driven, eventually, to embrace a neutral, agnostic monism. Without abandoning the mechanistic conceptions involved, the old materialism is sloughed off, and the natural world, physical and mental, is regarded as the expression of an unknown and unknowable substance. This is the position of Huxley, Spencer and many of the scientists and lesser philosophers of the latter half of the last century.

3. The Status of Mind

The important point to note concerning this naturalistic monism, in relation to the body-mind problem, is its conception of mind. In the words of Huxley,

> ...Our mental conditions are simply the symbols in consciousness of the changes which take place auto-

> matically in the organism...To take an extreme illustration, the feeling we call volition is not the cause of the voluntary act, but the symbol of the state of the brain which is the immediate cause of that act.[1]

Thus, while theoretically both body and mind should be regarded as concomitant aspects of one underlying reality, as a matter of fact the logical urge is to make one side or the other predominant. With naturalistic writers like Huxley and Du Bois-Reymond, "the lapse is always to the side of subordinating the psychical to the physical."[2] Thus it is that the parallelistic theories of body-mind relation worked out by these writers are called "conscious automaton" and "psychical epiphenomenon" theories. Ward has well summed up the status of mind in such theories,

> Even if conscious, the automata as part of the continuous mechanism are...powerless to withstand or to control it: consciousness is only comparable to a shadow that incidentally in some mysterious way accompanies their working.[3]

E. Singularistic Monism

1. Varying Forms

Turning from Cartesian dualism and its derivatives, we must take brief account of singularistic monism in relation

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1. Conclusion of article on "Conscious Antomatism." Quoted by Ward, NAA, I, 179.
2. NAA, II, 30, and passim.
3. ROE, 7.

to the body-mind problem. Monism of this kind takes various forms in the thought of different philosophers, according to the interpretation of the One and its relation to the Many. For none of these singularists absolutely deny the Many of experience; and in the thought of some of them the One is scarcely more than an underlying principle of unity or of ultimate explanation. Thus, at one extreme, is Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677), for whom all existents, mental or physical, consisted only of modifications of the attributes of the one Substance, God.[1] At the other extreme is the German philosopher who was so influential in the thinking of Ward, Rudolph Hermann Lotze (1817-1881). Lotze starts from the point of view of the Many, and is driven to the singularistic explanation only by what he conceives to be the impossibility of casual interaction on any other basis.[2] Between the extremes is Georg W. F. Hegel (1770-1831), for whom the One is absolute Idee and absolute process, "the final goal of things only because it is also their creative principle."[3] Hegel unites the One and the Many in his "concrete universal," "the divine Idee, or 'all-enfolding' nature of things, the true genus within which all individual facts fall,"[4] and of which,

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1. Spinoza, Ethics, Part I.
2. Ward, ROE, 215-224.
3. Weber, HOP, 512.
4. Royce SMP, 224. Lecture VII, "Hegel," 190-227. Cf. Hegel, ENC, pars. 213-215, 235-237.

we may add, they are the manifestation or actuality at the level of our human understanding.

2. Body-Mind Solution

But whatever form singularistic monism assumes, in the last analysis its solution of body-mind relations is the same. Ontologically, there are not two realities, but one. For, as Hegel says,

> Denn in der Tat, wenn beide als absolut Selbstandige gegeneinander vorausgesetzt werden, sind sie einander ebenso undurchdringlich, als jede Materie gegen eine andere undurchdringlich und nur in ihrem gegenseitigen Nichtsein, ihren Poren, befindlich angenommen wird...[1]

So on the level of empirical fact, he contends, "dass sie ein unbegreifliches Geheimnis sei," and no answer save that "of all the philosophers" - he mentions, specifically Descartes, Malebranche, Spinoza and Leibniz - can be given. These, he says,

> Haben sämtlich Gott als diese Beziehung angegeben, und zwar in dem Sinne, dass die Endlichkeit der Seele und die Materie nur ideelle Bestimmungen gegeneinander sind und keine Wahrheit haben, so dass Gott bei jenen Philosophen, nicht bloss, wie oft der Fall ist, ein anderes Wort für jene Unbegreiflichkeit ist, sondern vielmehr als die allein wahrhafte Identität derselben gefasst wird.[2]

Similar passages might be quoted from any or all of the

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1. ENC., Par. 389, which see for Hegel's own summary treatment of the body-mind relation.

2. Loc. cit. Cf. Spinoza, Ethics, Part II, Props. X, XI, XII, XIII; Lotze, MET, Vol. II, Bk. III, Chap. I, and Paragraphs 277-307; Royce, SMP, 417-419; Bradley, AAR, Chap. XXIII, 295-358.

singularistic monists, but few have set forth the essential points more concisely than Hegel in the passage of the Philosophie des Geistes from which these excerpts have been taken; although it may well be questioned whether all the philosophers, even all of those he mentions, would subscribe to his interpretation of those essential points.

As to the causal interrelations of body and mind, singularism would seem to be strictly limited to unbroken parallelism, since body and mind are but different aspects of one reality. With regard to the freedom or efficiency of the unified self or individual, however, we find a wide range of opinion, from the absolute determinism of Spinoza to the "fragmentary" freedom of Royce,[1] depending on the conception of the nature of the One and the significance of the Many.

F. Pluralistic Idealism

Still another element, and a most important one, in the historical background of our problem, is the pluralistic monism of Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz (1646-1716). The universe, for Leibniz, consisted of a vast collection of activistic, psychic beings or monads, each of which, with varying degrees of perfection, mirrored the rest of the uni-

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1. Cf. Spinoza, Ethics, Props. XXIX, XXXII; Royce, SMP, 428-434; and below, Chap. Five, Secs. C, D.

verse, but had no really effective relations with other monads. "The Monads have no windows through which anything may come in or go out."[1] The individual, plant, animal or human, consisted of a group of monads forming the body, and a dominating entelechy, which is the soul in animals and men.[2] But the "domination" is, for Leibniz, purely phenomenal - a "mirroring" process. Soul and body act each in accordance with the laws of its own realm or nature: the soul "in accordance with the laws of final causes through (its) desires, ends and means;" the body follows "the laws of efficient causes or of motion." And each is adjusted to the other "in virtue of the preestablished harmony between all substances, since they are all representations of one and the same universe."[3] Leibniz sums up the matter as follows,

> According to this system bodies act as if (to suppose the impossible) there were no souls at all, and souls act as if there were no bodies, and yet both body and soul act as if the one were influencing the other.[4]

A century after Leibniz (whose Nouveaux Essais sur L'Entendement Humain, written in 1704, was not published until 1765) Johann Friedrich Herbart (1776-1841) applied the idea of activism in psychology. The soul, for him, was a real quantity of energy which is being continuously expended in maintaining the unity of the soul against impressions. Herbart

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1. Leibniz, Monadology, Sec. 7.
2. Op. cit., Secs. 70-72.
3. Op. Cit., Secs. 78-79.
4. Op. Cit., Sec. 81.

and his disciples, especially W. F. Volkmann, were influential in the general psychological thought of Ward. Another pluralistic idealist, of the generation just preceding that of Ward, was the disciple of Kant, Charles Renouvier (1818-1903). Although a pluralist and a personalist, Renouvier's influence on Ward was not as great as that of Lotze or the Herbartians. This is doubtless due, in part, to Renouvier's thorough-going phenomenalism, which was contradictory to the realistic bias of Ward's metaphysical thought. Body and mind are, for Renouvier, phenomenally real. Phenomena are reality. Although Ward is insistent upon recognizing phenomena as real in the sense that they cannot be dismissed as merely subjective, yet their reality is for him always the result in consciousness of the psychic activity which is the ultimate ontological reality.[1]

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1. Cf. below, Chap. Seven, Sec. B, 3.

CHAPTER FIVE
WARD'S CRITICISM OF BODY-MIND THEORIES

A. Qualitative Dualism

1. It Involves a Questionable Analysis

Moving on toward a consideration of the contribution to the solution of the body-mind problem which James Ward offers, it is necessary, first of all, to note briefly his attitude toward dualistic and singularistic solutions of the ontological problem. As we have seen in Chapter Four, modern philosophy (and modern science, also) had its rise in the qualitative dualism of Descartes. Ward was strongly of the opinion that this dualism was directly or indirectly responsible for many of the errors and difficulties of modern philosophy. In particular, he wrote:

> These two problems - the relation of body and mind and the reality of external perception - have continued to vex philosophic thinkers from Descartes' day to our own, nor will they cease to trouble us till dualism is laid to rest.[1]

We may summarize Ward's criticism of the dualism of matter and mind in three points. The first of these is that such dualism involves and rests back upon a faulty and unwarranted analysis of the facts. Descartes, to whom this analysis is traced, was incurably rationalistic. The purely analytic and rational concepts which he arrived at,

1. PP, 12.

as he dissected his own cognitions, he erected into two distinct and disparate substances, res cogitans and res extensa, as we have seen.[1] Even though his successors more or less rejected or ignored the metaphysical assumptions and implications involved, still they were handicapped "by the defective analysis of the facts of mental life, which they took over from Descartes;"[2] an analysis which found a substantial matter-mind dualism within the psychological data.

In addition to this direct criticism of dualism as based on "the reification of abstractions"[3] abstractly arrived at, Ward is at great pains to account for the rise and plausibility of dualistic thought. The second and third points of his criticism of qualitative dualism, as commonly held, are to be found in these two explanations which he sets forth: (a) the fallacy of naive realism in its development of "the notion of the transsubjective." The common man, recognizing that the sun,e.g., is independent of individuals, severally, concludes that "it is and remains an object independently of them all collectively."[4] This is one step toward dualism. The second step is (b) what Richard Avenarius termed "introjection:" the reading into the experience of others, then back into one's own experience, of what we may call a

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1. PP, 6-11. Supra, Chap. Four, Sec. B.1.
2. PP, 13. Ward does not except Locke and Kant from this indictment.
3. NAA,11, 170.
4. NAA, II, 170-171.

subjective copying[1] of the external environment - a copying which is <u>not</u> evident in our own experience. Thus, quite naturally,

> ...we are induced to construe our own experience on the lines of a false but highly plausible assumption as to others' experience, which actually contradicts our own...With this contradiction and the fallacy of naive realism just now referred to, dualism is essentially complete.[2]

2. It is Metaphysically Unstable

However strongly and deeply dualism may seem to be intrenched in common sense, as a metaphysical theory it has proven inadequate and unstable. From the point of view of experience, as Ward says,

> Make two mutually exclusive halves out of the one concrete world: in the one you will find only your own so-called subjective states and have to become a solipsist; in the other the organisms you would find there you could call only automata at the best.[3]

Carry such a bifurcation of nature to its rigorous metaphysical conclusions, and, according to Ward, it leads, inevitably, to mutually inconsistent conceptions, which point the way to monism. To set forth this process is one of the chief aims of his <u>Naturalism and Agnosticism.</u> In these lectures he not only exposes the instability of dualism, but also traces out other weaknesses and inadequacies of naturalistic

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1. Ward does not use this term.
2. NAA, II, 172-173. Note the whole Lecture XVI, "The Rise of Dualism."
3. ROE, 7.

dualism and its logical descendant: agnostic monism.

From the point of view of our discussion we should note particularly that, for Ward, there is no crossing of the "ugly broad ditch"[1] between the body (regarded as matter) and mind, on the level of dualism. It is this, especially, which drives us toward monism, and is therefore at the basis of the logical instability of metaphysical dualism. For Ward is convinced that sensation, conation, and volition are not merely subjective[2] and that interaction is a fact that must be accounted for.

3. It has Epistemological Difficulties

And of course, therefore, Ward is clearly cognizant of the epistemological difficulties of any real dualism. Sensation is a fact, and it means (for Ward at least, as we have just said) that there is in this process a real crossing of the apparent "ditch," and not merely "subjective modifications."[3] How this can be: how there can be any knowledge of the one realm by the other (aside from some miraculous occasionalism such as that of the Cartesians) on an ontologically dualistic level, Ward cannot see. He does not deny that there is a "ditch" to cross (he holds to epistemological

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1. This phrase is cited by Ward, NAA,II,101. Source not given.
2. See, e.g., his discussion of subjectivity and objectivity, ROE, 122-124.
3. See ROE, 260; PP, 104-105.

dualism), but he contends that if the "ditch" is ontological, as well as epistemological, then it never could be crossed without miracle. This then is the meaning of his statement that "these two problems - the relation of body and mind and the reality of external perception - " will not "cease to trouble us till dualism is laid to rest."[1]

B. The Theory of Psychical Epiphenomenalism

1. Definition and Status

Closely related to the doctrine of metaphysical dualism, which Ward criticized so devastatingly in the ways we have just indicated, is the theory of psychical epiphenomenalism. As we have already noted,[2] this is one of the fundamental principles "on which the supposed unity and completeness of the 'full-orbed reality that modern science sets before us' depends."[3] In substance it is the theory that mind is nothing but an ineffective collateral product of certain physical series of events. Although theoretically and historically it was associated with the agnostic, naturalistic monism of such thinkers as Huxley and Spencer, its roots are in the old Cartesian dualism, as

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1. PP, 12.
2. Supra, Chap. Four, Sec. D,1.
3. NAA, I, ix.

Ward points out;[1] for its speculative basis is the complete disparateness of mind and matter. It is "but the scientific counterpart of that occasionalism to which the followers of Descartes were driven" to account for body-mind relations.[2]

In the thought of Huxley, this doctrine took the form of the "conscious automaton theory." In the words of Huxley, as we saw,[3] according to this theory, "Our mental conditions are simply the symbols in consciousness of the changes which take place automatically in the organism." Huxley has taken Descartes's theory of animal nature and moved it up one step, to explain the nature of mind, and the relation of mind to body. The mental series is only an impotent shadow which always accompanies the physical series, but without there being any causal connection between them.[4]

2. Epistemological Criticisms

In addition to the general criticisms Ward leveled against dualism, and which apply to this theory of body-mind, we may note several particular epistemological criticisms. In the Britannica article Ward states "two fatal objections

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1. NAA, II, 6.
2. Ibid.
3. Supra, Chap. Four, Sec. D,3.
4. NAA, II, 36-38.

to the conscious automaton theory." One of them is that "the assumption is epistemologically unsound." For, Ward contends, "The order implied in the distinction of physical phenomena and psychical epiphenomena is contrary to all experience and indefensible."[1]

Further, Ward insists that "a complete refutation" of the naturalistic premises of the theory is to be attained by asking how, from the standpoint of the kind of consciousness involved in the theory, any knowledge of the independent mechanical system is to be accounted for? How, from the naturalistic standpoint, again, can it be known that consciousness is concomitant with certain mechanical motions?[2]

3. Psychological Criticisms

Again, from a psychological standpoint, Ward levels several criticisms at this theory. In the Britannica section just referred to, his other "fatal objection" is that the theory "is methodologically unsound: its psychology is physiology in the bad sense." Psychological facts, Ward insists, cannot be presented in physical terms. There is no place in this theory for volition, or activity.[3]

And activity "is prima facie an ultimate and constitu-

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1. EB, 11th Ed., vol. xxII, 602.
2. ROE, 6-7.
3. EB, 11th Ed., vol. XXII, 602.

tive fact of our daily experience and of its historical development." If illusory, how did that illusion arise? This activity, Ward contends, it is impossible to account for on the basis of "mass that is inert and motions that are reversible."[1]

C. Singularistic Monism

1. It Necessitates Rigid Determinism

The method of James Ward, both as a scientist and as a philosopher, was to begin with experience exactly as he found it. Now in experience, he contends, "we find not indeed a dualism of material phenomena and mental phenomena, but a duality of object presented and subject affected, of subject striving and object attained."[2] Furthermore, as he proceeds to interpret this deliverance of experience it is clear that, for him, subject and object must be regarded as grounded in the metaphysically real; and neither they nor the interaction implied are to be dismissed as mere phenomena. The affection of subject by object and the striving and attainment by the subject must be interpreted in terms of immediate causal efficiency and positive freedom.[3]

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1. ROE, 7-8. NAA, II, 41-64.
2. ROE, 10. Underlining is mine.
3. See below, Chap. Six, Secs. C,1,b,c; C,3.

Contradictory to such a view of the world must be every singularistic monism: for such a monism, in the last analysis, must reduce individual mind and body to modifications, or phenomena. The logical terminus of such a doctrine, must be a rigid determinism, as Spinoza rightly saw, and in so far as real freedom and individual mental efficiency are posited, singularism is superseded.[1]

2. It Rules Out Interaction

But, further, singularistic monism rules out, not merely real freedom, but also any real causal interaction - "transeunt action," as Lotze called it. Unquestionably, in experience, we do "know" such determination of one body by another,[2] and common sense extends that concept to bodies other than our own. Lotze, however, found this common concept so unthinkable, that he was driven to singularism, in which there is no real transeunt action, interaction being but an appearance of modes of the One.[3]

3. The Facts and Significance of Activity and Conation

The significance of these two logical facts about singularism (that it makes freedom impossible and rules out

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1. Supra, 48, n.1.
2. ROE, 288.
3. See ROE, 215-216.

transeunt action) becomes clearer when we see that for Ward the fundamental notion of metaphysics is activity. He says, "Leibniz, for good and all, as I believe, started philosophy on a better track by making activity, not substantiality or reality, the fundamental idea."[1] And again, "Quod non agit non existit, said Leibniz, too."[2] Add to this the facts that conative activity, not cognition, is for Ward the central feature of experience; and that the world, for him, is primarily a "realm of ends,"[3] and Nature "a plurality of conative individuals;"[4] and it is clear that his whole system stands or falls with the reality of free individual activity and genuine plural interaction. These singularism must logically deny.

D. The Double Aspect Theory

1. Its Speculative Background

And now let us see how Ward dealt with the theory of body-mind relations which most naturally follows from singularistic speculation. This is the doctrine known as the double aspect theory. In substance it is the belief that body and mind and their intimate parallelism are to be explained on the basis that body and mind are but two sides

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1. EIP, 297.
2. Ibid.
3. ROE, 13.
4. ROE, 21.

or two aspects of the same single reality. As is clear, if that one reality is really physical, this theory becomes epiphenomenalism. Historically, also, agnostic monism, as we have seen, veered toward epiphenomenalism. But the double aspect theory, historically, is most often associated with idealistic monism, from Spinoza's day on down to the present. In the case of the more definitely singularistic monists, the one reality is conceived in terms of the metaphysical substance posited. More realistic and pluralistic monists lean toward doctrines of "mind-stuff." Spinoza, Schopenhauer and Bradley might be cited as illustrations of the former; W. K. Clifford and Morton Prince are recalled as prominent advocates of "mind-stuff" doctrines. Ward's criticisms, for the most part, are valid against either type. We may note, in passing, that Ward recognized this theory, at least in its more usual Spinozistic form, as "altogether less absurd" than epiphenomenal theories.

2. The Meaning of "Aspect"?

In addition to the general speculative criticisms directed at singularistic monism, Ward attacked the double aspect theory from two directions, chiefly. First,[1] he raises the question of the meaning of "aspect". What is "difference

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1. For second direction of attack, see next Section, p.62, below.

of aspect" due to? To difference of standpoint, or difference in the reality itself? The theory, he claims, "plays fast and loose" at this point.[1] If the answer be given that the underlying reality is unknown and unknowable, then the theory lays itself open to criticism as being an unwarranted assumption, made "simply because...the impossibility of causal connexion being taken as established...no other alternative remains."[2] If the attempt be made to posit a "mind-stuff" as in Clifford's thought, then Ward contends that "mind-stuff" inevitably becomes "matter-stuff over again" and one is back in conscious automatism.[3] For Clifford asserts that "reason, intelligence, and volition are properties of a complex which is made up of elements themselves not rational, not intelligent, not conscious."[4] To which "maze of psychological barbarism" Ward replies that,

> The assertion that new properties arise from any mere complication or conjunction of elements is never justifiable, least of all in such a case as this...(For) even things-in-themselves, if they are 'not rational, not intelligent, not conscious,' can neither have the motive nor the power nor the skill to group themselves and take each other's pictures.[5]

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1. EB, 11th Ed., vol. XXII, 601. Cf. NAA, II, 18.
2. EB, 11th Ed., vol. XXII, 601. Cf. NAA, II, 18.
3. NAA, II, 13-17. W. K. Clifford, "On the Nature of Things-in-themselves," LAE, 274-286. Cf. Prince, NMH. Cf. also Royce, SMP, 300-304.
4. Op. cit., 286.
5. NAA. II, 15, 17.

3. The Assumption of Parallelism

Let us note, next, Ward's second line of attack on double aspect parallelism. This is concerned with the assumption that the impossibility of causal connection between body and mind is thoroughly established; i.e., the theory of complete parallelism. Interaction, Ward holds, is not *prima facie* contradictory nor absurd. Further, he contends, "such a universal negative" as that embraced by complete parallelism cannot be sustained by empirical evidence. The meaning of "parallelism" is far from clear, for, though the physical series can be rather definitely defined, the psychical series is in a different case. And granted that the two series can be definitely defined and the meaning of parallelism made clear, how are such problems as sensation, volition, apparent interaction, to be solved on the basis of two absolutely disparate series?[1] Epistemologically, it seems that the double aspect theory "short-circuits" but does not solve these problems.

E. The Status of the Body-Mind Problem

1. Alternatives in Ward's Day

And, now, before examining Ward's own system and its

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1. EB, 11th Ed., vol. XXII, 601. NAA, II, Chaps. XI, XII. Cf. Pratt, MAS, 167, and *passim*; and Laird, OMB.

solution, we must pause a moment to look at the status of the body-mind problem as Ward took up his work. We should remind ourselves, first of all, that in Ward's day modern psychology, as we know it, was just at the birth. Ward himself, in the theoretical field, was one of the pioneers. Experimental psychology was in its very beginnings. Associationism of the older sort was in its heyday, and the keen observations and analyses of behaviorism were yet to come. If all this is kept in mind, we shall approach Ward's reanalysis of experience with a deeper appreciation and a lively respect for his keenness and accuracy. On the scientific side there were no alternatives, practically speaking. It was a question of working out a new conception of experience, or of leaving the body-mind problem as he found it.

On the philosophical side, as we have seen, there seemed to be two alternatives, both of which Ward found unsatisfactory: attenuated Cartesian dualism and Spinozistic monism (singularism) of one form or the other. Modern pluralism, pragmatic and realistic, was just about to come into being, along with the various forms of personalistic pluralism. Again, Ward was one of the earliest pioneers.

It will be worthwhile to set down here, also, the possibilities with respect to parallelism and causal

relationship, as Ward sums them up, in the Brittanica article,[1] for such a summary will enable us to see the problem somewhat as Ward saw it, half a century ago, before the days of modern psychology and the new realism, with their closely-reasoned and exhaustive analyses.[2]

2. Parallelism, As Ward Saw It

Ward carefully distinguished three types of body-mind parallelism, which are often confused. There is first of all what he called "psychoneural parallelism," and which he maintained was "a well established fact."[3] This is the general fact that "in development and efficiency, in the intensity and complexity of their processes, mind and brain keep invariably and exactly in line together." Ward regarded this kind of parallelism as simply one of the empirically given factors in the problem, to be accounted for. He did not believe that this implied or necessitated the assumption of a point for point (one to one) correspondence of the mental and physical series.

Secondly, he recognized a methodological or physiological-psychological parallelism, which he held to be entirely

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1. EB, 11th Ed., vol. XXII, 600-601.
2. Cf., for example, Broad's analysis in MPN, with Ward's summary in EB(on which these next two sections are based).
3. Unless otherwise indicated, refer to EB, 11th Ed. vol. XXII, 600-601, for quotations and points in this and the next section.

valid within the field of science. According to this, psychology and physiology set up a working agreement, and each stayed on its own side of the fence, studying its own type of facts. It is only when this sort of parallelism is extended beyond being a methodological rule or agreement that trouble arises.

And thirdly, Ward recognized, and consistently opposed, psychophysical parallelism proper. This doctrine involves the point for point parallelism of mental and physical facts, plus the assumption of absolute separation or lack of causal relations between the series. It is this latter type of parallelism which is embodied in the conscious automaton and double aspect theories.

3. Causal Relation, as Ward Saw It

As James Ward looked over the various body-mind theories of his day, he found four theories of causal relation between body and mind expressed in them. First, there was interaction as posited by common sense and the cruder types of naturalism. Secondly, there was occasionalism, as held by Cartesian dualism and its derivatives, by which interaction was accepted and explained on the basis of divine activity exercised on the occasion of the mental event incident to the effecting or affected physical event. Thirdly, there was the

"pre-established harmony" of Leibniz, which Ward regarded as of a kind with occasionalism, the difference being that for Leibniz God created the monads without windows and then took on himself the function of supplying their place all at once, rather than continuously.[1] And finally, of course, Ward recognized what he called "Spinozistic monism," by which he meant absolute lack of any real causal relation between the body and the mind.

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1. ROE, 260.

CHAPTER SIX
WARD'S SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM

A. Ward's Reanalysis of Experience

1. The Primacy of Experience

Finding, then, that the dualism of his day was inadequate to the facts, and that singularistic monism, the only alternative which seemed open to him, ends in the "blind alley" of determinism, Ward set about the re-examination of the facts, and the building of a metaphysics which would support them. This was the task of a life-time, and, naturally, covered a far wider scope than that of the problem of this dissertation. However, we cannot hope to grasp his solution of the body-mind problem unless we have some idea of the general nature of his work and thought. This latter falls naturally into two divisions: the psychological reanalysis of experience, and the metaphysical hypotheses which resulted in his monadism.

At the risk of monotony we must reiterate, here at the beginning of our summary examination of his reanalysis, the primacy of experience, for Ward. Few philosophers have been

more insistently empirical than he. It is not surprising, therefore, that he writes, concerning psychological method:

> If it be a sound maxim to proceed from the known to the unknown, then Analytic Psychology, starting from human experience should precede any attempt to treat of the genesis of experience as a whole, or to correlate psychology with physiology.[1]

And again,

> But in truth there is no question of a choice of methods: in every case physiological and comparative psychology must fall back on the facts and analogies of our own experience.[2]

He is not very anxious to offer a definition of psychology, for he contends it cannot be defined by reference to a subject matter, as can concrete sciences like botany or mineralogy.[3] Nevertheless, when, finally, he makes the venture he writes:

> Psychology then we define as the science of individual experience - understanding by experience not merely, not primarily, cognition, but also, and above all, conative activity or behavior.[4]

With experience thus primary in his psychology, it is not unnatural that his metaphysics, too, should be through and through experiential and activistic. Note the term "individual experience." Ward never made the mistake of substituting a capital E for the notion of individual ownership. When he does use "Experience," it is but to indicate

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1. PP, 25-26.
2. PP, 26.
3. PP, 26.
4. PP, 28.

experience common to and owned by a number of individuals: experience has no meaning, for him, apart from the experience of individuals.

Furthermore Ward never made the mistake, which he felt many philosophers have made, of imagining that they could literally "begin at the beginning."[1] That is out of the question, he holds; "but we must start where alone reflexion on experience can arise, at the level of self-consciousness."[2]

2. The One and the Many in Experience

And what does he find in experience, at that level? Most certainly he does not find the One, either as Absolute Subject or as Absolute Object. The standpoint of our human experience is always pluralistic. The world does not immediately confront us "as one Mind, nor even as the manifestation of one Mind."[3]

Yet, on the other hand, within each individual experience there is an organic unity, and within that unity an ever-present duality of self and not-self, of subject and object. Upon this "duality in unity" he insists, over and over again.[4] It is not too much to say that it is the crux of his reanalysis.

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1. See article "'In the Beginning'," EIP, 277-302.
2. ROE, 51-52. Cf EIP, 279-283.
3. ROE, p.v.
4. E.g., PP, 30, 31, 33, etc.; ROE, 10, 26, 52, etc.; NAA, II, 117-122.

3. Duality in Unity in Experience

This valid dualism which Ward finds in experience is for him always purely experiential in nature. It is not, in any sense, a substantial dualism, such as the Cartesian dualism of matter and mind. Although he recognizes a rough correspondence between the psychological subject and the individuality of the organism, and, again, between the objective continum and the environment, yet he insists they are not to be identified in either case.[1] The metaphysical basis of the experiential dualism is to be understood in the light of his monadism.[2]

4. The Analysis of Experience

a. The Content of Experience

On the basis of this duality in unity of subject and object, Ward proceeds to a detailed analysis of the nature and process of experience. We shall abandon his analytical order, for purposes of this brief and condensed exposition, and begin by imagining an instance of extremely simple experience. An object is presented to a subject. The first, and in some respects the most important fact to notice is

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1. PP, 29-30. Cf. ROE, 10, 26.
2. See, e.g., NAA, II, Chaps. XIV, XV; ROE, 26, 117-130.

that the reception is never really passive, but always reactive and selective.[1] This total reactive activity of the subject of experience (much wider than mere cognitive attention, in the usual sense of the word) Ward calls attention.[2] This "attentive" activity is engaged, so to speak, in three directions: (i) In conscious cognition of the presentation. This presentation is no isolated somewhat, but is in the nature of a change in a totem objectivum or objective continuum.[3] (ii) The "attentive" activity of the subject is also concerned with a purely subjective aspect of experience: feeling. Feeling is not, for Ward, a presentation, for it has no objective side whatever. He contends that we "know of" it, as we "know" "attention." We know them only through their effects, "by certain changes, i. e., which they bring about in the character and succession of our presentations."[4] And (iii) the "attentive" activity is concerned, also, in the third constituent of experience: conation, or conative activity. The object presented causes a feeling of pleasure or pain, which in turn arouses activity in the direction of avoiding painful experience or seeking pleasurable.[5]

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1. PP, 57, 58, 60, etc.
2. Ibid. Note the whole Chapter III, "Theory of Attention," 60-73.
3. PP, 46-51; 76-80; and Chapter Eight of this paper. For a thorough analysis of the continuum, see Marshall, CWP.
4. PP, 57-58; 41-45. Cf, SOK, 143-144.
5. PP, 51-55.

We must not conceive the factors in this primitive conative process in fully cognitive terms, as we would in describing mature consciousness. In a sense, these terms denote purely limiting conceptions of presentation, feeling and conation, far below the level of conscious awareness, as we ordinarily use that term. On the basis of this elementary recognition of the "three distinct and irreducible components, Attention (all activity, including conative activity), Feeling and Objects or Presentations as together constituting one concrete state of mind or psychosis,"[1] Ward proceeds to build up his conception of the development of perception, volition and intellection. Note that his fundamental principle of the duality of subject and object is clear here: on the subject side, "Attention" and "Feeling"; on the object side, "Presentations." Furthermore, he recognizes "two distinguishable - but normally inseparable - forms" of psychoses: those where the "attention" is determined involuntarily, and feeling follows "attention"; and those where the "attention" is determined "voluntarily," i. e., by the subjective feeling which here precedes the "act of attention". The former he calls sensory or receptive, the latter motor or active.[2] On the basis of this division of psychoses, the total objective continuum falls

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1. PP, 57.
2. Ibid.

into two phenomenal divisions, the "sensory continuum" and the "motor continuum."

b. The Subject of Experience

One of the most striking elements of Ward's reanalysis is his insistent recognition of the subject of experience. Experience is always "owned." Nearly all modern psychologists (in common with other scientists) persistently refuse to have anything to do with this "I" of experience. True, it is always assumed, even when it is denied; and Ward is persistent in clearly recognizing its reality, meaning and importance.[1]

About this essential notion of the active subject of experience, the conative individual, Ward builds his doctrine of the growth of self-consciousness and the development of personality, through social intercourse, from earlier stages of merely sentient life.[2] There is built up in the reciprocal interaction or mutuum commercium which is experience, not merely (i) an empirical "Me", composed of "the sensitive and appetitive self" and "the imagining and desiring self",[3] but also, (ii) an "I", an intellectual knowledge of "what we are as experients." "Into the empty 'form of consciousness' our

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1. PP, 34-35, 361, 370, 379, etc. Cf. below, VII, C, 2.
2. PP, Chap. XV; ROE, 120-124, 262-265, 391-393.
3. PP, 365, 366.

being fits," he declares.[1]

c. Body-Mind in Experience

We must not close this summary of Ward's psychological reanalysis of experience without noting that at this level Ward arrives at no solution of the body-mind problem. In a section of the Encyclopedia article (omitted in PP) he discusses certain proposed solutions which he rejects as contradictory to the facts of experience; but, on the positive side, he is compelled to leave the problem "as occasionalism formulates it, ...pending the metaphysical discussion as to the ultimate nature of interaction generally."[2] Psychology then, as such, cannot legitimately transcend an apparent dualistic interactionism, although it can, and in Ward's thought does, criticize the common sense interpretation of that viewpoint.

B. Ward's Monadistic Metaphysics

1. Its Logical and Historical Derivation

Ward, being a philosopher as well as a scientist, could not rest content with a mere psychological reanalysis of experience. Guided always by the light and norm of that

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1. PP, 381. This doctrine of the "pure Ego or Self" is developed in PP, 370-382.
2. EB, 11th Ed., Section 47, "Relation of Body and Mind." See supra, Chap. Five, Sec. E.

experience, he must push on to a doctrine of reality. Logically, this doctrine was determined for him by the necessity he felt of accounting for such elements in experience as the active subject, freedom, transeunt action, interaction of body and mind, and external perception, without, in any sense, denying the reality of these deliverances of experience, as critically understood and determined.

Historically, his metaphysical doctrine rests back, chiefly, on the work of three great predecessors: Leibniz, Kant, and Lotze.[1] The thought of Hegel, also was very influential.[2] In the best sense of the term, Ward is an eclectic. Unlike some great philosophers, he is not the least adverse to acknowledging his indebtedness to these predecessors and others.[3] He makes no claim to originality, yet in the exercise of discrimination and synthesis he did add a not inconsiderable determinative factor of his own.

2. The Monad, According to Ward

Abandoning, again, Ward's order of presentation, let us state summarily his monadistic doctrine of reality. He distinguishes two aspects of the world: that of nature, and that of spirit, or ends. He regards the latter as fundamental,

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1. Ward himself once said, "If I am anything at all, I owe it to two men, Hermann Lotze and Henry Sidgwick." EIP, 92.

2. Note, e.g., PP. 15-16, and Chaps. VII and VIII of ROE

3. See e.g., PP, Chap. I, and Pages 31, 33, 147, 203, etc., ROE, 2, 15-16, 21, 79, 106, 114, 149, etc.

and so interprets nature from the historical or moral, i. e., from a refined anthropomorphic point of view.[1] Those who take this point of view, he tells us,

> Take all their bearings from the historical standpoint and endeavor to work backwards from the facts of human personality and social intercourse. Their mode of thought is frankly, though not crudely, anthropomorphic...[2]

He holds that the world consists fundamentally and originally of a vast plurality of simple or elementary monads, or living agents. The conception of a "bare" monad is, he holds, a limiting conception, similar to the physical "dynamical concept of a mass-point as a center of force. The corresponding psychological concept answers to what Leibniz happily described as mens momentanea seu carens recordatione."[3] Such a monad is marked by immediacy, which, he says, "answers to what psychologists now call pure sensation, an ideal limit to which our simplest experiences never descend."[4] Again, he describes "the concept of the bare monad whose organism, so to say, reduces to a point and its present to a moment; which can only react immediately and to what is immediately given."[5] These bare monads, as well as all the higher types which develop through their interaction, Ward tells us, are to be conceived in terms of our own self-hood:

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1. ROE, 1-3, 28, 52, 71, etc.
2. ROE, 71.
3. ROE, 255. (Ward italicized only one word, as here.)
4. ROE, 256.
5. ROE, 257.

> The self of which we are conscious, then, furnishes us with our first paradigm of what we are to understand by the individuals of our plurality...Even the lowest also will possess whatever be the irreducible minimum essential to being in any sense a subject or self at all.[1]

This "minimum" nature of all monads may be stated in two terms: first, they are perceptive, in the Leibnizian sense that each one is in some sense dimly cognitive of the whole world of monads of which it is an individual, and which thus forms for it its objective continuum or totem objectivum; secondly, they are appetitively conative, each one seeking self-conservation and betterment through seeking pleasurable and, especially, through avoiding painful situations.[2]

3. His Monadology

a. The World

For Ward, then, the entire world is to be conceived in terms of these monads, or activistic psychical individuals. Unlike Leibniz's monads, these have "windows", and, while they mirror the universe, that mirroring and their apparent interaction is not to be explained on the basis of any "pre-established harmony," but are real. In fact, in Ward's thought there are no pre-established laws at all, unless the nature of

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1. ROE, 52.
2. ROE, 54.

the monads themselves be so regarded.[1] Through their interaction, on the analogy of habit, the so-called laws of nature are built up as statistical generalizations. There is, in nature, nothing inanimate, and "no rigorous and mechanical concatenation of things such as naturalism is wont to assume."[2] Again, he writes:

> The so-called interaction of atoms will not account for the contingency displayed in the world; but what we know as the conduct or behaviour of cognitive and conative individuals may, it is contended, explain both the contingency and the uniformity that we find there.[3]

On the basis of this monadistic ontology Ward builds an epigenetic theory of evolution as "creative synthesis," explainable only on the basis of the activity of experiencing subjects. Although later we must examine this important doctrine in more detail, let us here state it in Ward's own words, as briefly as may be. Over against a literal interpretation of "evolution," the epigenetic theory maintains that

> Each new organism is not an 'educt' but a 'product,' to use Kantian phrases; its <u>parts</u> are in no sense present in the embryo but are gradually organized, one after another, in due order, as the term epigenesis implies and as Harvey, who first used the term, prophetically maintained.[4]

This epigenetic theory may be maintained and explained, according to Ward, most easily on the basis of his panpsychic monadism. (On the other hand, epigenesis may justify monadism.)

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1. "And then, indeed," says Ward, "the world would start with as many laws as there are individuals," for he regards each individual as in some sense unique. ROE, 76, 63-64.
2. ROE, 78, 21.
3. ROE, 51.
4. ROE, 98.

The explanation he summarizes in the following passage:

> There is progressive experience at all because there are active individuals, severally *sui generis*, each from its own standpoint bent on working out a *modus vivendi* with the rest...The more experience advances, the more there is of adaptation *of* environment as well as of adaptation *to* environment.[1]

b. The Individual

Now, of course, in the process of this evolution the monads did not all remain separate individuals. Soon some of them began to acquire associates, and so individuals with complex bodies were built up. Within these bodies there is a closer or more intimate *rapport* between constituent monads than between one monad within and another without the body. In the higher, more complex living bodies, at least, we seem driven to positing a "director" or "dominant monad," which we may call a "soul."[2] Such a complex organism is no mere automaton. Regarding the dominant monad, Ward says: "Its dominance must be regarded as due in part at least to its innate or essential superiority, not solely to the accident of its position."[3] In some way, which Ward does not make very clear, that form of experience which we call, commonly, awareness or consciousness belongs, in a special sense, to the dominant

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1. ROE, 106. Note whole Lecture V, "Evolution as Epigenesis and Equilibration," pages 97-116. Cf. Lecture XII, particularly pages 251-254. See below, Chapter Ten.
2. ROE, 207.
3. ROE, 196.

monad of the individual's psychical organism.[1] The conscious subject[2] is to be regarded, therefore, as the psychological equivalent or manifestation of the dominant monad.[1]

c. God

As we begin at the level of our own pluralistic self-consciousness and explore experience in both directions, that of simplicity and that of complexity, we find that both lead beyond the world as we know it. So, Ward holds, theism is a necessary postulate. "How God created the world, how the One is the ground of the Many," he says, "we admit we cannot tell."[3] The existence of the world implies the limitation, but not the "diminution" of God: he is not the "Absolute" or "All," even though all are dependent upon him. He is both transcendent and immanent.

C. Ward's Modified Interactionism

1. Monadism and the Body-Mind Problem

a. Panpsychic Realism

And, now, at last, we are prepared to see how the body-mind problem is to be solved by James Ward, and to consider the arguments he presents for a modified interactionism.

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1. ROE, 462.
2. PP, 34-41.
3. ROE, 443. We have here (442-444) Ward's own summary of his theistic argument, which occupies a large part of the Lectures.

Ward never wrote any lengthy or detailed discussion of the body-mind problem, as such. One section, No. 47, of his Brittanica article dealt with it, as we noted above;[1] and a Supplementary Note, No. III, to The Realm of Ends,[2] takes up some of the details of a monadistic interpretation of body-mind relations. In addition, there are many scattered references to it, and brief discussions of various points, throughout his writings.[3] Perhaps it is not too much to say that it seems to be nearly always in the immediate background of his thinking. We have noted his attitudes toward substantialistic dualism and singularism. In his own metaphysical thinking, as we have seen, he embraced a panpsychic pluralism, although he admitted the possibility of an occasionalistic solution.[4] It is now our task to examine Ward's monadism in relation to the body-mind problem.

Let us begin with his statement that there could be no solution of this problem "till dualism is laid to rest."[5] The problem, for Ward, is deeper than the mere abolition of all real dualism. No "cheap and easy monism"[6] could satisfy his empirical realism. To reduce individual body or mind to the status of the imaginary[7] (as, in the last analysis, all singu-

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1. Supra, 64,f. This section of EB is not included in PP.
2. ROE, 461-467.
3. E.g., ROE, 254, 258; NAA, I, 14, 177; II, 4, 35, 38, 285; PP, 3, 7-11, 423, 441, etc.
4. ROE, 248-265.
5. PP, 12.
6. ROE, 24. Quoted from Bradley, Principles of Logic, 533.
7. "The main antithesis to 'real' is 'imaginary'." EIP, 297.

laristic monisms do) is, for him, quite as impossible as to regard them as substantially different. Consequently, his solution must be that of qualitative monism and quantitative pluralism.

But within the range of this general solution of the problem, there are two further possibilities: those represented by occasionalistic personalism and panpsychic realism. According to the former, the body, in common with the whole "order of nature," has no real existence save in the mind of God. The body, therefore, is to be regarded as the instrumental activity of the divine mind, at work upon the individual minds of other persons. Ward rejects this systematic occasionalism and embraces panpsychic realism on the grounds (i) of greater simplicity in the conception of divine activity, (ii) of the avoidance of the epistemological difficulties of subjective idealism, and (iii) of being better able to account for functional and organic evolution.[1]

b. The Individual Organism

For Ward, then, the complex individual, as we know him on the human level, at least, is a society of selves or living agents in mutual rapport.[2] This is the ontological reality: a society of monads whose unity is functional; not a being

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1. ROE, 247-269. See below, Chapters Nine and Ten.
2. On this and all other points in the remainder of this section, not otherwise noted, see ROE, 254-259; 461-467.

composed of disparate substances, matter and mind; nor a single being of double aspect. Now within this society of monads are distinguished, first, a dominant monad or "director"[1] and, secondly, a vast number of subordinate or ministering monads. Between the dominant and subordinate monads of the living organism there exists a peculiarly intimate relation. This intimate, or "functional" relation is different from the "foreign" relation to monads not of the organism. It is this difference, misapprehended by dualism, which lies at the basis of the body-mind problem and the difficulties that cling to it so long as the dualistic viewpoint persists.

c. Psychoneural Parallelism

This becomes clearer as we consider the psychoneural parallelism which lies at the heart of the body-mind problem. That there is an "intimate correspondence between psychosis and neurosis"[2] is beyond reasonable doubt, as Ward states:

> In development and efficiency, in the intensity and complexity of their processes, mind and brain keep invariably and exactly in line together...We reject materialism... while still maintaining this psychoneural parallelism to be a well established fact.[3]

It is not strange that this should be so, however, on the monadistic assumption. For, "the living being, that the psychologist regards ejectively as mind, the physiologist

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1. ROE, 207.
2. ROE, 461. Note Ward's use of "neurosis" in historical sense of "the specific and normal activity of the nervous system," (Warren, DPS,179.) vs. recent pathological usage.
3. EB, 11th Ed., XXII, 600, Cf. ROE, 461. On three types of parallelism distinguished by Ward, see supra, p. 64-65.

regards objectively as mechanism."[1] To the subject or dominant monad the subordinate monads which constitute the neural mechanism are "diaphanous."[2] There is more or less complete intimacy of rapport. This accounts for the fact that the organism has "windows," and also for the fact that millions of people live and die without knowing that they have a brain or other neural mechanism. Further, the subject or dominant monad is in contact with the entire world outside his organism only through the monads which compose this neural mechanism and the other subordinate monads. Through them he both knows, and effects changes in, the world external to his living organism.

d. Sympathetic Rapport

Rapport or the relation of immediacy between monads is for Ward a basic concept. Once more, as in the case of the monad itself, it is a concept derived from our own personal experience. There, instances innumerable occur in which behavior is conditioned entirely or largely on "'sympathetic rapport' or interest that rests upon cognition,"[3] "the sort of mutual understanding...which we daily observe in the personal intercourse of our fellow-men."[4] An excellent illustration is that of the relation between private citizens and

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1. ROE, 461. Cf. Drake, MPN, 80, 81.
2. ROE, 466.
3. ROE, 218.
4. ROE, 253.

public officials. The citizen knows little, and cares little, about the technical details of the smoothly working post-office or police department; "he only knows what they mean and confidently relies on their services."[1] "These officials are persons too, no doubt; but so far forth as their social functions are concerned, their position is analogous to that of subordinate monads."[2]

Now, of course, it is true that this and Ward's various other illustrations of sympathetic rapport between selves[3] are all taken from the high level of human self-consciousness. But Ward is convinced that, nevertheless, we are dealing here with an ultimate and all pervading element in experience. Let him speak for himself: In a passage in one of his best essays, "In the Beginning...," he is discussing the Leibnizian principle that quod non agit non existit, and that all appearances imply something active, though not themselves active. He continues,

> But what experience implies is activity at both ends, i. e., reciprocal interaction, commercium dynamicum, as Kant called it. When, then, 'finite centers of experience' are mentioned, are we not entitled to understand this phrase as meaning individual agents en rapport together? We can give no explanation of this rapport which does not covertly imply it; for we come here to the bedrock of experience: it involves two agents, we know that, and that is all we can say in the beginning.[4]

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1. ROE, 464.
2. ROE, 463-464.
3. E. g., ROE, 218-219.
4. EIP, 297. Cf. ROE, 219.

Thus, for Ward, all interaction, within and without the organism (presentation, conation and transeunt action) finds its ultimate explanation in the sympathetic rapport and concurrent response of monads.[1]

e. Mind and Body

It remains now, before turning to the arguments in support of modified interactionism,[2] to compare the conceptions of mind and body commonly held with those of this monadistic system. Except for those singularistic systems in which any real distinction vanishes, the common view is dualistic: body and mind are separate substances, or essentially disparate in that one is finite activity, the other the activity of the divine mind. Ward's system, however, seeks to preserve all the valid distinction there is, and at the same time to bridge the gap of disparateness. The distinction is preserved in subject-object and subject-subject relation. The disparateness is overcome, in that there is only one ontological reality: the society of monads in a world of such psychic beings or selves. On this view, body is the society composing the organism viewed, as it were, objectively. Thus, for the physiologist, and for the individual, in so far as he regards his own organism objectively, the body is entirely phenomenal. But, now, the subject or dominant monad (by virtue of his position and

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1. See below, Chapter Ten, Sec. A,4.
2. The term "modified interactionism" will be adequately

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defined and discussed in the sequel. (Note especially Chap. Twelve, Sec. A, p.208 f, below.) Yet in view of the technical use of "interactionism," a preliminary word would seem in order here. Granted, of course, that interactionism is a technical term with a definite connotation, it is no exaggeration whatever to say that the whole point of Ward's thought is just to controvert the connotation of such terms. He was a realist; which, being interpreted, means that he consistently refused to deny the genuine meaning and force of the deliverances of experience. One of these is for him, unquestionably, a basic natural duality. As we pointed out above (supra, 62-63), in his Britannica article he contends that, on the level of science, this duality, and its implied interaction, cannot be transcended. Yet on other grounds he is convinced that it must be overcome, metaphysically. This he attempts, first of all, by interpreting the basic duality as not substantial, but a subject-object duality. (Cf. Whitehead.) Secondly, by reinterpreting the meaning of "body" and "mind" in terms of his monadism. Consequently, it seems to me, there is no other way to name his solution than "modified interactionism." He did hold strenuously to interactionism, on the level of experience and psychology, insisting on the real efficiency both of "mind" and "body". Yet the only ontological reality, for him, was psychical activity; and he was a psychoneural parallelist, in his special sense, as adequately defined on pages 64-65, supra.

the consequent epigenetic attainment of self-conscious cognition) may be aware not only of the society of monads and the world beyond as object, or in objective relation. He may be aware, also, of the subject-to-subject, or intersubjective, relation of the monads of his own organism, and of the continuous changes wrought therein by contact with the world of monads outside the organism. This is "mind" according to Ward. It is in part - so far as it is content - phenomenal. But it is not "merely phenomenal or epiphenomenal; since it implies the subject, or dominant monad, to whom such phenomenal experiences belong."[1] Note carefully the distinction here between subject and mind. Mind is, so to speak, the internal view of the organism, belonging to the subject as conscious. It is the living organism regarded ejectively; the body is the same organism regarded objectively. The two points of view are forever distinct - "incompatible" is Ward's term: and "it is this incompatibility that gives rise to the psychophysical problem, so hopeless for the Cartesian dualism with its disparate substances, and so simple for the personal idealist."[2] So it is that Ward could write,

> And, now, instead of studying others' brains, for we cannot see our own, let us turn to our own minds, which none but ourselves can see. What have we here? Nothing but sensations and movements or complexes of these, the physical equivalents of which we find to

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1. ROE, 462.
2. ROE, 463.

> constitute the whole structure of brain? Nothing, I believe, except the mind which is conscious of having all these, together with the pleasure or pain it receives from them.[1]

2. The Fact of Bodily Control

This monadistic conception of body and mind is buttressed, in the thought of Ward, by the way in which it meets the demands of a critical interpretation of experience and nature. We may note here three points, in addition to that of the reality of external perception (which is implied throughout the preceding exposition.) The first of these is the fact of bodily control. As we might expect, an empiricist like Ward is very positive about the reality of bodily control:

> We are active beings and somehow control the movements of the bodies we are said to animate. No facts are more immediately certain than these, and there is nothing in our actual experience that conflicts with them. From these facts we advance to the abstract concepts on the strength of which Naturalism, by a grievous misapprehension of its own standpoint, attempts to question them.[2]

According to panpsychism, the explanation of bodily control is extremely simple. It is but the natural activity of the society of monads in sympathetic <u>rapport</u>, looked at from the point of view of the organism as a whole, under the direction of the dominant monad. Here, Ward contends monadism has a distinct speculative advantage of simplicity over occasion-

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1. PAE, 21.
2. ROE, 12.

alism with its cumbersome notion of the 'middle-man' activity of the divine mind. From the point of view of closeness to empirical fact, the realism of this view seems preferable to the phenomenalism of occasionalism. But, as Ward frankly says, concerning this and other arguments based on body-mind relations, "The only alternative left seems to be that adopted by the occasionalist; and perhaps to some this may seem preferable."[1]

3. The Freedom of the Subject

In addition and closely related to the fact of bodily control as an argument in favor of a modified interactionism, we find in Ward's thought the argument of "the reality of that self-determination which we directly experience,"[2] and which, he holds, can be clearly proved on empirical grounds.[3]

Now this freedom means, for him, first of all, freedom not merely from external constraint, but from internal necessity. "A man is internally free, then, whenever the ends he pursues have his whole-hearted approval"[4] - be they good or bad ends. This does not mean a <u>liberum arbitrium indifferentiae</u>, "for that would seem to differ in no respect from absolute chance or caprice."[5] But it does mean that, while choice is in large measure determined by character, that character is

1. ROE, 467.
2. ROE, 291. Ward's position on freedom is succintly given in PP, 404-407, and at greater length in ROE, 283-291.
3. PP, 407.
4. PP, 404-405.
5. Ibid.

not merely "nature modified by circumstances." Free self-determination involves freedom "to like as he likes" as well as "to act as he likes." It is positive, as well as negative, and, Ward believes, it may be shown, empirically, to involve "not mere freedom from constraint, but freedom to initiate, to turn circumstances to account, even - thanks to the ποῦ στῶ that reason affords - so to deal with oneself."[1]

Now monadistically, of course, this positive freedom of the subject is the freedom of the dominant monad, en rapport with the subordinate monads of his organism, who respond to his "directions." Thus, through their response he effects changes in the organism and through it in the environing world of monads. These changes, objectively observed, constitute the so-called "efficiency of mind," as it appears to the individual and to other persons. Thus the fact of real freedom is an argument for a modified interactionism, and the only real alternative to the monadistic solution would seem to be that of occasionalism, but, as we shall see, in the all-pervading role of "attention" and "interest" monadism would seem to offer a more nearly complete explanation of the nature of positive freedom.[2]

4. The Psychical Factor in Evolution

The final, and in some respects the most interesting and

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1. PP, 407.
2. See below, Chapter Twelve, Sec. B,2,c.

important suggestion in Ward's thought, in support both of interactionism and of his particular monadistic modification of interactionism, is that worked out through a consideration of organic evolution. As we must take this up in some detail later,[1] we may state here the important points very briefly, in so far as they bear on interactionism as a body-mind theory.

If the organic world is really nothing but a complicated material structure, whose development is to be explained fully by mechanical laws and the principle of natural selection alone, how is one to account for the anabolic nature of the process, for the "arrival of the fit, and its arrival in so many forms,"[2] and for the unquestionable presence of a direct teleological factor, at least in the case of man and the higher animals?[3] Further, what is the meaning and explanation of heredity?[4] Ward's position is that the only simple and satisfactory answer is in panpsychic realism, with its modified interactionism.[5] From the purposeful interaction of a world of cognitive and conative beings and of the social-individuals which they unite to form, an epigenetic evolutionary process results. "Subjective selection" and "self-conservation" must be added to natural selection in order to account for evolution. Without this introduction of the psychical

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1. See below, Chapter Ten.
2. Bowne, MET, 280.
3. NAA, I, Chap. X, 272-302; ROE, Lect. V, 97-116.
4. ROE, 206-212; EIP, Essay VIII, 253-276.
5. See below, Chapter Ten.

factor, and the consequent assumption of genuine mental efficiency in the natural world, evolution cannot be explained.[1]

These, then, are the chief positive supporting arguments for modified interactionism, to be found in the thought of James Ward: Only by means of such a system can you account (i) for objective presentations in experience, (ii) for the fact of bodily control, (iii) for positive freedom of the self, (iv) for the anabolic and teleological factors in evolution, and for genuine heredity. It shall be our task in the sequel to examine and criticize these suggestions.

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1. NAA, I, 291-302. Cf. ROE, 103-108.

PART TWO
PROBLEMS ARISING OUT OF WARD'S THOUGHT

CHAPTER SEVEN
THE ANALYSIS OF EXPERIENCE

A. Introductory Note

As we pass, now, to the criticism and evaluation of Ward's thought, it will be well to state clearly the change in method involved. Part One presents the historical background and the essential points in Ward's thought, particularly as it bears on the body-mind problem. Every important point has been documented with sufficient references. In Part Two each chapter will be devoted to selected problems arising definitely out of the material covered in Part One. For example, in this Chapter (Seven) no attempt is made to cover all or even many of the problems raised by Ward's analysis of experience, outlined in the last preceding Chapter;[1] only three points, each of which is vitally related to the body-mind problem, are selected for discussion. This selective method will be followed throughout Part Two. The only apparent exception is Chapter Eight, The Theory of the

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1. Supra, Chap. Six, Sec.A.

Continuum, and this exception is more apparent than real. For, in the last analysis, the speculative significance of the continuum has a vital bearing upon Ward's interpretation of body-mind relations, just because of its significance for his total metaphysical creed. And, also, the discussion of the objective continuum is in reality but the consideration of a fourth point under the general head of "The Analysis of Experience."

This Chapter (Seven), furthermore, will be intentionally limited because of three considerations: (i) It is introductory and preliminary to the problems which more directly concern body-mind relations. It is, so to speak, a necessary scientific prolegomenon to the understanding of Ward's metaphysical thought as it affects the solution of the body-mind problem. (ii) It is, therefore, for the most part concerned with psychology, purposely avoiding the metaphysical questions to which ensuing Chapters will largely be devoted.[1] (iii) In view of (i) and (ii) the aim of this Chapter will be, not to present anything like an exhaustive analysis and criticism, even of the three points discussed, but rather, to make clear their meaning, particularly as it bears on our problem. Anything further would not only take

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1. E. g., Chapters Nine, Ten and Eleven.

us far afield, but would inevitably raise the same metaphysical problems which later must be met, anyhow, and which can be dealt with more directly and profitably in connection with body and mind as understood by Ward.

B. The Science of Individual Experience

1. The Primacy of the Individual

It is difficult for us, today, to feel the importance and the necessity of the reanalysis of experience, as it must have appeared to Ward. The solution of a problem like that of body-mind was rendered impossible for him by the faulty conceptions of current doctrines. On the one hand there were the commonly accepted mechanistic associationism of the dominant psychologies; and the ingrained dualism of matter and mind of naturalistic thought, with its rigid mechanism. On the other hand, there was the all-absorbing monism of Hegelian systems, with their ultimate determinism. The reality and freedom of the concrete individual were lost in the "reification of abstractions" of one sort or another. The first necessity was to get back to experience and recover its real deliverances and implications.

As Ward attempts this task he first of all reinstates the individual as the real <u>primus</u> and <u>locus</u> of experience,

and, therefore, of psychological study and analysis. This is sound method, and one that has been exceedingly sinned against both before and since Ward's day. To start out with less or more than concrete individual experience is to ignore the only real beginning possible to psychology.[1]

2. The Pluralistic Nature of Experience

Ward is likewise on solid ground in his emphasis upon the pluralistic standpoint of experience. In truth, we do not start with the One, but with the Many, in speculation. And however far from the plurality of experience our speculation may take us, the Many are still there and must always be accounted for. With respect to his pluralism, however, we should keep in mind the facts, first, that Ward was an insistent empiricist in scientific and philosophic method; and, second, that nevertheless he recognized clearly the limitations of pluralism and the necessity of an ultimate transcendence of it in metaphysics.[2] Starting out "to ascertain what we can know, or reasonably believe, concerning the constitution of the world, <u>interpreted throughout and strictly in terms of mind</u>,"[3]

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1. Cf. PP, 26-28, 104; EIP, 277-302. See <u>supra</u>, Chap. Six, Sec. A,1.
2. Loc. Cit. Also, ROE, Lectures II, III and XI. <u>Supra</u>, Chap. Six, Secs. A,1; B,1.
3. ROE, p.v. Italics his.

his metaphysics is rooted and grounded in the psychology whose "exclusive business" it is "to analyze and trace the development of individual experience as it is for the experiencing individual."[1] It was on the basis of such a psychology that he could begin his metaphysical discussion by writing,

> At the outset, this world immediately confronts us not as one Mind, nor even as the manifestation of one, but as an objective whole in which we discern many minds in mutual interaction. It is from this pluralistic standpoint that our experience has in fact developed, and it is here that we acquire the ideas that eventually lead us beyond it.[2]

Note, then, that in his general analysis of experience Ward finds - purely on the level of the psychology of individual experience - the two-fold "objective <u>whole</u> in which we discern <u>many</u> minds in mutual interaction." The singularistic element, the "objective whole," he has shown to be purely phenomenal, the "<u>totum objectivum</u>" or "objective continuum,"[3] varying with each individual's experience, and explainable on the basis of the primacy of the pluralistic standpoint (at least if metaphysical pluralism, "many minds," is assumed). True, the psychical element (the "minds") is at this point ("at the outset")

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1. PP, 104.
2. ROE, p. v.
3. PP, Chap. IV. <u>Supra</u>, Chap. Six, Sec. A,2. Chap. Eight, below, deals with the metaphysical significance, if any, of the objective continuum.

pure assumption. But the point to be noted is that, having analyzed experience (in Psychological Principles) Ward begins his metaphysical work with an "objective whole" purely psychological in character, and a pluralism unshaken, and still fit to be the basis of metaphysical speculation.

3. Activistic Panpsychism versus Substantialism

Ward's inherent pluralism, then, is to be noted. But its true significance can be grasped only as it is seen in relation to the underlying monism of his thought. His pluralism is not an ultimate pluralism of "substances." All real existents - all the Many - are for him of the nature of mind; i. e., psychical activity is the only "stuff" of reality,[1] and this ultimate activity, which is reality, exists as many minds forming an interactive whole. Ward's theory is not to be confused with panpsychisms of the "mind-stuff" variety. This ultimate union of pluralism and monism is at the very foundation of his metaphysics, and yet it is rooted and grounded in empirical psychology and epistemology. Ward found nothing in his psychological analysis of experience to contradict this fundamental metaphysical hypothesis. On the other hand, he found it possible, on this basis, to

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1. Cf. PP, 343-344, 381-382; EIP, 297; ROE, 391-393. Supra, Chap. Six, Sec.B.

account for the particulars of experience,[1] and to solve the riddle of epistemology.

C. Duality of Subject and Object

1. Duality versus Dualism

At the basis of the riddles to be solved lies the apparent dualism of mind and body. Ward was right in insisting that short of miraculous occasionalism there was no solution of this problem so long as the dualism of disparate substances was maintained. And this brings us face to face with the essential question concerning Ward's analysis, from the point of view of the body-mind problem. That question is this: Is that duality which we know as "the bedrock of experience"[2] a duality of subject and object within the unity of individual experience, as Ward contends, or is it a dualism of disparate phenomena or substances of matter and mind as has been traditionally maintained? Upon our answer to that will depend, in large part, our judgment concerning Ward's solution of the problem of body-mind relations. The two points which seem to me to weigh heaviest in favor of

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1. See below, Chaps. Nine and Ten, for critical discussion of important points.
2. Ward, in Muirhead, CBP, II, 30. Cf. NAA, II, 110-123 on this duality in experience. Cf. <u>supra</u>, Chap. Six, Sec. A, 3, and references there cited.

Ward's position, and which he brings out in his analysis, are these: (i) the reality of the subject, and its distinction from the objective factor in experience; (ii) the activity of the subject.

2. The Ownership of Experience

First, Ward insists, rightly, that all experience belongs to subjects; that,

> ...however much assailed or disowned, the concept of a 'self' or conscious subject is to be found implicitly or explicitly in all psychological writers whatever - not more in Berkeley, who accepts it as a fact, than in Hume, who treats it as a fiction;[1]

and, we might add, it is to be found even in the behaviorists who refuse to mention it!

But, further, regarding this "owner" of experience, or subject, Ward holds that it is not to be defined in purely phenomenal terms. "We cannot call our consciousness of self merely phenomenal."[2] It is this latter position which is of most importance in answering the question under consideration as to the subject-object analysis of experience. For on the purely phenomenal level you cannot get away from a disparate body and mind: they are simply both there as distinct phenomena. The only possible solution in that case

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1. PP, 35. Cf. 34-41; 376- 382.
2. ROE, 237.

is to "explain away" one or both, metaphysically. But the point of Ward's analysis is that there are more than the disparate phenomena in experience: that body and mind as phenomena are both objective presentations, and in experience always stand over against an experiencing subject.[1]

In the last analysis, I suppose, each of us must judge Ward's analysis on the basis of our own experience. For my part, I think he is fundamentally correct. The arguments against his position are well summarized by Professor Strong.[2] They may be given in three sentences from his discussion:

> (1) Granting its existence [Ward's non-phenomenal subject], it is impossible to give a rational explanation of the manner in which our knowledge of it was obtained...
>
> (2) But, even if our knowledge of it could be accounted for, it would be impossible to assign it a nature...
>
> (3) Finally, the theory would be inconsistent with the fact that our whole knowledge of the Ego and its function is in truth derived from experience...[3]

The answer to the first of these objections would seem to be that knowledge of the existence of a subject and even a limited knowledge of its nature might well be had inferentially or intellectually; and, in fact, is so acquired

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1. On the doctrine of the experiencing subject, see supra, Chap. Six, Sec. A,4,b, and below, Chap. Eleven. Cf. PP, 34-41.
2. WMB, 203-209.
3. Op. cit. 206-207.

in part.[1] But Strong overlooks the fact that the subject, though not phenomenal, is for Ward, never entirely non-empirical. All that we know about it we do know in and through conscious experience. Ward is extremely careful to keep his psychological doctrine of the subject of experience free from any metaphysical implications of a non-conscious soul. He says definitely,

> This psychological concept of a self or subject, then, is after all by no means identical with the metaphysical concept of a soul: it may be kept as free from metaphysical implications as the concept of the biological individual or organism with which it is so intimately connected.[2]

However, the subject must not be confused with the biological organism. Nor, on the other hand, is it merely "the unity and continuity of the so-called contents of consciousness." The analysis of experience reveals clearly

> ...feeling, and effort or impulse, as the result of feeling: and it is just these purely psychological facts of feeling and impulse that compel us to recognize a conscious subject as well as a unity and continuity of the so-called contents of consciousness.[3]

As to Strong's second objection, it has validity only on the basis of such a view of the nature of reality as Strong's own phenomenalism. If Ward's fundamental Leibnizian conscious activism be granted, this objection

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1. Cf. supra, Chap. Six, A, 4, b. PP, 370-382.
2. PP, 35-36. Cf. Brightman, IP, 174-178, 189-191.
3. PP, 36. Cf. Brightman, op. cit.

simply has no meaning. And the third objection, if it has any meaning for Ward's thought, amounts only to a repetition of the first, and would seem to be based on a misapprehension of Ward's doctrine.

3. The Activity of the Subject

The second important point for our problem in Ward's analysis of the subject-object duality of experience, is that of the activity of the subject. Conceive the subject or consciousness as real in any sense save that of psychic activity, and sooner or later, *ipso facto*, either the subjective side is divested of every mental characteristic, or one element of a dualism of substances is posited which demands, for its metaphysical complement, the disparate substantiality of the object, and the world is sundered into matter and mind, of one metaphysical sort or another. The former is what happens, even, in the case of "mind-stuff" theories, which Ward so vigorously criticized.[1] Only on the basis of an activistic conception of the subject in experience, is it possible to understand the duality of subject and object in experience, without falling into substantial dualism, which would render the problems of

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1. NAA, I, 177; II, 15-17. Cf. Clifford, LAE, 274-286. and see *supra*, Chap. Five, Sec.D,2.

perception and of body-mind relations insoluble. Experience, then, according to Ward's reanalysis, does not give us a substantial dualism of matter (including body) versus mind, but does show a unified experience within which we may always distinguish a duality of (i) an active conscious subject who is experiencing (ii) an objective whole, within which, further, many objects may be distinguished, among which are those called "mental" and "material". And dualism is possible only by a "reification of abstractions" from that duality in the unity of experience.

D. The Organic Unity of Experience

1. The Selective Activity of the Subject

And now, keeping as much on the level of the analysis of experience as may be, let us examine the organic unity of experience, as Ward conceives it. It must be kept in mind that this unity is, for him, purely experiential, i.e., phenomenal, not substantial. In Hegelian fashion, we may distinguish a thesis, an antithesis and a synthesis. The thesis is the selective activity of the subject.

Within experience we may distinguish a certain unity due to the selective activity of the controlling subject. Every presentation, however dim and undifferentiated it may

be, arouses in the subject a corresponding feeling, on the basis of which the conative activity is determined, looking toward the preservation and betterment of the organism. No two experients are, for Ward, ever alike, and so this selective activity varies with the subject. It is one pole of the organic unity of individual experience.

2. The Unity of the Continuum

The antithesis is the unity of the objective continuum. The world confronts the selecting individual subject, not as many disparate beings, but as an objective whole - a continuum - from which presentations are differentiated. Undoubtedly, whatever may be the metaphysical explanation of this continuum, its unity is in part to be explained, on the psychological level, as being due to the fact that it is a presentation to a single subject. However explained, it is the other pole of the unity of individual experience.

3. Functional Unity and the Self

Thesis and antithesis are gathered up, in experience, in the synthesis of the functional unity of the self. The unity of experience is not an artificial knitting together of disparate elements. It is not a miraculous "substantial unity" of distinct substances, as Decartes supposed, misled by an abstracting rationalism. Experience, as we know it,

is best described as an organic unity. Within that total unity the cognitive and conative subject (at the self-conscious level of our human experience, at least) seems to be in a two-fold relation to the objective continuum. To a certain relatively small part of it (which we call body) he stands in an intimate relation, involving a large measure of direct control. With the balance of it he seems to be in more or less indirect relation and far less effective control through the body. Subject and body function together, and this functional unity is distinguished from the rest of reality as "self".[1]

Thus Ward's reanalysis of experience may be seen, I trust, to be really fundamental and necessary to the task of accounting for body and mind on the deeper, metaphysical level. The last trace of Cartesian dualism, in so far as it involved a faulty analysis of experience into a dualism of substances (real or phenomenal) had to be eliminated. Three centuries of the keenest analytical thought of mankind had failed to make progress against the impossibility of that

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1. Here we reach the very heart of the body-mind problem, in Ward's thought. Before attacking it critically, we must deal with a number of metaphysical questions. See Chap. Eleven, below, for further discussion of the nature and development of the "self."

dualism. At the same time, the valid pluralism and duality within the unity of experience had to be preserved, and its explanation made possible on a monistic basis. To deny these was, indeed, to fly from Scylla and be lost in Charybdis.

At this point we come upon the contention of Dr. John S. Marshall, that "the (objective) continuum theory is ...a refutation of extreme pluralism," and "is the supreme expression of the fact that Ward is not a genuine monadologist."[1] We must turn aside from our direct examination of Ward's solution of body-mind relations long enough to consider carefully this claim.

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1. Marshall, CWP, 138-139.

CHAPTER EIGHT
THE THEORY OF THE CONTINUUM

A. The Principle of Continuity

1. The Theory and the Principle

One of the most distinctive and important contributions of James Ward to psychological thought was his theory of the objective continuum. Perhaps next to the subjective-objective duality in unity (which has been considered in the preceding Chapter) this theory of the continuum is for our problem of body and mind, the most important part of his reanalysis. That is particularly evident in the light of the interpretation of the continuum and its significance which Dr. J. S. Marshall gives us in his dissertation entitled, The Continuum in James Ward's Psychology.

In that excellent study Marshall makes two significant statements of a general nature which we must consider carefully. In the first place, he says,

> The problem of the continuum is largely a problem of Ward's method. It is a problem of making explicit his methodological presuppositions. These are rooted in his epistemology and general philosophy.[1]

In so far as Marshall makes any attempt at all to "make

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1. Marshall, CWP, 4.

explicit" Ward's "methodological presuppositions," he succeeds in laying bare only one such presupposition, viz., the principle of continuity.[1] It is clearly Marshall's implication, therefore, that there is a direct and important relation between the principle of continuity and the continuum theory. That, I take it, must be the meaning of the quotation just given. In other words, Marshall is contending that the theory of the continuum can be understood only on the basis of the principle of continuity. This, I shall attempt to show, involves a mistaken notion of the nature of the continuum, resulting from a confusion of scientific and metaphysical standpoints.

And, now, this ~~mistake and~~ confusion leads Marshall to a second statement of even wider and deeper significance, both for Ward's philosophy in general and the body-mind problem in particular. He says,

> The theory of the continuum is the supreme expression of the fact that Ward is not a genuine monadologist... Ward does not need to transcend the empirical level to find his pluralism transcended. The continuum theory is itself a refutation of extreme pluralism.[2]

This, indeed, is important, if true. Yet how amazing that Ward himself seems totally unaware of the speculative

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1. Op. cit., 4, 37, 155, and <u>passim</u>.
2. Op. cit., 138-139. Note the entire passage.

significance of the theory of the continuum! The truth seems to be that the theory has no such significance at all, but that Marshall's conclusion rests back on the same confusion mentioned above and involved in the statement first quoted. In order to dispel that confusion and lay bare the mistaken conception of the continuum to which it leads, we need only to see clearly the meaning of the principle of continuity and of the theory of the continuum in Ward's thought, keeping in mind always the distinctions of standpoint urged in Chapter Three, above.[1]

2. Ward's Use of the Principle of Continuity

a. Early Recognition of the Principle

In his dissertation Marshall has a lengthy and enlightening discussion of the development and use of the principle of continuity by the mathematicians, from Greek times down to Leibniz, and of its appropriation and application by the philosophers, particularly Leibniz and James Ward. Its place in the work of the latter we must note in some detail.

That James Ward was conscious of the importance of the principle of continuity in the development of a rational

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1. Supra, 19-27. Cf. Ward's essay, "Philosophical Orientation and Scientific Standpoints," EIP, 182-208.

philosophy there can be no doubt. As early as 1870 he wrote to a friend, concerning epistemological method, that "on the analogy of ourselves we build our knowledge of things without," and went on to expound this in terms of the principle of continuity:

> So knowledge grows, one part acting and interacting with another...Is it not possible so to connect knowledge with knowledge without a break as at last to see in the Macrocosm such a resemblance to the Microcosm that it shall be recognized as the expression of a Mind, whose image we bear?...A realistic idealism may yet prove the solution of philosophy.[1]

b. Ward Derived it from Leibniz

From this early recognition on down to his latest work the principle can be traced, explicitly or implicitly present. Ward himself acknowledges that he borrowed it from Leibniz.[2] In the Preface to his Nouveaux Essais sur L'Entendement Humain, the latter declares:

> Rien ne se fait tout d'un coup, et c'est une de mes grandes maximes et des plus vérifiées, que la nature ne fait jamais de sauts. J'appelais cela la loi de la continuité.[3]

Perhaps the clearest statement of how completely he regards this principle as applicable in the natural world is to be found in the following fragment of a letter, written October 16, 1707, to an unknown person:

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1. EIP, 37. Quoted by his daughter from a letter Ward wrote Henry Wolstenholme, August 25, 1870.
3. Leibniz, Nouveaux Essais, 17.
2. ROE, 20, 53-54.

> Men are connected with the animals, these with the plants, and these again with the fossils, which will be united in their turn with bodies which the senses and the imagination represent to us as perfectly dead and shapeless. Now since the law of continuity demands that when the essential determinations of a being approach those of another so that likewise accordingly all the properties of the first must gradually approach those of the last, it is necessary that all the orders of natural beings form only one chain, in which the different classes, like so many links, connect so closely the one to the other, that it is impossible for the senses and the imagination to fix the precise point where any one begins or ends:[1]

On the basis of such rigorous application, Leibniz goes on to predict, in this letter, the discovery of creatures "which as regards many properties,...might pass for vegetables with as good right as for animals.[2] He further suggests the importance of the principle for philosophy, in revealing new truths, and says, "I flatter myself that I have some ideas concerning them, but this age is not qualified to receive them."[3] These ideas he worked out in his Nouveaux Essais, to some extent, where they were published for the first time half a century after his death.[4]

It is clearly evident, however, as Marshall points out,[5]

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1. Langley, LNE, 712-713. (Italics Leibniz's) Cf. Nouveaux Essais, 17, 225, 422-423. For references to Leibniz's other writings, see Langley, LNE, 334, n.1.
2. Langley, LNE, 713-714. The discovery of bacteria has vindicated this prediction!
3. Ibid.
4. Nouveaux Essais, particularly 225, 422-423.
5. Op. cit., 25, 35.

that Ward is not nearly so thorough-going in its application as Leibniz. This is due, undoubtedly, to the fact that speculation, with Ward, was constantly balanced, checked and limited by empirical observation. If, indeed, continuity is "the one speculative principle in Ward's general method,"[1] yet it never functions alone and with the freedom we find in Leibniz, and it is always found in conjunction with the test of experience. We may illustrate this by quoting the following footnote from the Psychological Principles:

> The principle of continuity then gives us no title to infer from the distinction reached by analysis to the separate existence of the factors analyzed. Only experience can justify such a separation...So in psychology we find a duality of subject and object but never any warrant for dualism. On the other hand, the underlying unity and all-embracing totality, sometimes spoken of as the Absolute, does not belong to the empirical plane.[2]

c. The Principle in Ward's Thought

On the other hand, while not nearly as rigorous as Leibniz in his application of the principle, Ward was clear as to its importance for metaphysics. He says definitely:

> Every system of thoroughgoing pluralism accepts the Leibnizian principle of continuity, at least to the extent of maintaining that there is no infinite gap, no complete diversity between, one monad and another, a principle against which the Leibnizian theology itself offends.[3]

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1. Op. cit., 155.
2. PP, 442, n.3. (Underlining mine. Not cited, in this connection, by Marshall.)
3. ROE, 54. Cf. ROE, 20, 52-53,185-188, 433.

He cites with approval, also, Leibniz's succinct phrase, "Nature never makes leaps." [1] In so far as his general conception of the nature of the universe may be said to determine every scientist's work it must be freely admitted that Ward's adopted principle that "Nature never makes leaps" may be clearly traced throughout Psychological Principles. This, undoubtedly, is what Marshall refers to when he calls continuity "the one speculative principle in Ward's general method."[2] Someone - probably Ward himself - has taken the trouble to trace the principle through Psychological Principles, and to list in the Index some twenty-five passages where it is "referred to or illustrated."[3] A careful checking of these passages shows that in not one of them is the principle itself directly considered. Nor is the principle, in a single instance, made use of, so to speak, constructively, in the determination of specific doctrine; but always it is present, explicitly or implicitly, only in a general and interpretative fashion, illustrative of the general truth that "Nature never makes leaps." Certainly, neither from these passages, nor from anything in the method of Ward's development of the doctrine of the objective

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1. ROE, 20.
2. Op. cit., 155.
3. PP, 472.

continuum, can an argument against pluralism as a metaphysical principle be deduced.

It is of some importance to note that, being a speculative principle, continuity functions particularly in Ward's epistemology. Marshall has rightly recorded this fact. Discussing Ward's epistemology, he speaks of the principle of continuity as the "cardinal methodological axiom," and again as "a postulate of the rationality of experience: an axiom of the possibility of explanation."[1] In my judgment, that is putting the matter rather strongly. I do not believe the principle of continuity can be shown to function in quite such an important manner, epistemologically, in Ward's thought. Its primary application is ontological, rather than epistemological. Marshall's confusion here, once more is chiefly that of standpoint. However, that is of little moment at present. The important point is that the principle of continuity is a speculative principle; that as such Ward recognizes it and uses it continuously; and that as such it functions only in a general and interpretative (and not in a determinant) manner in his science.[2]

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1. Op. cit., 37.
2. See below, Sec. C,1, of this Chapter.

B. The Definition of the Theory of the Continuum

1. The Objective Continuum

Our next and more essential task is to try to make clear what Ward meant by the objective continuum, and, at the same time, to see, if we can, how he arrived at that theory, and what place it held in his thought, i.e., what kind of a theory it was, for him.[1]

In his observation and interpretation of the facts of human consciousness James Ward was impressed, first of all, by what he called the "continuity of consciousness."[2] What we have to deal with as psychologists is not a structure made up, so to speak, of separate bricks which, in some fashion or other, have been put together, but rather with a continuous whole which is being constantly modified in the course of the individual's experience. He says:

> ...Though analysis be first in the order of knowledge, synthesis is first in the order of existence.
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> The proximate fact for the psychological observer is, however - this much, at least, we may safely say - a unity that is differentiated. But though differentiated, it is not disintegrated.[3]

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1. It will be noted that this Section (B) is in fundamental agreement with Marshall's excellent exposition of the continuum. Disagreement reenters with the consideration of the significance of the theory, in Section C.
2. PP, 76.
3. PP, 409-410.

On the basis of this view of conscious experience, therefore, he finds a sensation, or "so-called elementary presentation,"[1] to be "really a partial modification of some pre-existing and persisting whole, which thereby becomes more complex than it was before."[2]

It is this "pre-existing and persisting whole," or consciousness as it continuously presents itself to the individual, which is for Ward the totum objectivum, or objective continuum.[3] There are far better analogies in biology, he insists, than in physics or chemistry, to "the progressive differentiation of experience."[4] "The process," he says, "resembles a partial segmentation of what is originally continuous, rather than an aggregation of elements at first independent and distinct."[5]

It is important to keep well in mind, then, these two emphases in Ward's doctrine of the presentations: (i) They form a presentational or objective continuum. (ii) Particular presentations are never to be regarded as discontinuous or distinct. Let us have them once more, briefly, in his own words:

> But even when most definite, what we call a presentation is still part of a larger whole. It is not separated from other presentations,

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1. PP, 78.
2. Ibid.
3. Cf. Brightman, POI, 13-19, on the "datum self."
4. PP, 76.
5. Ibid.

> whether simultaneous or successive, by something which is not of the nature of presentation, as one island is separated from another by the intervening sea, or one note in a melody from the next by an interval of silence.[1]

And, again, he writes, in treating of the nature of the presentations as modifications "of some pre-existing and persisting presentational whole,"

> ...this increasing complexity and differentiation never gives rise to a plurality of discontinuous presentations, having a distinctness and individuality such as the atoms or elementary particles of the physical world are supposed to have.[2]

2. Psychoplasm and Anlage

In addition to the terms 'objective continuum,' and 'presentational continuum,' Ward makes use of the word 'psychoplasm.'[3] So far as I have been able to make out, these terms are strictly synonymous, so far as their content, or essential reference is concerned. In connotation, however, the term psychoplasm, from its relation to terms such as bioplasm and protoplasm, suggests innate or underlying structure, and the broader relationships of the individual continuum.[4] This seems to be Ward's point of view. He states plainly that for the psychological individual, psychoplasm is the objective continuum. However, for the concrete

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1. PP, 76.
2. PP, 78.
3. PP, 412-429. Cf. 76-80.
4. Ibid.

individual, that is, for the individual considered in his historic and natural relationships, psychoplasm involves something further which he denotes by the German term Anlage.

In order fully to understand all that the doctrine of Anlage comprises, we shall have to take into account Ward's theory of the monads; for, like the whole monadology, the doctrine of Anlage goes back to Leibniz. In Section 57 of his Monadology, Leibniz writes of "the special point of view of each monad." Similarly, for Ward, Anlage is "this intentional aspect of the body ...as it is for the concrete experient when - so far as we can trace it - his experience begins."[1] Interpreted in less technical language, as I understand him, Ward means that when consciousness begins the individual is already in possession of a presentational plasm or continuum. From the moment of the birth of consciousness on, this continuum undergoes modification, but nevertheless, in some sense it persists, and itself modifies the process of experience. This original given factor, which, though soon modified, persists and itself modifies, is the Anlage which is comprised in psychoplasm when considered as of the concrete individual. "It would be psychoplasm," says Ward, "but psychoplasm as modified by

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1. PP, 428.

heredity."[1]

3. Objective and Subjective Factors

In order to complete our survey of Ward's definition of the continuum, we must note the respective places which he gives to the objective and the subjective factors in the process of the modification of the objective continuum in experience. Here we touch upon a matter of great importance for the understanding of Ward's general psychology; namely, his insistence upon the activity of the self or subject.[2]

In the first place, he insists that the two factors are found always together. Specifically, he says,

> ...At every step the subjective and the objective aspects, function and structure, the experient and the experienced, mutually mould and modify each other.[3]

This is not to say, however, that they are of equal importance in the determination of experience. In analysis, which is primary for knowledge, the objective aspect and results are obtrusive. But in the actual world of experience in its ongoing, he holds that it is the subjective factor, i.e., interest, which is determinant. Let us have the statement in his own words:

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1. PP, 428.
2. ROE, 104-106; PP, 69; NAA, II, 255.
3. PP, 410.

> There must be material to synthesize, of course: we cannot synthesize what is not 'given.' But we do not synthesize merely on the ground of presentation. Differentiation implies some concentration of attention; but effective synthesis implies interest as well.[1]

And, again, he puts the matter even more strongly when he writes, a little farther on in the same passage;

> So the objective differentiation progresses on <u>subjectively</u> determined lines. This is for psychology the first and fundamental fact: to lose sight of it is to miss the essential meaning of experience.[2]

In Ward's thought, then, the objective continuum as actually presented has a twofold determination: (i) it is determined by the objects which are presented. According to his monadistic metaphysics these objects are real, for "presentation is a relation among monads not a subjective state in a single monad."[3] (ii) The continuum owes its modifications (i.e., differentiations) largely to the selective activity of the dominant monad (the activistic subject.) This total activity Ward calls "attention,"[4] meaning thereby the total reactive activity of the subject.

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1. PP, 414.
2. PP, 415. Italics his.
3. ROE, 260. Cf. 54, 466.
4. Cf. above quotations from PP, and PP, 57; ROE, 54, 260, 466. On "attention," as Ward uses that term, see <u>supra</u>, Chapter Six, Sec. A,4,a.

C. The Significance of the Theory of the Continuum

1. It is a Scientific Theory

And now, having summarized Ward's doctrine of the presentational continuum, let us move on to our first criticism of Marshall's treatment of that doctrine. That advance can best be made through a discussion of the significance of the continuum in Ward's thought and work.

The first, and the essential point to note here is that for James Ward the continuum was always a scientific theory. This may seem obvious, and yet it is important, particularly if one is to understand rightly the relation of the theory to Ward's underlying metaphysics and to the speculative principle of continuity. For that the continuum theory is scientific, not metaphysical or epistemological, means, first of all, that its basis is purely empirical, and not speculative. It is, for Ward, primarily a sound interpretation of the plain facts of conscious experience. Psychology, for him, was always "an empirical science which deals with experience as fact."[1] How anyone can read the Psychological Principles and overlook or be in confusion on this point is hard to see. Certainly there seems to be no doubt about the matter, so far as explicit judgment goes. Marshall himself

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1. Marshall, CWP, 38; Ward, PP, 26.

plainly recognizes the fact, as we have just noted. W. E. Johnson states what would seem to be a consensus of opinion when he writes: "Empirical psychology in the work of James Ward was united to a more complete and thorough-going method."[1]

This is not to deny the fact that the continuum theory is a theory, and not simply a scientific observation. On the basis of the observed facts, Ward has built a logical superstructure (particularly as regards the subjective factor in the determination of the continuum) which he believes is entirely warranted, nay, rather, is demanded by the facts. This, too, is completely within the range of legitimate science, and is the common practice of all kinds of scientists. True, his acceptance of the general principle of continuity undoubtedly affected Ward's concept of the continuum, but only in the "general and interpretative fashion, illustrative of the general truth that 'Nature never makes leaps,'" referred to above.[2] But in no sense does it transform the theory from a scientific hypothesis into a philosophical speculation.

2. The Theory is Not Self-Sufficient

Whence then arises the apparent confusion between the

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1. In the British Journal of Psychology, 16 (1925) 3. Quoted by Marshall, CWP,1.
2. Supra, p. 114.

scientific and philosophical viewpoints, which, we have intimated, seems to be manifest in the work of Dr. Marshall? It arises, I think, in the fact that the continuum theory, in the very nature of the case, points beyond itself. Even though it be found to fit perfectly the concrete psychological facts and situations (as Ward held it did), yet it was of such a nature as to demand explanation and justification that was bound to carry the speculator beyond science, into metaphysics. Ward not only recognized this,[1] but he definitely attempted to meet the challenge by his monadistic theory, and his doctrine of presentation as the result of a relation of subjects,[2] in his metaphysical theorizing. He himself was always careful not to bring this metaphysics into his scientific discussion.

3. Its Historical Significance

The continuum theory, then, is a scientific theory or interpretation of conscious presentations, and ought not to be confused with speculative explanations, and justifications which grew out of it. It remains to note very briefly the relation of Ward's work in this field to the current atomistic psychology of the England of Ward's day, and its

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1. PP, 412, n.1.
2. Ibid.; PP, 428; ROE, v, 60-64, 209-210, 257-260.

similarity to certain later systems.

The dominant note of the psychology of the last century, both in Great Britain and on the Continent, was that of analysis, and the prevailing mode was analytic sensationalism. It was against this deeply intrenched tendency within his chosen field that James Ward waged almost lone battle. That he was eminently successful in the long run, there can be little doubt. Although perhaps a bit overenthusiastic, the statement of the writer in the British Journal of Psychology is not wholly inaccurate:

> British psychology has for over a quarter of a century put off its mourning garb for associationism. Professor Ward gave mental atomism its quietus long ago.[1]

It seems doubtful whether the true significance of the continuum was very greatly appreciated at first, even by Ward's own disciples, but there can be no doubt that slowly but surely its meaning penetrated and permeated psychological theory in England. However that may be, Ward's famous article on "Psychology," which appeared first in the 9th Edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica, in 1885, was hailed at once as a masterful and authoritative piece of work.

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1. British Journal of Psychology, 16 (1925) 56. Quoted by Marshall, CWP, 2.

Although I have found no evidence of direct connection, it is of interest to note the strong similarity between Ward's continuum doctrine and the central teachings of the Gestalt psychologists.[1] In fact, the similarity seems to be so great that one might almost say that they are fundamentally the same. The explanation, perhaps, is to be found in the fact that they were opposed to the same type of analytical associationism.

D. The Problem of the Continuum

1. As Dr. J. S. Marshall Saw It

Turning once more to the aforementioned statements by Dr. John S. Marshall in The Continuum in James Ward's Psychology, we find that the underlying contention of that paper is that the psychology of Ward, the continuum theory, and, in particular, the conception of psychoplasm, are obscure and difficult because Ward failed to make clear his principles of method. He says, e.g.,

> The problem of the continuum is largely a problem of Ward's method. It is a problem of making explicit his methodological presuppositions. These are rooted in his epistemology and general philosophy ... Even Ward's philosophical writings are obscure because the postulates of method are implied rather than expressed.[2]

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1. Cf. Hartmann, GPS, 17.
2. Marshall, CWP, 4.

The problem of the continuum, in other words, is for Dr. Marshall a problem, not of psychological interpretation but of philosophical presuppositions, of Ward's underlying method of dealing with his material and its problems. Marshall gives us the impression, surely, that he intends to make these presuppositions of method clear and explicit. By implication, at least, one would also suppose that he intends to link up the presuppositions with Ward's work, particularly with the continuum theory. As we have already remarked,[1] Marshall discloses but one supposed methodological presupposition, and, so far as I can see, he fails almost entirely to show us how that principle applies to the continuum. On the other hand (I believe because he fails to distinguish the respective standpoints of science and metaphysics, which play so important a part in the understanding of Ward) he seems to me to miss the real significance of the presupposition he does expound. Let us look at his treatment of that presupposition.

2. The Principle of Continuity

We have already noted the fact that the principle of continuity is, indeed, as Marshall contends, of exceedingly

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1. Supra, Sec. A,1, of this Chapter

great importance as a speculative principle in Ward's work.[1] Whether or not it is, as Marshall holds, "the one speculative principle in Ward's general method,"[2] does not particularly concern us here. Suffice it to recognize that there can be no question but that it did underlie all of Ward's thinking. Now Marshall thinks that Ward does not make clear just what this principle means for him, or what its status is in his work. He writes:

> The principle of continuity seems to be the one speculative principle in Ward's general method. Considering that it is speculative, it is surprising that he never made a more thorough exposition of its significance and status for his system.
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> However, it may be that Ward intended that the meaning of the principle of continuity should be: it is sound method to proceed without break unless there is empirical evidence to the contrary.[3]

And that latter phrase expresses exactly, I think, just what Ward did intend the principle of continuity to mean. Dr. Marshall proceeds:

> There are many passages which have this coloring. But Ward often tends to give the principle more than a methodological meaning. That is because a methodological principle always has its influence upon the science in which it is used.[4]

Undoubtedly it is Marshall's intention to show that the doctrine of the continuum is one of those places where the

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1. Supra, Sec. A,2,a,c.
2. Marshall, CWP, 155.
3. Marshall, CWP, 155.
4. Ibid.

principle of continuity has more than a methodological meaning. Yet it is not at all apparent, to me at least, that he succeeds in doing any such thing. He gives us, in the dissertation, an excellent summary of the history of the principle of continuity. He presents also a good exposition of the details of the theory of the continuum. And he makes it fairly clear that he thinks the two are related in intimate fashion: doubtless that the continuum theory is an instance of the functioning of the principle of continuity in the thinking of James Ward. But proof or substantiation of this latter view seems to be entirely absent.

3. Is the Theory of the Continuum Speculative?

The reason for this failure to carry out the evident intention of the dissertation is, by this time, I trust, not far to seek. The principle of continuity, as Dr. Marshall rightly recognizes, is a purely speculative principle. If the theory of the continuum were a speculative doctrine, let us say, a metaphysical or epistemological explanation, it might be in order to attempt to find its basis in the principle of continuity. But for James Ward the theory of the continuum is not a speculative or philosophical doctrine. It is a clear-cut scientific hypothesis, rooted and grounded in empirical observation, and held in the conviction that it

is logically necessary as the reasonable interpretation of those observed facts. After describing, in the vivid language quoted above,[1] the 'continuity of consciousness' that he finds in experience, Ward himself states:

> In our search for a theory of presentations, then, it is from this 'continuity of consciousness' that we must take our start. Working backwards from this as we find it now, we are led alike by particular facts and general considerations to the conception of a totum objectivum or objective continuum which is gradually differentiated.[2]

The theory of the continuum, then, as a scientific theory, has little or no direct speculative connection with the principle of continuity. As a speculative methodological presupposition that "it is sound method to proceed without break unless there is empirical evidence to the contrary," of course there is connection. But evidence of more than that general connection I fail to find, either in Marshall or Ward. This is not to say that the continuum theory has no speculative bearings or meanings. It most certainly does; but those bearings and meanings all hinge upon and follow after its validity, first of all, as a scientific hypothesis. It is because Marshall fails to recognize clearly the scientific nature of the continuum theory, and

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1. Supra, Sec. B,1, second quotation; note the whole section.
2. Ward, PP, 76. Cf. the context of this quotation, and also pages 49-50.

constantly confuses, therefore, the two standpoints in the work of James Ward (i.e., the scientific and the philosophical) that he falls into the error of contending that the problem of the continuum is a problem of the methodological presuppositions, and that he likewise misses the true significance of speculation with respect to the continuum.

This true significance, I believe, is this: that the continuum theory, while it may be a sound interpretation of the facts, is not completely self-explanatory. Particularly under the historical conditions of its development, it demanded further justification: a fitting into and checking up with the whole philosophy of nature and life of which it must manifestly be a part. Here, indeed, speculation must play the leading part; and here, indeed, the principle of continuity becomes of prime importance. But that takes us to the subject of the monadology, and, incidently points us back to the main theme of this paper.

We may, then, sum up our criticism of Dr. Marshall's attempt (or at least, projected attempt) to discover the principle of continuity in the origin and development of the continuum theory, by saying, in homely phrase, that he got the cart before the horse.

4. What Does Ward's Continuum Imply?

Thus far in this Chapter we have been dealing primarily with the first of Marshall's two statements, which we set out to criticize.[1] Over against his contention that the problem of the continuum was speculative (i.e., was that of "making explicit" Ward's "methodological presuppositions") we have set the plain fact that the continuum is a scientific hypothesis, with only a comparatively minor and unimportant relation to the only methodological presupposition Marshall is able to uncover (i.e., to the principle of continuity). Interesting as this statement is, in itself, however, its chief importance for our problem of body-mind relations is in its implications. Those implications come to a head in the second statement we quoted[2] and set out to criticize. This was to the effect that the theory of the continuum is proof that Ward was not a genuine pluralist, not a true monadologist; that this theory, on the empirical level, transcends extreme pluralism.

Now in the first place, we must agree with Marshall, in so far as his statement implies that James Ward was not ultimately a pluralist. That is true: he was a theist, as Part II of the Realm of Ends adequately reveals.[3] But, in

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1. Supra, Sec. A,1, of this Chapter.
2. Ibid.
3. "Theism," pages 225-453.

entire disagreement with Dr. Marshall, (i) I contend that if he is right and the theory of the continuum actually contradicts pluralism and monadism, then Ward's whole system, including the doctrines of the dominant monad, the functional unity of the society of selves, and the continuum, falls with the monadism; but (ii) I insist that this is not the case: that the theory of the continuum does not refute either monadism or pluralism, but merely points beyond them.

The curious thing about Marshall's statements that "the theory of the continuum is the supreme expression of the fact that Ward is not a genuine monadologist," and that "the continuum theory is itself a refutation of extreme pluralism"[1] is that they are interlarded with sentences that give the key to the whole problem:

> The unity of presentations seems to be due to the fact that they are presentations of one attending subject. It is the dominant monad that makes possible the functional organization which makes up a human body or community of subjects...The functional unity of the society of selves is as central for him as the selves. Ward does not need to transcend the empirical level to find his pluralism transcended.[2]

With any or all of these latter statements I have no quarrel. They are accurate statements of Ward's teaching. But all that they can possibly mean, it seems to me, is

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1. Marshall, CWP, 138-139.
2. Loc. cit.

(i) that Ward's monads do have "windows," and that, therefore, it is epistemologically that his pluralism is transcended;[1] and (ii) that this transcendence points to a personalistic, panpsychic pluralism. To draw out of them the inference which Marshall does is simply to ignore the distinctions between epistemological, metaphysical and scientific standpoints.[3] For the continuum is a scientific hypothesis. Partly on the basis of it, and in explanation of it, Ward works out his doctrine of the dominant monad and the consequent functional unity of the society of selves in the human individual. If from this theory of the continuum one makes a direct metaphysical inference (as Marshall does) he is ignoring the purely scientific status of the continuum in Ward's own thought, and elevating it into a metaphysical reality in its own right. This is to upset Ward's whole monadistic system, and deny the very doctrines from which Marshall himself is arguing: the dominant monad, the functional unity of the individual, and even the very nature of the continuum as a presentational continuum. For Ward states definitely that "presentation is a relation among monads not a subjective state in a single monad,"[2] and the only

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1. As Ward himself clearly taught. See ROE, 260, 466.
2. ROE, 260.
3. Cf. supra, 21-23, 24-25.

ontological realities involved are the active, psychic beings - the monads. The continuum is only phenomenally real, and in no sense except the epistemological does it transcend pluralism. Ontologically, again, the functional unity implies only the dominant monad and its active, pluralistic relations with the subordinate monads which, for Ward, are the body of the individual. How or in what sense there is any denial or refutation of monadology or pluralism involved, either in the doctrine of functional unity, or in the theory of the continuum rightly understood, I am not able to see. Of course, from the point of Bownian, view of occasionalistic personalism the entire problem of presentations is altered - and with it the whole body-mind problem. In that case - granting that the facts justify a continuum theory - the continuum may be regarded as the phenomenal expression of the ontological unity of the direct action of the divine mind on the subject.[1] That seems to me to be the ultimate source of Marshall's confusions of standpoint. He had failed to sterilize completely his verbal and intellectual instruments, and so has seriously infected with

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1. Of course, for Ward, as for all theists, the ultimate source of all unity is the divine mind. In a footnote in PP, 286, n.1, e.g., he makes such an implication. But this is far beyond the empirical facts of science. In ROE, Part II, this is worked out metaphysically.

his own metaphysics an otherwise objective and valuable study of the continuum and its meaning in Ward's more realistic personalism.

CHAPTER NINE
PROBLEMS OF MATTER AND THE BODY

A. The Realms of Experience

1. The Kantian Distinction

Returning now to the more direct examination of Ward's thought in relation to the body-mind problem, we naturally take up for consideration next the aspects which have to do with matter and the body. On the psychological level, as we have seen, Ward held that matter and body are presented in experience as an objective continuum. In delving below the surface of this psychological continuum, Ward, as he so often did, followed the guidance of Immanuel Kant, and began his metaphysical thought with the distinction of two realms of experience. These two realms, the realm of nature and the realm of ends, he held to be genuine aspects of the one universe.[1] Ward contrasts these two realms thus:

> The one never reaches the individual and concrete, the other never leaves them; for the one spontaneity and initiative are impossible, for the other inertia and rigorous concatenation; to the one the notions of end and value are fruitless, nay meaningless, for the other they are of paramount importance.[2]

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1. ROE, Lecture I.
2. ROE, 2-3.

Yet Ward was rightly careful to note that these two very distinct realms were only aspects of the one world, and that just here was the problem: "where and how are we to find the final unification or mediation of the two?"[1]

2. The Primacy of the Spiritual

The first step for Ward is to decide which of the two aspects is the more fundamental. In Naturalism and Agnosticism he examines at length the claims of those who hold the realm of nature to be primary, and of those who are driven by the contradictions of that position to posit an unknown tertium quid, of which both are aspects. He finds that both of these attempts are futile, and so in The Realm of Ends he sets out to explore the possibilities of taking the spiritual as primary. This position, he says, "will have this advantage, that while it may be possible, setting out from mind, to account for mechanism , it is impossible, setting out from mechanism to account for mind."[2] Again, he puts the matter clearly:

> That the mechanical aspect in itself is thoroughgoing is precisely the position frankly accepted...Again, the facts (1) that the teleological is there, and (2) that the mechanical scheme can find no place for it, are precisely the reasons which lead us to conclude that the mechanical theory cannot be either ultimate or supreme.[3]

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1. ROE, 3.
2. ROE, 18. Cf. 431.
3. NAA, II, 285-286.

Thus far, as over against the naturalists and absolute monists, Ward seems to be unquestionably correct in his general procedure and conclusions. If metaphysics is to be based upon all the facts of experience, then it is only by abstracting from or ignoring the reality of teleological facts that philosophers can maintain mechanistic determinism, whether naturalistic, realistic or idealistic.

3. The Reality of Nature

But although Ward took the standpoint of the supremacy of the spiritual aspect, he never made the mistake of denying altogether the metaphysical reality of the material aspect. Nature, for him was real: it was there to be explained, never to be in any sense explained away. Ultimately it was indeed found to be of the nature of spirit or mind, but it was not, on that account, to be regarded as merely phenomenal. "As actual," he declares, "it is - so far as we can judge from its physical constitution - just what it always has been, the permanent theatre of perpetual changes."[1]

These two factors in his thinking: the supremacy of the spiritual, and the reality of nature, issue in two definite principles upon which his metaphysics rests. The first of

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1. NAA, I, 197-198.

these is that of the entire instrumentality of the physical world. The second is, in a word, his personalism. Although finding indirect expression here and there, this first principle is stated in absolute clearness in his discussion of the cosmology of theism, when he declares:

> ...In short, the physical world is simply a system of means provided for the sake of the realm of ends: it is only to be understood as subservient to them, and apart from them is alike meaningless and worthless.[1]

With this ultimate view of the essential meaning of physical nature, it is natural that he should be led to the second basic position which he rather strikingly summarizes in these sentences in the first chapter of the The Realm of Ends:

> Man only knows the world as it faces him and he interacts with it, and he knows it only so far as he finds it intelligible. And finding it intelligible he can only conclude that it is not after all an alien Other but has its ground and meaning either in another self or in a community of selves. This much we are taking as already clear.[2]

If this seems a short and easy method of arriving at a fundamental standpoint (as indeed it is!), we must remember that practically all of his philosophical writing is an attempt in one way or another to expand and justify this point of view. So far as I am aware, he never gathered up into brief compass the arguments for these fundamental

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1. ROE, 252.
2. ROE, 28. (Italics mine.)

metaphysical first principles, as distinct from the more general position with regard to the supremacy of the spiritual. Here again, perhaps, we have a reflection of the scholastic and religious interests and atmosphere of his day and his environment. His battle was against the Gog and Magog of natural realism and agnostic monism, and he was not greatly concerned to defend his particular metaphysical creed against those who belonged in the same ontological household of faith. Yet we are face to face, here, with a fundamental question and a speculative decision of first-rate importance to our body-mind problem. What is the exact status of the physical world (which includes, of course, our own bodies)? Must we regard it personalistically, as Ward assumed in the last quotation above? If so, are we to regard it realistically, throughout, as he did, or phenomenalistically and occasionalistically? What are his grounds for the positions he holds, so far as we can work them out?

Let us consider first his grounds for the rejection of phenomenalistic occasionalism.

B. Realism versus Phenomenalistic Occasionalism

1. The Status of the Problem

The problem as Ward faced it is stated succinctly in the last phrase of the quotation just cited: for the personal idealist the world "has its ground and meaning either in another self or in a community of selves." Which?

As we have just indicated, Ward was clearly conscious of the metaphysical kinship of all who accepted the spiritual as the primary, regardless of their choice of these alternatives. We reiterate the fact that his chief interest was in asserting and defending the broader standpoint, because, in many respects, his discussion of this (to him) secondary alternative is sketchy and inconclusive.[1] However, just because, from the point of view of the body-mind problem, the question of the metaphysical analysis of the physical world is so all-important, we must consider carefully such reasons as Ward does offer or suggest for his choice of realistic panpsychism.

2. Simplicity of Explanation

In the first place, Ward held panpsychism to be prefer-

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1. ROE, 247-269.

able to the occasionalistic hypothesis[1] commonly adopted by idealistic theists, on the ground of simplicity of explanatory principles. Although he specifically denies the validity of Leibniz's charge against occasionalism, viz., that it involves "perpetual miracle" and "irrational recourse to a Deus ex machina,"[2] yet he does contend that it introduces a cumbersome duality of divine activity. The panpsychist, he tells us, may indeed find it difficult to specify the exact nature of the psychical intercourse of the monads,

> But it is questionable whether - nothwithstanding this - the occasionalist with his apparent psycho-physical interaction is not in a worse position; for he only dispenses with the need for any specification by assuming what we may call a 'dualism' in the divine activity, and that to many minds will always appear too cumbrous and, so to say, unscientific, to be intellectually satisfactory.[3]

This "cumbrous and, so to say, unscientific" dualism, is a dualism entirely within the divine activity in the sense that God first creates the selves or persons who are ends in themselves; and then, in order that this realm of ends

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1. In these following Sections I have in mind particularly the doctrines of idealistic occasionalists - as I feel sure Ward had - although Ward clearly recognizes the fact that, historically, occasionalism was most often associated with ontological dualism.
2. ROE, 249.
3. ROE, 257.

may function (i.e., that these purposeful beings may have intercourse with one another) it is necessary that we posit for him a second and a different type of activity. This is a mediating activity, which on the phenomenal view of nature, appears to us as the physical world. Now panpsychism, Ward holds, is simpler in that there is only one kind of activity posited: the original creative effort which brings into existence a world of cognitive and conative monads, whose mutual psychical interaction provides all the necessary mediation.

This argument, it must be admitted, is hardly impressive. In the first place, Ward ignores the fact that both panpsychism and occasionalism must, in any case, posit a duality of divine activity, viz., creativity and conservation. Granted, for the sake of argument, that panpsychism does avoid a distinctly different form of activity (i.e., the mediative), yet it so vastly increases the complexity of the conserving activity that one may well question whether, in the last analysis, the conception is any less cumbrous or unscientific than that of occasionalism. But it is not at all clear that panpsychism does or can reduce the number of types of divine activity by dispensing with a distinctly different form in mediation. What it does, and all that it does, is to reduce mediation, so to speak, to its lowest terms:

> The existence of an indefinite number of such monads ['bare' monads, in sympathetic rapport] would provide all the 'uniform medium' for the intercourse of higher monads that these can require, without any need for such divine intervention as occasionalism assumes.[1]

Thus, apparently, Ward pushes the problem of the explanation of the mediation back out of sight, but he has not yet solved it apart from recourse to a special form of divine activity. For the direct mediation of occasionalism he has substituted the indirect and vague mediation of the "sympathetic rapport" of an indefinite number of 'bare' monads. Before this can be accepted as less cumbrous and more scientific, even as regards types of divine activity, it is necessary to examine more closely and critically the concept of "sympathetic rapport." Apart from the immediate question of panpsychism versus phenomenalistic occasionalism, such an examination cannot be long postponed, for Ward's entire theory of the physical universe would seem to rest ultimately upon this idea of the psychical relation of simple monads.[2] Meanwhile we may well doubt whether panpsychism has any real advantage over occasionalism as a simple explanation of the divine activity which either is the physical world, or which produces and sustains that world.

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1. ROE, 257.
2. To that examination a large part of the next Chapter of this dissertation is devoted.

3. Epistemological Difficulties

Ward is on safer ground when he rejects occasionalism because of its epistemological difficulties. According to the occasionalist, presentations are subjective modifications, due directly to the activity of the divine mind in contact with the experiencing mind. In this assumption, declares Ward,

> Occasionalism becomes hampered with all the epistemological difficulties of what is known as subjective idealism, difficulties which made the existence of the external world such a hopeless problem for modern philosophers till Reid began to clear the way by his criticism of the Cartesian 'theory of ideas.'[1]

The problem suggested by Ward, here, is, in its entirety, one far beyond the scope of the immediate discussion, both in extent and in substance. Suffice it to say, first of all, that it is questionable, perhaps unfair, to say that "all" the difficulties of subjective idealism must be imputed to occasionalism. That would seem to be a patent over-statement. Modern philosophical occasionalism, at least, carefully avoids some of the difficulties in question. In particular, for example, those difficulties inherent in Cartesian and Berkelian "ideas" are no more to be imputed to occasionalism than

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1. ROE, 259.

to panpsychism. Homer seems to have been nodding at this point!

But, on the other hand, there is a residuum of truth in Ward's charge. On the occasionalistic assumption, we know nothing of the nature of an absolutely unmediated contact of one human mind with another. Our knowledge of other minds would seem to be mediated, exactly as is our knowledge of things. How, therefore, can the occasionalist account for the rise of knowledge of the realistic existence of other minds, while imputing only phenomenal existence to things? It would seem that such knowledge cannot be accounted for, logically, by the occasionalist, without the pure assumption of an additional realistic factor which not only is absent from occasionalism per se, but is really foreign to that explanation. In any case, it would seem only arbitrarily to be limitable to other minds, and denied to things. Ward's position (which he nowhere argues in detail) is that a complete realism of other minds and things is both a simpler and a prior hypothesis -

> If that can be called a hypothesis which claims to be the bare statement of the facts... and further, we may say with some confidence that occasionalism would never have heard of but for the Cartesian dualism of matter and mind and the Cartesian theory of ideas as subjective states.[1]

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1. ROE, 260.

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

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1. [illegible]

In other words, on what logical basis does phenomenalistic occasionalism posit any ontological distinction between persons and things - other than the basis of pure assumption? Of course, the necessities of coherent general explanation may seem to demand such an assumption, but Ward is strongly convinced to the contrary,[1] I think rightly. At this point, as he intimates, occasionalism is in the same boat with the Leibnizian "windowless monads"; and, compared to the epistemological simplicity of Ward's conception of really interacting monads, it is true, as he says,

> That God should have created the monads without windows and taken on himself the function of supplying their place - whether continuously, as the occasionalists assumed, or once for all, as Leibniz held - seems then a needless complication.[2]

4. The Problem of Evolution

Ward's third major argument for panpsychic realism is concerned with the functional or dynamical aspect of the world. With the details of the contribution of Ward's monadism to a possible explanation of evolution we shall be

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1. If the occasionalists are right, and things are phenomenal then the divine mind would seem logically to be the <u>only</u> realistic object strictly knowable, and one is driven to a pure phenomenalism (Cf. Renouvier, PER), and ontological singularism - apart, again, from pure assumption.
2. ROE, 260.

concerned later,[1] but certain general aspects must be noted here. Ward was convinced, on excellent grounds, that monadism more completely and simply accounts for the ongoing and progression of nature than does phenomenalistic occasionalism.

The human constituents of the realm of ends are members of the natural order, in a real sense, Ward contends.

> It was Leibniz himself, the founder of modern pluralism, who said that "a disembodied soul would be a deserter from the general order, which implies matter and movement and their laws."[2]

Life and mind arise out of nature and are dependent on nature; and the inorganic and lower organic parts of nature evidently precede the higher organisms. Truly all must admit that Natur ist die Vorstufe des Geistes, on any system. Yet Ward points out that for the monistic occasionalist, as Lotze said, nature is "only a system of occasions or means for producing presentations in spiritual beings."[3] Now, Ward declares,

> For the monist...to suppose nevertheless that this system is maintained by the divine activity, when as yet there are no spiritual subjects to benefit by it; nay, to suppose further that this system is actually itself not so much a means adapted to them but rather a means to which they are adapted - surely this is a ὕστερον πρότερον not easy to match.[4]

A partial answer to this argument of Ward's may be given

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1. See next Chapter.
2. ROE, 254.
3. Lotze, MET, Par. 97. Quoted, ROE, 264.
4. ROE, 264.

on the basis of the doctrine of the "Given", advocated by Dr. E. S. Brightman.[1] On this view, nature is not merely "a system of occasions or means for producing presentations." It is an order of the divine experience, and the irrationality suggested by Ward in this passage is to be explained on the basis of the Given in the nature of God, with which he is in eternal struggle.

Then, again, panpsychic realism avoids any "breach of evolutional continuity"[2] in accounting for the appearance of life, mind and self-conscious spirit, in nature. And as we saw,[3] Ward held, more or less consistently, to the Leibnizian dictum: Natura non facit saltus. Further, it is possible, on this system, to account for the waste and "natural evils" of the physical world, without immediate resort to an inexplicable "Given" in the divine nature and activity, such as that to which occasionalistic personalism is quite logically driven.[4] As moral evil is accounted for by human freedom, so natural evil may be explained by the real, if limited, freedom of the monads, and by their acquisition

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1. Brightman, POG, 113,123-138; 182-193. Cf. FOG, 152-153, 172-178, 184-193.
2. Loc. cit.
3. Chapter Eight.
4. ROE, 87-89, 349-360. Cf. Brightman, POG, loc. cit, and Ward's essay, "The Present Trend of Speculation," EIP, especially pages 177-181.

of habitual behavior.

The acceptance or rejection of Ward's argument here would seem to depend upon one 's presuppositions. If the principle of continuity is to be taken seriously in building a metaphysics; and if one is bound to commit as little as possible to his asylum of ignorance, in explaining the details of the world; then there would seem to be merit in Ward's position. This does not mean the denial of the Given; for in any case waste, evil, and irrationality are undeniable aspects of the natural world, and must be imputed to God, ultimately, if the monads are created. But at least some measure of irrationality would be avoided. Clearly, also, justification, on the basis of the production of character, for imputing freedom to the monads, which is necessary for a solution of the problem of natural, evil, depends upon a rigorous application of the principle of continuity.

Thus because of its positive advantages in accounting for the evolutionary character of nature, as well as for what seem to me to be its epistemological advantages in accounting for the knowledge of the real existence of both persons and things,[1] Ward would seem to have some justification for his choice of panpsychism rather than occasionalistic personalism.

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1. Cf. <u>supra</u>, 147, 148.

C. Monadism and Nature

1. The Ultimate Question Involved

In the previous Section (B) we have examined Ward's choice of panpsychic realism rather than occasionalistic personalism. We must now consider certain problems arising in the physical sciences which call into question the panpsychic element of Ward's realism. The ultimate question which these ensuing considerations set before us is this: Granted Ward's insistence upon the primacy of the spiritual and the necessity of a "refined anthropomorphic" standpoint, is it necessary or urgently reasonable to interpret the real physical world in purely mentalistic terms? Ward held that it was; hence his monadism. A negative answer would point toward the interpretation of refined common sense (e.g., Neo-Scholasticism) or of critical realism. Naturally, a fair evaluation cannot be made until we have considered in greater detail Ward's doctrine of evolution and his interpretation of causal interaction.[1] Nevertheless, this ultimate question should be borne in mind as we discuss certain other more general problems of his monadistic interpretation of nature.

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1. See next Chapter.

2. Natural Law and Mechanism

One of the very difficult features of Ward's monadology is that of the psychical explanation of all natural laws and natural mechanism.[1] But though very difficult, it is not an impossible conception, nor even a manifestly improbable one. From the point of view of Ward's interpretation, the difficult aspect of natural law and mechanism, as ordinarily conceived, is the absolute lack of anything remotely resembling, or even indicating the presence of freedom or contingent choice. The key word here is "necessity," and if that were all that were to be found in nature, then, indeed, we would be justified in describing the world as a "rigorous and mechanical concatenation of things such as naturalism is wont to assume."[2] But this is not all. There is contingency in the natural world, and there is freedom in the realm of ends (which, as we have pointed out, is for Ward inextricably imbedded in the realm of nature.) Starting frankly from the realm of ends as primary, and consistently holding to the historical-moral or refined anthropomorphic standpoint and norm, Ward is, of course, obviously able to account for most

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1. Vide ut supra, Chap. Six, Sec. B. 3, a. Cf. ROE, 63-80.
2. ROE, 78.

contingency and all freedom. That much, at least, is clear gain; for he is beyond question correct in his contention that mechanism *per se* never can account for the facts of contingency, teleology and mind.[1]

The difficulty with the panpsychic explanation is the other side of the problem, viz., how to account for the rigid and inanimate, or the strictly mechanistic aspects of nature. Now Ward holds that these aspects can be accounted for by monadism. In a word, his explanation is this: habit, and the statistical constancy of large numbers. He himself states it in a brief sentence: "The fixity, so far as it is real, will embody the result of experience; so far as it is apparent, it will be due...to the statistical constancy of large numbers."[2] Although finding its type or analogue on the level of human experience, this explanation refers of course to the experience and numbers of the innumerable simple or 'bare' monads which constitute the inorganic world, and are the basis of organic nature.

Now in the nature of the case, there can be no proof or disproof of this explanation. All that we can say about it is that Ward, in his exposition of it, makes it seem possible. He is able to show, I think, that the unquestionable presence

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1. ROE, 14-18, and *passim*. NAA, I, Chaps. IX, X.
2. ROE, 78.

of natural laws and mechanism - of "fixity" in nature - is not an insuperable barrier to panpsychism.[1] But so far as rational argument for the position goes, it is all contained in the sentence quoted above.

3. The Extent of Psychic Animation

Granting that nature may be explained monadistically, we must further ask, What are the probabilities of the real existence of psychic life below the level where it can be clearly and reasonably demonstrated? In other words, What are the grounds, if any, for the extention of psychic animation to apparently inanimate portions of the physical world?

In dealing with this problem, we note, first, that the line of demarcation is very dim and broad. It is impossible to say that here psychic life definitely appears to cease, or at this point it clearly begins, in any ordered arrangement of living creatures. As we go down in the scale, so far as we can tell, the life of mind seems to fade out very gradually into purely mechanistic activity; and even the organic itself fades only gradually into the surely inorganic.

Now as to Ward's grounds for assuming the psychic animation of all nature: aside from general considerations of

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1. See ROE, 65-67.

the adaptability of monadism to the facts of nature, there seem to be two, (i) Spinoza's principle of the "animation of all individual things," and (ii) the Leibnizian principle (referred to above) of continuity, according to which, "Nature never makes leaps."[1] Once again, precise and definite justification of these principles, on Ward's part, does not seem to be available. He apparently assumes them, on the basis of his general contentions versus naturalism and in defence of the primacy of the spiritual, and then proceeds to show that it is possible to understand the universe, if, proceeding with these principles, one extends mentalism throughout nature.

Over against this position we must weigh a very strong scientific objection. Ward himself points out that the lowest known organisms are "highly complex and extremely varied," but claims that "there is nothing to suggest that we have reached the limits of life." He insists, further, that

> All we can say is that our senses and the artificial aids and methods of research at present available do not enable us to discriminate between yet simpler forms of life and <u>their</u> environment; not that these do not exist.[2]

With what is here said as a general statement of fact concerning our senses and the state of research, we can have

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1. ROE, 20-21. <u>Supra</u>, Chap. Eight, Sec. A,2.
2. ROE, 21.

no quarrel. But it is not clear that that is "all we can say," nor that "there is nothing to suggest that we have reached the limits of life." The facts are these, as Professor C. D. Broad points out:

> Everything which we have the least ground for believing to be sentient is a living organism; i.e., a highly complicated material structure consisting of millions of molecules. Moreover, every organism is composed of a comparatively few chemical elements, viz., Carbon, Oxygen, Hydrogen, Nitrogen, Sulphur and Phosphorus.[1]

Lacking <u>any</u> scientific evidence for sentient life below the level of these "highly complicated material structures," it would seem that nothing short of absolute logical necessity should force us to posit such psychic animation of apparently inanimate nature. Whether there is such necessity is, again, the ultimate question. All that we are concerned with here, however, is to note that the application of the principles of animation and continuity, in the simple and easy Leibnizian fashion that Ward adopts, completely overlooks or ignores certain plain facts of inanimation and discontinuity clearly revealed by scientific analysis. It is, truly, as Broad states, "an enormous extrapolation to ascribe any kind of sentience to inorganic matter which does not consist of these six chemical elements."[2] General philosophical

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1. Broad, MPN, 645.
2. Ibid.

considerations and the theoretical adaptibility of monadism to the gross facts of nature and of life hardly justify such "an enormous extrapolation," in the face of specific facts such as those involved in the intricate structure and limited chemical constitution of all known living sentient organisms.

4. The Monadistic Constitution of Body

Our progress then, thus far, may be summed up by saying that we must grant that it is not impossible to explain natural law and mechanism monadistically, but that there are real, though negative, difficulties in the way of extending psychical animation throughout apparently inanimate nature. These difficulties demand strong grounds, if we are to adopt that assumption. Before we leave the direct consideration of the monadistic conception, to consider such possible grounds in the problems of interaction and evolution, we must ask another question: Is there anything in our direct experience of body which weighs for or against the theory of the monadistic constitution of our bodies?

It is to be noted that in answering this question we are not concerned with epistemological and psychological problems of body-mind relationships. We are asking simply whether, at the point where our knowledge of physical matter should be most intimate, almost immediate and direct, there is any

evidence which would seem to support or to bring into question Ward's theory that the body consists of a vast multitude of monads in functional relations of peculiar intimacy?

So far as direct empirical observation goes, of course, there is and can be no evidence for or against monadism. As Ward well said, in another connection, the monadistic interpretation "goes far beyond our psychological facts: it is a speculative 'first chapter' in place of the psychological one, which we have had to admit to be lacking."[2] Yet it does seem that on the empirical level of psychology there are certain general facts plainly evident, of which Ward seems to have taken little or no account. These facts may be comprehended under the statement that life and consciousness have always an organic basis, and that nothing in our observation of our own bodily experience warrants us in any other conclusion. True though it be, as Ward contends,[1] that the conception of organism is fundamentally teleological, that does not alter the fact that whenever and wherever we have any experience of our own bodies which we have any clear right to call psychical or mental, there we always find a certain complicated arrangement of "living"

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1. E.G., Muirhead, CBP, II, 41. Cf. NAA, II, 26-29; ROE, 209-211, etc.
2. PP, 412, n. 1.

matter which we call "neural." We have no immediate or "internal" bodily experience which is an experience of matter, per se. Direct bodily experience is always of matter as organized protoplasmically, and, probably, as organized neurally. In other words, there is absolutely nothing in our experience of our own physical organism to justify the extension of psychical animation to all matter, but only, at most, to matter in certain specific configurations and combinations.

As we go on to study the problem of causal interaction and of evolution, it will be well to bear in mind these facts, negative though they are: that the extension of psychic activity to the conception of inanimate matter has not the slightest empirical basis, but is a purely speculative assumption; and furthermore, such an assumed extension must be made in face of the facts, scientifically both objective and introspective, that psychical animation seems clearly limited to complicated organisms, constituted of a half dozen chemical elements.

CHAPTER TEN
PROBLEMS OF PSYCHIC ANIMATION

A. The Problem of Physical Interaction

1. Ward's Lotzian Background

Now Ward had at hand two arguments which he might have used far more clearly and forcefully than he did, as grounds for an extension of psychic animation. I refer to (i) the monadistic interpretation of causal interaction of things, and (ii) the argument from evolution. This is not to imply that Ward was not conscious of the importance of these considerations; for he was, and he dealt with both at some length. But, apparently, he did not consider that monadism needed 'bolstering up' in this fashion; so he merely deals with evolution as exhibiting the adaptability of monadism to the facts of nature, and treats of interaction as a difficulty which can be solved by pluralism quite as well as by singularism. No doubt this attitude is explicable as due to his complete idealism or mentalism. He could entertain no conceptions of realism save of that natural realism which he felt, rightly, had been rendered _hors de combat_ in _Naturalism and Agnosticism._ But we of a later day must reckon with

critical and neo-realisms, which are hardly within the scope of Ward's anti-naturalistic arguments.

Considering first the problem of causal interaction in the physical world, we note that Ward's treatment of this problem was highly colored, if not rather completely determined by his approach to it through the work of Lotze. This philosopher, beginning as Ward did with the Many, came to the conclusion, speculatively, that causal interaction, or as he called it, "transeunt action" was really unthinkable. Ward gives us Lotze's argument "in its barest outline" as follows:

> Since attributes cannot be separated from substances, "no state can detach itself from the thing A, whose state it was, so as to subsist even for an infinitesimally small moment between A and B, as a state but yet nobody's state, and then connect itself with B so as to become its state."[1]

On the basis of this impossibility, Lotze posits singularism as a speculative necessity; but Ward, having previously accepted the pluralistic standpoint, explains such interaction on the basis of the purely psychical nature and the 'sympathetic <u>rapport</u>' of the monads which constitute "things."

The point to emphasize here is that Ward apparently accepted without criticism Lotze's analysis. And, on the basis

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1. ROE, 216. The quotation is from Lotze, presumably, but Ward does not give its source.

of that analysis, Ward's psychical interpretation does become as reasonable a ground for the positing of monadism as Lotze's argument (or lack of it) for the assumption of singularism. Ward seems entirely justified (other considerations apart) in holding that the pluralistic explanation can account for causal interaction if it be granted that Lotze's metaphysical analysis and exposition of causal interaction is correct.

2. Analysis, Abstraction, and the Phenomenal

The weakness of Ward's treatment of interaction lies in his acceptance of Lotze's rationalistic and analytic approach to the facts. To some, this "weakness" may seem to be its strength. For we touch here a fundamental question of standpoint which can no longer be avoided. Ward's thought, proceeds from a mixture of the standpoints of analytic rationalism and concrete empiricism, which now and then becomes a confusion. Nowhere is that confusion more evident than in his treatment of the problem of causal interaction, for this problem involves the troublesome questions of the nature and meaning of "phenomena" and the "psychical."

That both standpoints (i.e., that of analytic rationalism and that of empirical realism) may be philosophically justified, and that the same thinker may, nay, must embrace

both in differing situations, may be freely admitted. It is not the mixture, but rather the confusion or inconsistency in their use, with which we are here concerned. Let us examine, first, the two standpoints in Ward's doctrine of phenomena.

In his criticisms of naturalistic realism Ward contended strongly that naturalism, in its assumption that the conceptual constructions by which science interprets phenomena were to be taken as real, is guilty of a rationalistic error nothing short of absurd. For by this assumption, "reason attains *a priori* to a knowledge of the real *per se*,"[1] and thus he states plainly, "it perpetrates the absurdity we have so often stigmatized of phenomena *per se*." [2] Throughout his criticism of naturalism, Ward holds consistently to this standpoint that the concrete deliverances of experience are the real. Thus, for instance, he contends that the notion of empty space and empty time, as necessary antecedents of the things and events that are said to fill them, is an inversion of reality;[3] and, again, he asks rhetorically,

> Why should appearances not be reality? Nay what else can they be? How can reality appear, shine forth, and yet remain totally and forever beyond the knowledge of those to whom it appears?[4]

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1. NAA, II, 181. Cf. 104, 149-151, 272, 275-276.
2. Ibid.; quotation, 276.
3. NAA, II, 149-151.
4. NAA, II, 276.

On the other hand, when he comes to build his own system, he begins well enough on the empirical level of concrete experience;[1] but almost at once he abandons his concrete empiricism by adopting as his hypothesis the abstract and analytical mentalism of the Leibnizian-Lotzian monadology. His interests here (The Realm of Ends) are primarily the defense of spiritualistic theism, and secondarily the justification of pluralism. If I judge correctly, these interests lead him to commit exactly the same fallacies of rationalistic analysis and abstraction that he so thoroughly and justly condemned in naturalism, and lead him, even, to carry them one step farther, at least in the case of purely physical phenomena.

Consider, for example, his interpretation of causal interaction. The bodies involved, and the apparent causality are not merely phenomenal, i.e., purely subjective. They are appearances of realities. Now when naturalism, realistic or agnostic, attempts to probe behind the real appearances, and posits matter in motion or an unknown somewhat, it is being absurdly rationalistic, and is abstracting from the total reality which includes facts of life and mind.[2] But when Ward himself embraces Lotze's rationalistic analysis

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1. E.g. ROE, 2, 225, and passim.
2. NAA, II, loc. cit., and passim.

of 'transeunt action' into substances whose states seem to be transferred, and then posits those substances as psychic, and interprets their seeming interaction as mental rapport, that, apparently, is not being absurdly rationalistic or abstract. I confess that I cannot make out the difference. Both Ward and the naturalists are being abstract and rationalistic, but in the case of causal interaction the naturalists have the advantage, at least, of being closer to a literal description of the actual phenomena, and, also, of proceeding logically, step by step, to their abstracts. Whereas the monadologists, on purely speculative grounds, and principally for the sake of overcoming speculative and epistemological difficulties, confuse the status of the concrete phenomena involved and deny their own empirical premises. By a species of rationalistic legerdemain the entire physical world disappears into the maw of mind!

3. The Level of the "Psychical"

The weakness of this position emerges more clearly, perhaps, as we consider the meaning and use of the term "psychical," and its equivalents, as applied to the phenomena of nature, e.g., to causal interaction. Pointing out that there is at least an aspect of nature, described by such terms as law and order, subject and attribute, which is "so much

metaphor borrowed from the world of persons," Ward goes on to state that,

> For the pluralist, however, it is more than metaphor. If the Leibnizian assumption, that there are no beings entirely devoid of perception and spontaneity - which Lotze too accepted - is otherwise sound, then the objections to transeunt action between things become irrelevant. For these objections do not apply to personal interaction based on mutual rapport, which is all that the pluralist requires.[1]

Now there is an inherent confusion of standpoints in this apparently plausible position of Ward's, which really invalidates the whole argument. "Transeunt action between things" is an empirical perception or conception, on the level of comparatively massive concrete objects, which, even on Ward's own system, consist of millions - probably countless millions - of "bare monads." These elemental perceptive and spontaneous "beings" of the "Leibnizian assumption" are infinitely below any level where empirical transeunt action has any meaning. How an event on the one level is to be explained by assumed events on the other would seem to demand considerable elucidation. Not only do we have no indication as to how minute psychical relations of constituent monads is to account for empirical transeunt action, but it seems inconceivable that there could be such an explanation. Here, again, we have "an enormous

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1. ROE, 219.

extrapolation" which would seem to demand ironclad logical necessity to force one to adopt it.

4. Mediation in "Sympathetic Rapport"

Coming to still closer grips with the significance of the "psychical," let us note the confusion between the structural and the activistic or functional connotations of the term "sympathetic rapport." The fundamental psychical relationship, upon which Ward bases all phenomenal physical relations (e.g., transeunt action) is that of "sympathetic rapport." This concept he takes from our human social experience, and he defines it as "interest that rests upon cognition."[1] He analyzes it, further, into (i) "the apprehension or the knowledge on the part of one person of the 'attitude,' the feelings and intentions displayed or announced by other persons;" (ii) active response, "in their cooperation or opposition, actual or prospective;" and (iii) "the new feelings and intentions of the person interested, to which this knowledge leads."[2]

Note that in the concise definition of sympathetic rapport as "interest that rests upon cognition," and in items (i) and (iii) of his analysis, Ward has only the element of

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1. ROE, 218. Cf. supra, Chap. Six, Sec. C,1,d.
2. Ibid.

structural consciousness and its changes. Theoretically, Ward clearly intends that there shall be nothing else. "The doings and sufferings of persons are both alike immediate," he declares, "...All that is strictly personal in social intercourse is of this nature."[1] Evidently the second item in his analysis, which introduces the activistic or functional element, is intended to be so interpreted. In a footnote to Supplement III of ROE he recognizes Lotze's objection that "there may be many intermediating processes producing the conditions on which this rapport depends." His answer is, "but if we look closer we find no mediation so far as the rapport itself is concerned."[2] If so, then Ward is introducing a purely speculative, not to say imaginary, assumption. For as a matter of fact we know absolutely nothing of the "cooperation or opposition, actual or prospective" of persons save through the mediation of the physical world, of our own bodies, at least. It simply is not true that in "social intercourse" "the doings and sufferings of persons are both alike immediate" (whatever may be true of rapport, per se) on the human level, unless the whole realm of experience which makes up this physical mediation is purely illusory, and Ward certainly does not intend to say that. He simply

1. ROE, 218.
2. ROE, 463, n.2.

ignores these implications of functional mediation, and surreptitiously (and apparently unconsciously) reintroduces them with the functional-activistic element of item (ii).

Of course it may be perfectly true that one mind can immediately affect another. Recent investigations would seem to support this thesis,[1] but that is not the point in question here. Ward definitely assumes such immediacy for his monads on the basis of our experience in social intercourse; and it is the empirical basis of that assumption we are questioning. He, himself, admits frankly that, "The precise details of this psychical intercourse the pampsychist is unable to specify".[2] To make such an assumption, then, on the basis that we know such immediacy in social intercourse, and that "all that is strictly personal in social intercourse is of this nature,"[3] is to confuse the structural and functional elements in experience, and to ignore the functional mediation almost always (if not always) implied in empirical intercourse.

It seems apparent, therefore, that Ward's monadism has

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1. See, e.g., reports in popular news journals of investigations being conducted at Duke University, which seem to confirm the possibility of telepathic communication.
2. ROE, 257. (Note Ward's peculiar spelling.)
3. ROE, 218.

not really solved the problem of transeunt interaction, save by pure assumption, based on a mistaken reading of human intercourse. His argument begins with a rationalistic and false analysis of the situation, ignores the vast difference in level of monads and interacting bodies,and "solves" the problem by reading back into extremely simple experience a questionable type of personal relation, which, in any case, is known only to exist on the relatively high and genetically late level of human experience.[1] Had Ward been able to accomplish what he set out to, and what he thought he had accomplished, it would, indeed have been a strong argument in favor of pluralism and of panpsychism; an argument which, incidentally, might have been used to establish his general position with even more telling effect than he employed it. For any ultimate metaphysics must attempt an explanation of transeunt action, and one which could offer such a simple solution of this difficult problem would have a decided achievement to its credit!

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1. Ward assumes that sympathetic rapport exists on much lower levels, but this, again, is open to serious question, and would certainly be denied by many, if not by most biologists. Cf. ROE, 253-254.

B. The Problem of Evolution

1. Ward versus the Naturalists

As we turn to the consideration of the problem of evolution and Ward's attempt to solve it monadistically, we find the historical setting to be once again, that of controversy. At this point, as at so many, Ward's thought is to be grasped best by first seeing clearly the doctrine which he was controverting. Again, as so often, it was the mechanistic naturalism of his day that called forth his opposition and led to his attempted reinterpretation of the theory of evolution.

The point of the doctrine of evolution as expounded by the naturalists (in particular by their high priest of that day, Herbert Spencer), to which Ward was most insistently opposed, was that of the mechanical explanation of progress or development. He says:

> One thing at any rate is certain, a strictly mechanical theory of the world, since it necessarily implies complete reversibility, can never explain what we understand by progress and development.[1]

This objection he elaborates, pointing out "the vital

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1. ROE, 103.

difference of value between organization and disorganization, sense and nonsense," whereas in the mechanical realm "composition and resolution are altogether on a par," so that "mechanism can always, life and experience can never, be made to move backwards."[1]

In the first volume of Naturalism and Agnosticism, the mechanical theory of evolution is subjected to an exhaustive and devastating examination.[2] In particular, Ward shows that Spencer confused evolution without guidance and evolution with guidance;[3] and that out of space, time and mass, however manipulated by the naturalists, progress, history and meaning can never be deduced.[4] Then, in the last Chapter,[5] Ward himself examines the work of Darwin and points out that he made no pretence at explaining the origin of life mechanically, but, on the other hand, regarded certain teleological factors as indispensable to the theory of evolution. Self-conservation and the subjective selection implied in knowledge, e.g., are inevitably related to the theory of natural selection![6] Such factors as these, Ward contends, are

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1. Loc. cit.
2. NAA, I, Part II, Lectures VII to IX, p. 185-271.
3. Op. cit., 203-211.
4. Op. cit., 243-246.
5. Op. cit., Lecture X, p. 272-302.
6. Op. cit., 291-302.

certainly not compatible with mere mechanism, and do imply the presence of mind.[1] An examination on this point of the work of the naturalists (in particular Spencer), Ward declares, will reveal that

> on the one hand we have statements purporting to be strictly mechanical; on the other, conceptions not mechanically intelligible slipping in unawares and gradually changing the venue.[2]

2. "The Arrival of the Fit"

Before turning to the positive side of his discussion of evolution, we may pause long enough to note that, in dealing with this general problem, Ward was at his very best. In the first place, he was a competent biologist in his own right, with a thorough mastery of theory as well as having practical experience in that field.[3] Secondly, he was as completely at home, also, in physics and mathematical theory as in biology. In the third place, being perhaps the best theoretical psychologist of his day, in England, he was thoroughly prepared on that score, to deal with the implications of mind in nature. Added to this equipment was his natural keenness in detecting the weaknesses in an opponent's

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1. Loc. cit. Cf. Vol. II, 91-92.
2. NAA, I, 263. Note illustrations of this, cited from Spencer's Principles of Biology: NAA, I, 263-265.
3. Cf. the statement of his daughter, Mrs. Olwen Ward Campbell, EIP, especially 81-82, on this and related points.

argument and a passionate thoroughness in dealing with them. Naturalism and Agnosticism may be regarded as perhaps the final word on the negative criticism of mechanistic naturalism and agnostic monism, at least on the other side of the Atlantic.[1]

Ward's negative criticism of the naturalistic doctrine of evolution makes clear two necessary tasks on the positive side: (i) the presence of those factors which cannot be accounted for by mechanistic naturalism must be considered; (ii) the modus operandi of the evolutionary process must be investigated, and a working explanation suggested.

In the last previous Section we noted Ward's statement that "a strictly mechanical theory of the world...can never explain what we understand by progress and development."[2] Concerning the attempt to account for natural development by such mechanical principles as the conservation of mass and energy he remarks:

> It is notorious that these concepts are the result of ignoring those differences of quality which alone convert units into individuals. Without these we may have Erhaltung but not Entfaltung, as a German would say: we

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1. Note the statement regarding Ward and Spencer, EIP, 82. Cf. the work of Bowne, in American thought.

2. ROE, 103. Cf. Bowne, MET, 280: "The arrival of the fit, and its arrival in so many forms, are left quite unaccounted for by the great principle of natural selection. Yet these arrivals contain the knot of the problem."

> may have conservation and indefinite composition but not development and definite organization.[1]

The explanation, then, of progress or development - what Bowne called "the arrival of the fit"[2] - is to be found in "those differences of quality which alone convert units into individuals." For, he tells us, "in other and plainer words,"

> ...there is progressive experience at all because there are active individuals, severally sui generis, each from its own standpoint bent on working out a modus vivendi with the rest.[3]

And again he puts this view in a phrase: "So all nature is regarded as plastic and evolving like mind,"[4] and quotes with approval the statement of C. S. Peirce, "The one intelligible theory of the universe is that of objective idealism, that matter is effete mind, inveterate habits becoming physical laws".[5]

3. General Laws of Development

As to the general laws or principles which may be found to obtain in this plastic and evolving experience of active

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1. ROE, 103-104. Cf. McDougall, MEE, passim.
2. Loc. cit.
3. ROE, 106.
4. EIP, 243. Cf. ROE, 73-74.
5. Quoted from C. S. Peirce, "The Architectonic of Theories," Monist, 1(1890)170. EIP, 244; ROE, 74. Cf. Royce, WAI, II, 226, from which Ward quotes at length.

individuals, which is nature, Ward notes particularly these three:

(i) Evolution is always the result of a reciprocal process of adaptation, never of a one-sided adaptation of the individual to, or by, the environment, as commonly held.

> For pluralism the adaptation is not rigidly one-sided but more or less reciprocal, a mutuum commercium, to use Kant's phrase. The more experience advances, the more there is of adaptation of environment as well as of adaptation to environment.[1]

This doubtless, may be regarded as the natural implication of a realistic pluralism.

(ii) Evolution always manifests the Spinozistic principle that "every individual thing, so far as in it lies, endeavors to persist in its own being."[2]

(iii) But (i) and (ii) are not sufficient to account for the world as it is.

> Self-conversation alone however, strictly taken and regarded as everywhere realized, would result in nothing better than a static world, in which there would be no new events and no history. Such a state as final would correspond to the complete rest and quiescence with which, according to Spencer's law of equilibration, the drama of evolution must close.[3]

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1. ROE, 106. Cf.89, and PP, 30-31, EIP, 275. Cf., also, Henderson, OOn, FOE; and Northrop, SFP, Chap. IV.
2. ROE, 21, 52; NAA, I, 290-294, 298 f, II, 92, 131, 134. Cf. Spinoza, Ethics, III, 6.
3. ROE, 52-53.

Consequently, we must recognize a principle which Ward variously calls self-realization or self-betterment, a "striving not merely to live, but to live well."[1] Again, he speaks of

> ...the persistent endeavours of each to conserve or improve its position. Each, so far as in it lies, is to be conceived as 'proving all things and holding fast that which is good.[2]

On the biological level, he says, it is this principle "which first gives natural selection its '<u>point d'appui</u>'"[3] Looking at the matter from the point of view of the category of value, which is characteristic of life and irrelevant elsewhere, he declares that it is the presence of the value experience, "which such terms as well-being and ill-being imply...that gives to what we have called guidance or direction its motive and its meaning."[4]

4. Preformation versus Epigenesis

With respect to the nature of the evolutionary process, Ward's position was that the older theory of preformation (the history of which he summarizes) is compatible only with the singularistic conception of the universe.[5] According to this theory, the term evolution is to be taken literally,

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1. NAA, II, 92.
2. ROE, 54.
3. NAA, ibid.
4. "Heredity and Memory", EIP, 255. Cf. NAA, I, 280-287.
5. ROE, 97-101.

and the process regarded as "the successive unfolding of...a system of emboitement or involution."[1] As such it is "the direct negative of evolution as we understand it today."[2]

Modern evolution, then, has no logical right to the term "evolution," so far as conception of process is concerned. Its conception is that of "epigenesis or the continuous creation of what is essentially new."[3] It is this conception, certainly, which rules in modern science, although the naturalists were busy seeking to explain the apparently new on the mechanical basis of the redistribution of matter and energy. It is Ward's contention - and here we reach the heart of his philosophy of evolution - that the "continuous creation of what is essentially new" is not apparent but real. That evolution is really epigenesis or creative synthesis, and that, therefore, it is compatible only with panpsychic pluralism.[4]

> The whole is more than the sum of its parts - that is the cardinal characteristic of evolution as understood by the pluralist...All real synthesis entails new properties which its component factors in their previous isolation did not possess.[5]

It is this undeniable characteristic of organic - and, for

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1. ROE, 98.
2. Ibid.
3. ROE, 351.
4. ROE, 101-116.
5. ROE, 101-102.

Ward, of so-called inorganic - evolution which mechanism is powerless to explain. We must now turn to the second task noted above,[1] and examine Ward's "working explanation" of "the *modus operandi* of the evolutionary process." This entails the consideration (i) of the nature of "creative synthesis," (ii) of the relation of structure and function, and (iii) of the "mnemic" theory of heredity.

C. The Panpsychic Explanation of Epigenesis

1. Creative Synthesis

Thus far in our discussion of evolution we have been moving largely on the level of scientific theory. On this level, Ward was convinced that no explanation of evolutionary process was to be had. Nor, as we have seen, is it to be had by trying to extend the mechanistic concepts of science into metaphysics, as the naturalist did. The teleological factors are inescapable, and these factors can only be accounted for by the presence of mind in Nature. This, in essence, is the argument of *Naturalism and Agnosticsm*. In *The Realm of Ends* Ward set, as one of his major tasks, the metaphysical elucidation from a realistic point of view of

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1. Sec. B,2.

this presence of mind in Nature, particularly as evident in organic evolution.[1]

And here we find a definite and more than methodological use of the principle of continuity. In the first place, there was its application in extending the concepts of life and particularly of consciousness to the inorganic and lower organic realms. The validity of this extension I have held to be open to serious question.[2] Again, now, we find Ward applying the principle of continuity, in the explanation of the facts of epigenesis. He takes the concepts which he derives from a study of human experience and with them builds a working explanation of the evolutionary process.

He begins by interpreting "epigenesis or the continuous creation of what is essentially new,"[3] in terms of the concrete integrations of conscious experience. He writes,

> The concrete integration of experience is the diametrical opposite to the mechanical resultant of a composition of abstract units: it is a creative resultant or synthesis, to use Wundt's happy and striking phrase.[4] Evolution, then, for the pluralist is always synthesis, and all real synthesis is creative synthesis.[5]

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1. ROE, Chaps. V and VI.
2. Supra, Chap. Nine, Secs. C, 3 and 4.
3. ROE, 351.
4. Ward credits Lotze (MET, Par. 268, 271) with "first signalising the fact to which Wundt has given the name." ROE, 104, n. 1.
5. ROE, 104.

He finds illustrations of such creative synthesis in the timbre of a musical note, a melody, the recognition of a picture as a significant whole, etc. However, he warns us that we must not overstress the cognitive element in the mutuum commercium of active individuals which is Nature.

> The synthesis by which experience is extended and enriched is then, we have to remember, not merely nor primarily knowledge. We begin by trying and end by knowing. Practice is the parent of theory and realisation the surest verification...The reality, whatever it be besides, is this interaction of cognitive and conative agents: reality is experience.[1]

2. Structure Determined by Function

Furthermore, Ward contends that the true meaning of this creative synthesis may be understood only in the light of the true relationship of structure and function. The naturalist always makes structure primary and function to depend upon structure. This, Ward insists, is to invert the truth:

> ...The pluralist holds structure to be mainly though not entirely determined by function...The multiplicity of parts of which a structure is composed is only a whole or organized when regarded in the light of the specific function which it subserves. This function is the new fact that is more than the sum of their properties, the creative synthesis that makes the parts an individual unity.[2]

The whole problem of the nature of organism, and of the

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1. ROE, 106.
2. ROE, 107.

relation of function to the organism, and in particular to the structural elements of the organism, is most difficult, not to say obscure, and far too complicated to be dealt with here.[1] The important point to note is that Ward took the position, unequivocally, that structure is dependent, for the most part, on function. He insists that

> The determination of structure by function is beyond question in the human affairs from which in the first instance all these teleological concepts of structure, function, organ, end and the like are derived; and it is, of course, on this analogy that the pluralist's interpretation exclusively rests.[2]

Furthermore, it should be noted that this position is absolutely essential to his panpsychic interpretation, the whole notion of epigenesis as creative synthesis depending upon it. That, perhaps, is clear enough already from the quotations just given, and from the notion itself. But here is Ward's own succinct statement:

> The acquisition of new experience by commerce with the environment, the process that is to say of development through experience - in which clearer and distincter percepts, wider and exacter adjustments are attained - is to be conceived as a process in which subordinate monads are drilled and maneuvred: here it is that, as we say, function perfects structure. We may call it biotic as distinct from genetic organization.[3]

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1. See, e.g., Driesch's Gifford Lectures, SPO; Northrop, loc. cit., and C. J. Herrick's excellent study, from the physiologists point of view, NFB.
2. ROE, 107.
3. ROE, 210.

He proceeds to illustrate this, and to justify its application and extension in biology and psychology.

3. The Mnemic Theory of Heredity

a. Transmission of Acquired Characters

This lengthy discussion of Ward's general and specific theories of evolution brings us at last to that part of his interpretation which has to do more directly with body and mind relations: his mnemic theory of heredity. This theory begins by maintaining the validity of the Lamarckian doctrine of the transmission of acquired characters, and, concomitantly, of course, denying the possibility of explaining heredity on the basis of the principle of natural selection alone.

Here again, as in the preceding Section, we come upon one of the most complex and difficult problems of biology, adequate discussion of which is, of course, far beyond the scope of this dissertation. J. Arthur Thomson, in his masterly work, Heredity, devotes a long chapter to it(i.e., to the problem of the transmission of acquired characters).[1] He lists some eighty-five books and articles dealing with this

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1. Thomson, HER, Chap. VII, 164-249. Cf. Nordenskiöld, HBI, Chap. XVIII, 603-616, "Modern Theoretical Speculations."

question alone.[1] His conclusion is that the transmission of acquired characters is very questionable. Thomson's arguments are based upon the work of August Weismann[2] (1834-1914). Ward examines the chief contentions of Weismann, and subjects them to a searching criticism,[3] in his lecture on "Heredity and Memory." His conclusion, which seems to be quite adequately supported, is that Weismann has failed to show the impossibility of the Lamarckian theory, being unable to prove the absolute stability and isolation of the germ-plasm; and that, further, the essential modification of that original position which he made in his theory of intra-germinal struggle and selection, amounts to a complete surrender of that position, and therefore has undermined his whole argument, "as Delage and many others have urged."[4] And so:

> In short, while the ground on which was based his direct and positive proof of the impossibility of the inheritance of acquired characters is abandoned, his full and definite admission of the need for some equivalent of that Lamarckian factor remains.[5]

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1. Op. cit., 587-588. Note entire Bibliography with subject-index to it, 539-596.
2. See excellent Weismann bibliography, Thomson, HER, 581-583.
3. EIP, 260-270.
4. EIP, 270.
5. Ibid. Cf. Thomson, loc. cit., and 458-475, on "Weismann's Theory of Germinal Selection." On Weismann's "full and definite admission," see EIP, 268-269.

Thus in the field of scientific theory Ward has laid the foundation for an explanation of the progress of evolution. In his metaphysical discussion he takes up and builds upon an insuperable difficulty which he has pointed out in his scientific discussion, and which, alone, would appear to overthrow the neo-Darwinian contention of Weismann and his followers.[1] This difficulty is that of conceiving any explanation for "the enormous advance from jelly-fish to mammal, which is what we find," when, considering the supposed isolation of the germ-plasm, incident to the advance from Protozoa to Metazoa, we should expect, rather, "a practically stationary state."[2] Not that Ward denies the validity of natural selection or of the mixing process which produces congenital variations. But, if the ancestral plasms have been inaccessible and unchangeable since the first appearance of Metazoa, then how account for the marvelous development of species? In the words of Delage, which he quotes:

> Without the inheritance of acquired characters there can be no new ancestral plasms, and without ancestral plasms more complicated than those of the Protozoa there can be none of the superior animals.[3]

Therefore, as Ward himself concluded:

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1. EIP, 265-267. Cf. ROE, 101-116, 206-212.
2. Ibid.
3. Yves Delage, L'Hérédité et les grands Problèmes de la Biologie générale, 1903, p.560. Quoted, EIP, 268.

> To say that no acquired characters are transmitted would be tantamount to saying that nothing is transmitted; and to say that the automatisms accomplished in a single lifetime are not in any degree transmissible is to say that transmission can never begin.[1]

Holding, then, that there is, in some sense, transmission of acquired characters, the mnemic theory of heredity is Ward's answer to this difficulty; a difficulty which would, indeed, seem insuperable to the neo-Darwinians.

b. Heredity as Memory and Habit

In this theory Ward made use of the various facts, laws and principles we have been examining, and, guided by the principle of continuity, on the analogy of our own experience, he posited not only the organic world of the biologists, but all of so-called physical nature, as consisting of psychically active individuals.[2] In our human experience we find two aspects: "What is done, natura naturata - the decisions made, the habits formed, the customs fixed." It is only on the basis of this (so to speak) 'solid' side of life that we are enabled to move forward, as the other aspect presents itself. This other aspect Ward describes as follows:

> What is still to do, natura naturans, implies further spontaneity and growth; new decisions to be taken, fresh experiments to be made, with their usual sequel of trial and error and possible eventual success; happy thoughts or

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1. ROE, 210. Cf. Nordenskiöld's conclusion that the discussion of "the whole of this problem of evolution ...must, as far as our own times are concerned, terminate in a number of unanswered questions." HBI, 616.
2. ROE, 101-108.

> inspirations occurring to the individual; and the rise of great men inaugurating new epochs for their race or for the world.[1]

This two-fold nature of experience Ward extends outwardly to the whole so-called physical world, as well as inwardly to the experience of the cognitive and conative individuals who make up that world, in reality. Thus, on the one hand, he explains the contingency we find in the world,[2] and on the other the fixity and continuity there present, so far as it is real and not merely apparent.[3]

Now the aspect of natura naturata, or "what is done", consists in our conscious experience of those elements made possible by memory and habit. Extending this concept to the problem of evolution, we have, in a word, the mnemic theory of heredity: "In short, what habit is for individual life that is heredity for racial life."[4] The long wrestling with the problems of evolution, out of which Ward developed his concept of the nature and principles of natural development, with its emphasis on "the arrival of the fit," epigenesis as creative synthesis, the importance of function in the determination of structure, and his determined battle for the theory of the transmissibility of acquired characters - all

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1. ROE, 72-73.
2. ROE, Lect. IV, 70-96.
3. Ibid.
4. EIP, 275.

this but clears the way for the simple but profound conception of heredity as memory and habit. A theory which he held applicable not only in the realm of biological evolution, but in the realm of metaphysical development as well. In the Henry Sidgwick Memorial Lecture, "Heredity and Memory,"[1] so often referred to already, Ward applied his theory to organic evolution. It is my judgment that in this theory he has, in principle, the only rationally adequate explanation of organic development in the natural world,[2] without direct resort to the deus ex machina of divine experience, as in Bownian personalism. But Ward himself was thoroughly convinced that it must be applied rigorously or not at all: that, in the words of the last sentence of the Essay:

> The mnemic theory will work for those who can accept a monadistic or pampsychist interpretation of the beings that make up the world, who believe with Spinoza and Leibniz that "all individual things are animated albeit in divers degrees." But quite apart from difficulties of detail, I do not see how in principle it will work otherwise.[3]

Thus we are led back, after the consideration of the nature of the physical world (including bodies) in these two Chapters, to the consideration of Ward's monadism, in particular to the problems of subject and self, and the question of how, on the basis of Ward's "monadistic or pampsychist interpretation" body and mind are related.

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1. EIP, Essay VIII, 251-276. Separately published.
2. Sources of doctrine acknowledged, EIP, 263.
3. EIP, 276.

CHAPTER ELEVEN
THE SUBJECT, THE SELF, AND THE BODY

A. The Subject and the Monad

1. The Psychological Subject

a. Subject and "Soul"

One of the difficulties to be faced in attempting a criticism of any element of Ward's thought is the fact that his whole system is so very well-balanced and coherent. It is hard to deal with one factor without dealing with all. It is this difficulty which has been largely determinant in putting off until last the examination of what would seem to be the elementary and primary components of his metaphysics. Now that we have considered important problems raised by the application of his monadism, we are, perhaps, better prepared to examine the basis of his system, itself.

Pointing out, as we have seen, that "the truth...is becoming ever clearer to us" that Nature is not primary, he takes his stand on the dictum: "Mind is not the impotent shadow of Nature as thus shaped forth, but this shaping is itself the work of mind."[1] This general

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1. NAA, II, 247.

position he interprets to mean, not that all souls are substances, but, rather, that we must proceed "on the spiritualistic interpretation of all substances as souls."[1] In other words, the ultimate constituents of reality are to be conceived on the analogy of ourselves.

In Chapter Seven we examined the elements important to our investigation in Ward's reanalysis of experience. It is not too much to say that the crux of that reanalysis, and the primary logical source of the concept of the monad, is Ward's doctrine of the subject of experience.[2] Our first task in this ~~final~~ Chapter, then, is to examine that doctrine.

First let us seek to make clear once more just what Ward means and does not mean by the subject of experience. He does <u>not</u> mean substantial soul, in anything like the historic metaphysical meaning of that term. The subject is not "a simple substance, an entity, indivisible and inextended, therefore indestructible and capable of continuing its activities indefinitely after the death of the body."[3] Nor, on the other hand, is it a soul in McDougall's own modern sense of merely "a being that possesses, or is, the

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1. ROE, 392. Cf. <u>supra</u>, Chap. Six, Sec.B.
2. See <u>supra</u>, ibid, and Chap. Seven, Secs. c,D.
3. McDougall, MEE, 14. Cf. Ward, PP, 35-36, 381.

sum of definite capacities for psychical activity and psychophysical interaction."[1] The subject is, for Ward, certainly that. But he is not satisfied to leave it merely that; in fact he believes that it reveals itself as more than just that which acts and interacts. Needless to say, also, Ward would not agree further with McDougall's analysis of the soul's capacities and activities.[2] Yet with McDougall's essential aim, and with his insistence upon the importance and reality of the soul or subject and its real efficiency, he would doubtless be in entire sympathy. Perhaps the most important and most oft-repeated emphasis of his own psychology was on this functional and hormic aspect. Truly, their "emphatic foot-steps fall in the same places."[3]

b. Subject as "Self"

But Ward's functionalism is balanced by a structural aspect that places him - where he is usually listed, I think - among the self - or personalistic psychologists. For him, the subject is "an individual self," "an experiencing subject or experient," a "conscious subject," "Ego," or, more

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1. McDougall, BAM, 365. Cf. Pratt, MAS, 180-181.
2. Ibid., and passim. Cf. Woodworth, CSP, 182-204.
3. Cf. Marshall, CWP, 25-26, on mind, in Ward, as "primarily volitional," and PP, 359-360.

definitely, "pure Ego."[1] He himself has stated his position summarily, yet in the strongest manner:

> Psychology without a soul - as the 'rational psychologists' described soul - is quite possible but not psychology without a self, a being that in its acquaintance and intercourse with objects - that is, directly or indirectly, with other selves - feels and acts. Let the substantiality of this being be interpreted how it may, the actuality of it is past question and therefore never questioned.[2]

There are many fascinating and important questions and problems raised by Ward's doctrine, but time and space permit the notice of only one, here: How is this self or subject known? It is not consciousness, per se. It is a conscious being, known only reflectively or intellectually, strictly speaking. It is wider than consciousness: better described as experiential rather than conscious.[3] It is reactive or conative - primarily so - rather than merely cognitive; and so must, in part at least, be inferred rather than known directly. Let us have Ward's own statement on this important, and, I think, sound position:

> The I is known reflectively in the Me because the Me has been synthetically constructed by it, much as an artist paints his own portrait by means of a mirror. The mirror for self-consciousness is the social medium, and as this is perfected the portraiture improves...

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1. All on one page: PP, 35, but used more or less synonymously throughout PP.
2. PP, 381. Note the whole passage, 380-382.
3. Cf. PP, 21-22, 47-48, etc.

> We conclude then that we know intellectually what we are as experients: into the empty 'form of consciousness' our being fits.[1]

One of the important aspects of this matter of self-knowledge is the epistemological corollary, that a subject never knows itself save in relation to an object or objects, or, as Ward would say, in relation to the objective continuum. We come, here, upon that universal duality of subject and object noted previously,[2] in our examination of the analysis of experience, from the opposite side.

2. The Nature of the Monad

If, perchance, one should point out - as well he might - that Ward's subject as purely psychological may be interpreted entirely in terms of McDougall's active soul, in spite of Ward's denial of soul doctrine,[3] it might possibly have to be admitted (not forgetting, of course, to point out the wide differences in detailed analysis, on the other hand). But, on the metaphysical side, the ontological distinction which underlies them, and which is reflected in the psychological doctrines, becomes apparent. Ward's ontology is neither positivistic nor purely activistic,[4] but is

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1. PP, 381.
2. Supra, Chap. Seven, Sec. c.
3. PP, 35, 381, etc. Cf. Broad, MPN, 570; see supra, 191-193.
4. Whatever that may mean!

definitely panpsychic. The world consists of monads, or selves, of various grades of simplicity and complexity, patterned on the paradigm of our human conscious selves: definitely conative and cognitive.[1] In Ward's thought neither the conative nor the cognitive aspect may be omitted. To stress the conative aspect, in the psychological doctrine of the subject, to the exclusion of the cognitive element, is unfair to Ward's ontology. And also, I think, to his own psychology. On the other hand, Ward parts company at this point, just as definitely, with those psychologists and philosophers who limit self to cognitive consciousness, or who make awareness primary as, e.g., in defining consciousness as "awareness; what ceases when we become unconscious; all the states and processes of thought, feeling, will, self-experience, etc."[2]

One difficulty here is with the term "consciousness". As Ward says, "its manifold ambiguities are something of a scandal."[3] He considers the confusions in its meaning and use, and prefers to try to avoid them by using the wider term "experience" and its variants,[4] as his basic term. Thus the conative factors may be clearly and surely included in his

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1. Cf. supra, Chap. Six, Sec. B; ROE, p.v, 60-64; 254-260.
2. Brightman, IP, 383. Cf. Chap. VI, 166-211: "What is Consciousness?"
3. PP, 21.
4. PP, 21-24, 35-41, etc.

concept. And, so, strictly speaking, his subject is an experiencing being, rather than a conscious being. In his psychology this works well, but it does not save him from metaphysical difficulties.

Metaphysically, the subject, or "monad", is to be conceived as a psychical being, conative and cognitive. In order (so to speak) to reduce this concept to the point where it may be applicable to the whole range of existents - those, e.g., who compose so-called inanimate physical nature - he imagines conation and cognition as of minimal proportions. This concept of "bare" monads, he tells us, is a purely abstract and limiting concept.[1] That is all very well: as he points out, the physicist uses the same method.[2] But in any case, there are two objections that will not down. The first of these we have already considered in connection with physical interaction, viz., the abstractness, not to say the impossibility, of the concept of sympathatetic rapport, which, for Ward, is the only real form of mutual interaction between monads.[3] In normal experience there is no such thing as unmediated psychic rapport.

The other objection I would raise is this: by what

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1. ROE, 52-54, 195, 254-255. Cf. supra, Chap. Six, Sec. B, 2.
2. ROE, 195, 255.
3. Supra, Chapter Ten, Sec. A.

logical right may we call activity "psychical", and the monad a "self", when conation and cognition have been reduced to a point where they no longer resemble, even remotely, anything in our conscious experience which goes by those names? This is, perhaps, but another form of, or at least closely related to, the argument advanced in Chapter Nine against the extension of the concepts of consciousness and psychical animation to the world.[1]

Of course, Ward's answer to this objection is seemingly clear and simple - and unsatisfying to many. His answer is: by right of the principle of continuity. Granting freely that this principle has a legitimate and even indispensable place in metaphysical reasoning, we must, nevertheless, not forget that it is always subject to the check of experience. This Ward himself is careful enough to point out in another connection.[2] And in the light of experience, both uncritical and scientific, the whole notion of the complete psychic animation of nature is abstract and unreal - a 'closet philosophy' - in my judgment.[3]

3. The Subject as the Dominant Monad

In the light of our chief problem of body-mind relations,

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1. Supra, Chapter Nine, Secs. C,3,4. Cf. Chap. Thirteen, Sec. B, below.
2. PP, 442, n.3. Cf. supra, Chap. Eight, Sec. A,2,c.
3. Cf. Chap. Thirteen, Sec. B, below.

we must note the identification, in Ward's thought, of the psychological subject with the dominant monad, in complex organisms. He writes:

> The higher the form of life we take note of, the more we seem driven to assume that the organism has a director, and is not a mere automaton. It is here that we are led to talk of an heir and to regard the body as his heritage. This heir is the soul or dominant monad.[1]

In his note appended to The Realm of Ends on the "Relation of Body and Mind,"[2] he specifically makes the identification of subject and dominant monad, although he nowhere discusses the grounds of the identification, except in the most general way. It is of importance to note the context of this identification, however, since probably he felt - perhaps rightly - that no further justification was necessary. On this important point it will be well to have his own statement. He says, "we may fairly call an established truth" the point that,

> whereas the mechanism that is the one object of the physiologist's study is altogether phenomenal, the mind that the psychologist studies is not - as the naturalist vainly strives to maintain - merely phenomenal or epiphenomenal; since it implies the subject, or dominant monad, to whom such phenomenal experiences belong.[3]

With this identification, per se, there can be no disagreement, if the general structure of Ward's Monadism be

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1. ROE, 207. "Soul," here, not a metaphysical term. Note rejection of metaphysical "soul," supra, 191-194.
2. ROE, 461-467.
3. ROE, 462.

accepted. Of course, if one deny either the reality of the subject or the conception of the structure of the individual as held by Ward, then this identification might be contested. Doubtless it was the patency of this situation which kept Ward from attempted justification. The context of it, in any case, brings us to the next point we must consider: the nature of the individual organism, of which the subject or dominant monad is the director.

B. The Self in Ward's Thought

1. Ward's "Philosophy of Clothes"

Ward's concept of the individual is well stated in a phrase he used in discussing the problem of heredity: the organic individual is to be conceived metaphysically as "a commonwealth where the whole is for the parts and the parts for the whole; where all are more or less en rapport."[1] And, as we might expect, he is careful to add that "the key to all this is to be found...in social intercourse."[2] The basis for the monadistic interpretation of this conception he lays in his doctrine of the psychological subject, which we have been examining. As Marshall points out, it is the

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1. EIP, 275. Cf. Marshall, CWP, 132-133.
2. Ibid.

subject as dominant monad which makes possible the functional organization or community of subjects which is a human individual.[1] The commonwealth, as Ward elsewhere insists, is therefore really a monarchy.[2] This dominant monad or soul, through the selective distribution of its activity,[3] in large measure controls, directs and determines the process of his own embodiment. This doctrine Ward speaks of as "a new 'philosophy of clothes.'"[4]

Psychologically, this activity of the dominant monad is reflected in the principle of subjective selection. In this principle, he says, "the primarily practical character of experience...is clearly manifested."[5]

> By this name, then, let us denote the fact that - out of all the manifold changes of sensory presentation which a given individual experiences - only a few are the occasion of such decided feeling as to become objects of possible appetite or aversion. It is thus by means of movements that we are more than the creatures of circumstances and that we can with propriety talk of subjective selection. For ...we can, by what is strangely like a concentration of attention, convert the idea of a movement into the fact.[6]

Such possibility of the distribution of attentive activity, then, lies at the basis of Ward's entire analysis of

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1. Op. cit., 138-139.
2. ROE, 211. Cf. below, Chap. Twelve, Sec. B, 2,c.
3. Cf. Ward's psychological "attention," <u>supra</u>, Chap. Six, Sec. A,4,a.
4. PP, 442. Cf., EIP, 193-194. The doctrine he acknowledges as from Leibniz, with indebtedness to Spinoza.
5. PP, 50.
6. PP, 50-51. Cf. 34-41, 51-59, 376-382, 423-426, 441-442, and <u>passim</u>; <u>Ency</u>. <u>Brit</u>.,11th ed., XXII, 552,554,558,598.

experience, psychologically. And the controlling and determinative character of the dominant monad, metaphysically, is rooted and grounded in this character of experience thus analyzed by Ward. The dominant monad is primary. "Whereas... for the one [naturalism] the question seems to be how the body comes by its soul; for the other [panpsychic pluralism], it is rather how the soul comes by its body."[1]

2. Body and the Self

In the commonwealth of monads, then, which make up the individual, the position and meaning of the dominant monad is clear. Psychologically, he is the subject, the owner and controller, and to some extent, at least, the determiner of experience. Monadistically, in the <u>mutuum commercium</u> of experience this real, unpresented, 'pure' self is in interaction with the other members of his commonwealth which, phenomenally, are known as "my body," and (by means of them) with the rest of the universe of monads, "'a vast and complex web of life,' whose myriad fibres are all intertwined, though every one is unique,"[2] and which is "the common organism or matrix of all monads."[3]

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1. ROE, 106.
2. ROE, 58.
3. ROE, 258.

In the course of this interaction there is psychologically developed what we may call the common notion of self, the 'empirical' ego, the 'Me' (as contrasted with the 'I').[1] Of course, metaphysically speaking, this self is but the phenomenal reflection of the subject or pure self as it interacts with other selves. Perhaps the essential point of Ward's whole argument for a subject is just this, that without a real'I' there would never be any 'Me'. For our problem, the empirical self is of importance, for it is this self, not the 'I', in relation to the presentations, which is primarily implied in the common notion of mind, when the body-mind problem is under discussion.

Now Ward very carefully and fully traces the origin and growth of the experience of self.[2] He shows how it originates in what is "variously styled the vital sense, coenaesthesis or somatic consciousness."[3] Thus, with the development of definite perception, "The body becomes, in fact, the earliest form of self, the first datum for our later conceptions of permanence and individuality."[4] The continuous presentation of one's own body is "transferred" to

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1. PP, 35, 361-371, etc.
2. PP, Chap. XV, 361-382,"Presentation of Self, Self-Consciousness, Subjective Being."
3. PP, 364. Cf. Broad, MPN, 566.
4. PP, 165.

other bodies which resemble it. Without such transference, he says, "it is hard to see how we should ever be prompted to convert the temporally discontinuous presentations of external things into a continuity of existence."[1]

With the details of Ward's analysis of the development of the experience of self, we are not here concerned further, interesting and important as they might be. He traces it through "the imagining and desiring self", "which the natural man locates in his φρήν or midriff;"[2] through the stage of intellection made possible by social life and the acquisition of language[3] to the "thinking and willing self,"[4] which distinguishes the thinker from the thoughts, until, finally, the "subject of experience that we call the pure Ego or Self,"[5] emerges in our experience and thought.

3. Ward's Synthesis of Mind

Ward's empirical bent is seen once more in the last two chapters of Psychological Principles. After taking experience apart, he is not content to leave the abstract pieces lying about. He must put them all together, and see what the

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1. Loc,cit. Cf. 32-34.
2. PP, 366.
3. Cf. PP, Chap. XII, 286-312, "Intellection".
4. PP, 370. Cf. ROE, 120-124.
5. Ibid. On all this,cf. Eucy. Brit., 11th ed., XXII, 598-599.

resulting concrete individual looks like. Especially, he must see if the individual 'works,' for he knows that the model he took apart (our individual experience) was the experience of a living, active being.

The result of this attempt at "a general synthesis of mind,"[1] is his doctrine of the concrete individual. Once more, we must avoid anything like an attempt at an adequate criticism, or even a complete summary, and be content with noting several points of importance for our body-mind problem.

Mind, as thus synthesized, is seen once more to be a unity of experience, just as it is, indeed, for the most primitive conscious being. But on the level of our human intellection we are able to recognize a subjective factor and an objective factor, a duality within the unity of experience, each side of which in turn we have been able to analyze further. True, of course, this duality in unity is present in all experience. But through the abstractness introduced into scientific and philosophic thinking by Descartes's analysis of these factors of experience into metaphysical substances, European thought in this field was shunted on~~to~~ a three century detour. It can only be brought back by such a reanalysis of experience as Ward has undertaken, making clear

1. PP, 408.

the unity of experience.

This psychological unity must not be confused with metaphysical unity. Unquestionably Ward has been often and badly criticized by those who have fallen into this error. The confusion which results from such a misunderstanding is apt to lead to curious statements.[1] The unity of experience (including the unity of the objective factor within experience) is purely psychological. One source of difficulty, here, is the failure adequately to differentiate metaphysical, psychological, and epistemological objectivity.[2] That which is psychologically objective, is not necessarily an epistemological object, nor a metaphysical being. One who stresses the unity of the psychological totum objectivum, and includes the empirical self within that unity, may at the same time be an epistemological dualist and a metaphysical pluralist - all of which Ward did and was! Again, it is a question of sterilizing one's verbal instruments, and keeping them sterilized.

To get back to Ward's concrete individual: what we call the "mind" of a man is then a psychological unity, within which may be distinguished (i) a subjective factor and (ii)

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1. See supra, Chap. Eight. Cf. N. K. Smith's criticism of Ward's continuum, ITK, 95-99.
2. Cf. PP, 18.

an objective factor. Within the subjective factor there may be further discriminated (a) the conative aspect (which seems to Ward to be primary) and (b) the cognitive aspect. Note that these are aspects not to be so clearly and separately distinguished, as may the elements of the objective factor. The objective factor, while originally and fundamentally a psychological presentational continuum becomes differentiated in the developing experience into (c) the empirical self, within which may be distinguished various aspects of feeling and action, and (d) a group of simple and complex presentational experiences ranging from the simplest conceivable sensation through perception, imagination, ideation, etc. In all these latter, at least, the presentational element is so mixed with the subjective as to perhaps defy complete abstract analysis. For the secret of activity and development, including differentiation, is the principle of subjective selection.

Upon the details of Ward's analysis of experience, doubtless much corrective work will have to be done as the years go by. Some has been done already.[1] But his essential view of experience as the unity of objective and subjective factors, and as being thus the datum from which we must start

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1. See, e.g., the work of G. F. Stout, MAM, etc.

all our investigations of reality, is sound. Metaphysical idealism on the one hand, and mechanistic materialism and naturalism on the other, have each sinned against reality by setting up one factor or the other as ontologically ultimate.[1]

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1. Cf. Chap. Thirteen, B, below; there the claim is made that Ward himself fell into this ontological pit!

CHAPTER TWELVE
MIND AND BODY

A. Ward's Modified Interactionism

1. Mind and the Dominant Monad

We have just seen what "mind" meant to Ward, and incidentally, what "body" meant, psychologically. From that point of view, both are objective presentations, and both imply a duality of subject and object, as does all experience. We must now consider their metaphysical meaning and its implications for the problem of their relationships.[1]

Experience, according to Ward, is always the experience of a subject. In the case of a complex being, such as man, the subject of an individual's experience is the dominant monad of the group or society of monads that are the individual, as we have seen.[2] Metaphysically, then, all presentation, feeling and conation, as experienced by the concrete individual, is really the experience of the dominant monad; and it is

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1. On this whole problem, as here considered, see supra, Chap. Six, Sec. C, where the elements of Ward's solution are summarized, and his own discussions: ROE, 254-258, 461-467; Ency. Brit, 11th ed., XXII, "Psychology," Sec.47; PP, 423-429.

2. Supra, Chap. Eleven, Sec. A, 3.

the dominant monad which controls and directs the activity of the individual. We have noted also the fact that the 'bare'monads which constitute the apparently inanimate background of all organisms are in immediate rapport, and that all physical interaction is conceived as ultimately nothing but psychical relationship.[1]

Within the total society of monads the dominant monad bears a two-fold relationship to other monads. To the comparatively small group (still, an enormously large number!) which compose the rest of his own organism, he has a peculiarly intimate relationship. This, Ward says, "we may call an internal, functional, or vital...relation."[2] To the rest of the universe of monads, the dominant monad has only an "external, foreign, or physical, relation."[3] As we shall see, this latter relation is always indirect: it is, so to say, administered through the monads who are in the former relation.

Now granting that we must not conceive these relationships in purely spatial terms, for they are not really so, yet there can be no doubt that our spatial perceptions have their exact prototype in the realm of metaphysical being.

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1. Supra, Chap. Ten A.
2. ROE, 257-258. See supra, Chap. Six.
3. ROE, 258.

Perhaps it would be more nearly proximate to say that they are the exact adumbrations of monadistic reality, in so far as they are veridical perceptions. That being so, what is the spatial point in the body representing the position of the dominant monad? Or does it move about? Hardly, unless within very limited range, for it must, undoubtedly, keep in very intimate proximity to the cortical centers of the brain. But we know that individuals have lived for long periods minus one or more portions of every section of the brain area, apparently suffering thereby only the loss of certain functions, depending upon the portion destroyed. In a word, the point is that the whole conception of the location of mind and dominance in a single monad is exceedingly questionable.

2. The Metaphysics of Interaction

Calling the dominant monad "A," Ward makes this most significant statement:

> The totality of these internal relations at a given time answers to A's objective experience at that moment. Certain changes in this whole are, so far as A is concerned, initiated by certain of the subordinate monads: these changes answer to A's sensations, and to these it is receptive or passive. Certain other changes, on the other hand, are due to A's active initiative: these entail sensations in certain subordinate monads, and their response is what we call A's movement.[1]

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1. ROE, 258.

We have here in the compass of three sentences Ward's whole solution of the body-mind problem, on the metaphysical side.[1] Body and mind are a unity in A's objective experience, which, metaphysically, is a relationship between A and the society of psychical beings or monads which make up the organism of which A is the controlling or dominant monad. What is commonly called "conscious mind" is the cognition by A of A's own psychologically objective experience, plus A's own subjective experience. What is usually meant by "body" is an epistemological and a metaphysical projection or objectification of a <u>part</u> of A's psychologically objective experience. According to Ward, the epistemological objectification may be completely justified. But any metaphysical objectification which creates an "ugly broad ditch" of disparate substances is doomed to failure. His monadism, he believes, successfully provides for the real epistemological duality, with interaction, which experience makes necessary, but avoids the pitfall of the dualism of disparate substances. For the <u>real</u> duality is that of dominant monad over against the world of monads. The <u>real</u> interaction is that between the dominant monad and the rest

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1. His lengthy note on "Relation of Body and Mind," ROE, 461 to 467, is a justification and expansion of the solution here succinctly stated.

of the commonwealth which is the monadistic society called an organism. Through the subordinate or functionally related monads, the dominant interacts with the rest of the common matrix, which is the universe.

B. Perception, Determination, and Freedom

1. The Problem of Perception

a. The Metaphysics of Perception

The passage from which the gist of Ward's solution has been quoted[1] continues with the discussion of the pluralistic solution of the problem of external perception, particularly in contrast to that of occasionalistic personal theism. The essential problems involved here we have already discussed at some length,[2] agreeing with Ward, in large measure, in his arguments for pluralism, but questioning the panpsychic aspect. Let us here note specifically the application of his monadism to the interpretation of perception, particularly as it involves the so-called relation of body and mind. This brings us back to the other type of relationship sustained by the dominant monad to its world of monads,

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1. Supra, p. 12-2. ROE, 254-260.
2. Supra, Chap. Nine, Sec. B, 3; Chap. Ten, Secs. A, 3 and 4.

mentioned above.[1] To all monads external to the dominant monad's own organism, it sustains what Ward calls "an external, foreign, or physical, relation."[2] That is, it is in relation to them only through the mediation of the subordinate monads of its own organism. (And usually, also, unless the particular "foreign" monad be contiguous to the organism through still other monads which intervene; but at present they may be disregarded.)

Here, as in transeunt action, the relationship is to be conceived, ultimately, purely in terms of psychical rapport. The subordinate monads, so to speak, minister to the dominant monad, by conveying to him the information gathered regarding the world of monads external to the individual organism. In this process, they themselves because of the "intimacy" of the "functional" relationship, are "diaphanous".[3] This is the panpsychic way of combining the physiological and physical facts with the psychological facts, and overcoming the apparent "ditch" between them.

Once more, this is an explanation of accepted facts which must stand or fall with the extension of the psychical conception beyond the limits warranted by scientifically

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1. Cf. supra, p. 12-1-2 : "Within the total society of monads, the dominant monad bears a two-fold relationship to other monads."
2. ROE, 257-258.
3. ROE, 466.

verified experience. Details of the panpsychic doctrine of perception are wanting, so that we may leave the matter with this general observation, except to note that Ward, himself, seems puzzled by the state of intimacy within the organism, just referred to, such "that the organism has 'windows,' - is, so to say, diaphanous for its own subject and yet opaque to all subjects besides."[1] It leads him to say of the relationship, that it is "what we seem driven to call a subjective or intersubjective relation."[2] This is of a piece with his doctrine of sympathetic rapport, which we have previously questioned.[3]

b. The Nature of Presentation

One further word might be added, also, concerning the nature of presentation. For Ward, it is an absolutely basic fact of experience. We are fortunate, again in having his own succinct summary on this point. Discussing the duality in unity of experience, he remarks:

> But as regards the bare fact of presentation there is nothing to be said; it is that relation of subject to object and of object to subject, in virtue of which they are severally subject and object. As the absolutely ultimate relation within experience we can either say that

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1. ROE, 466.
2. Ibid. Note whole discussion, 466-467.
3. Supra, Chap. Ten, Sec. A, 4.

> it is inexplicable, or that it needs no explanation, or we may entertain the notion of an Absolute, in which the unity of experience outlasts the duality.[1]

His monadistic interpretation of perception is his method of reducing the complex experiences of presentation to their simplest terms, where "there is nothing to be said," for one has reached "the absolutely ultimate relation " of a subject and an object, as pluralistically conceived. That monadism could so explain perception, he regarded as being another argument in its favor. Here, again, we reach the underlying question of the acceptance or rejection of the panpsychistic conception, per se.[2] If it be accepted then little exception can be taken to Ward's metaphysical explanation of perception, for he has but sketched it in the large.

2. The Problem of Freedom

a. Mechanism, Cause, and Determination

Early in the dissertation it was pointed out that the solution of the body-mind problem went hand in hand with those of mechanism and teleology, and freedom and determinism.[3] With the former of these correlative problems we have been concerned all along, of course, and particularly in dealing

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1. NAA, II, 117.
2. See below, Sec. B, 4.
3. Chap. Two, Sec. A, 4.

with Ward's panpsychism. The monad is fundamentally a teleological concept. For Ward, all so called mechanism is to be accounted for on the basis of habit, habit which is the result of the activity of purposive beings, bent on self-conservation and self-betterment.[1] By implication, therefore, unless the monads are purely subsistent (which is not Ward's doctrine), freedom and not determinism is the fundamental characteristic of the Many, and so primary in the world.

But Ward, of course, did not deny the fact of determinism in our human experience, nor fail to recognize its metaphysical importance.[2] He discriminates two meanings of cause and two meanings of determination. "Cause" means, in the case of a conative subject, immanent efficiency and purposiveness. As used by science, it means neither of these, but merely uniform precedence. I.e., of two events, the one (the cause) always precedes, and may be expected uniformly to precede the other (the effect).[3] Concomitantly, regarding determination,

> ...we experience determination in both the forms which make up the two sides of causation: the effect as

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1. Cf. <u>supra</u>, Chap. Ten, Secs. B,1,2 and 3. See ROE, 50-54, 72-76.
2. Cf. ROE, Chap. XIII, "Freedom", 270-291, on freedom and determinism.
3. ROE, 75, 273-277.

> determined, the cause as determining; and we experience both, not objectively as presentations of what is not self, but subjectively as immediate states of self. We have moreover no ground for regarding the one as a whit more real than the other...and essentially distinct though they are, both arise together in certain situations.[1]

And in the world of our experience we find both of these forms of determination manifest:

> The one form, that of self-determination - implying such teleological categories as personality, utility and worth - dominates all our interpretations of the world as a realm of ends. The other form, that of determination according to fixed law, implying in the last resort only the categories of mechanism, underlies our scientific description of the so-called realm of nature or world of things. The one has been called the ethical postulate of freedom, the other the epistemological postulate of necessity.[2]

To sum up, then, Ward recognizes clearly both mechanism and teleology, determination and freedom, as genuine aspects of both subjective and objective experience. But as a monadoligist, he regarded the postulate of freedom as the fundamental and primary principle; for, after his examination of mechanistic philosophies in Naturalism and Agnosticism, he came to the conclusion "that while it may be possible, setting out from mind, to account for mechanism, it is impossible, setting out from mechanism, to account for mind."[3]

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1. ROE, 288. Cf. 277-279.
2. ROE, 279.
3. ROE, 18.

b. Monadism and Freedom

Among the inescapable facts of experience which Ward faced were such as (i) bodily control, involving apparent interaction of body and mind, (ii) the positive freedom of the subject or self "to initiate, to turn circumstances to account, even - thanks to the ποῦ στῶ that reason affords - so to deal with oneself";[1] and (iii) the teleological factors undeniable present in organic evolution. Ward would seem to be quite correct in his assumption that these data must be faced and a solution offered by any respectable metaphysics.[2] Each of these involves cause and determination in both senses recognized above. Ward's contention was, therefore, that each of these facts involved, not merely negative freedom, but real and positive freedom. They could be solved only if, in each situation, an immanently efficient, active self or subject or person could be posited. Let us see more particularly what that meant, in Ward's thought.

It meant that wherever you found any fact of freedom, there was (i) a psychological subject dealing effectively with the content of his objective continuum; and (ii) this

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1. PP, 407.
2. Cf. <u>supra</u>, Chap. Six, Secs. c,2,3 and 4.

meant metaphysically, a dominant monad in controlling interaction with his subordinate monads, and through them, in lesser control of environing monads. These, for Ward, are the proximate facts of freedom. Furthermore, (i) and (ii) express, from two different points of view, exactly and literally the same facts. It is this, the panpsychic nature of freedom and control, that is so easily missed, and so essential to Ward's thought.

And, further the heart of that psychic interpretation is not cognition, but conation.

> Regarding experience in this wise as life, self-conservation, self-realisation, and taking conation not cognition as its central feature, we must conclude that it is not that 'content' of objects, which the subject cannot alter, that gives them their place in its experience, but their worth positive or negative, their goodness or badness as ends or means to life.[1]

Or again, e.g., in brief "We begin by trying and end by knowing. Practice is the parent of theory and realization the surest verification."[2] We must not make the mistake, however, of supposing that this priority of the conative implies that the cognitive and conative aspects can be

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1. NAA, II, 134. Cf. PP, 360.
2. ROE, 106. But, as Marshall points out, "That does not mean for Ward that theory is true because it is useful; rather it is useful because it is true." CWP, 26. Cf. Ward's remarks, Mind, o.s., 15(1890)232.

separated. Ward's monads - even the 'barest' of them - were always both active and percipient "in the Leibnizian sense, that is to say."[1] The importance of conation is reemphasized here, however, because it involves so essentially, in Ward's thought, the principle of real freedom. Without this element of active, positive freedom Ward did not see how the organic world could ever be what it was, save by an occasionalistic assumption.

C. Interest and Freedom

We must analyze this conative element in the doctrine of freedom one step further. Describing free determination by personal agency, Ward writes:

> Psychologically the situation must be interesting; but this is not a quality pertaining to the situation as such, it is a character that the subject as such gives to it. And gives why? Because the subject is not, like an inanimate thing, indifferent to circumstances, but has ends and aims to realise, and therefore assumes a different attitude towards its environment according as this helps or hinders it in the pursuit of its purposes - purposes which conform to no general law save that of self-conservation and betterment. Its <u>own</u> character determines the character that it gives to objects, and its behaviour towards them is so far essentially self-determination. To deny all this is tacitly to deny the reality of the self or subject of experience altogether.[2]

The first question which this fundamental analysis of

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1. ROE, 54, n.1.
2. ROE, 288-289.

the basic active relationship of Ward's Monadism suggests is once more that of its reasonable application. How can we apply a term like "interest" to any possible "experience" truly imaginable as possessed by beings on the level, even, of the lower living organisms, to say nothing of the mass of monads who make up the inanimate environment? Will the principle of continuity justify such a psychologically "enormous extrapolation"? [1] In my judgment, it certainly will not. True, this description of free determination is purely on the human level. But Ward certainly intends that we shall conceive free activity on the lower levels on this pattern. Not only is this plain from his rigorous application of the principle of continuity, but he tells us definitely that the concept of the monad is fashioned on the paradigm of our human experience, and "even the lowest also will possess whatever be the irreducible minimum essential to being in any sense a subject or self at all."[2] Even that minimum includes cognition and conation. And the latter, for Ward means free effective determination of and by subjects, which is what Ward is definitively describing in this passage.

Another and final question we must raise concerns the nature of the control of the subordinate or ministering monads

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1. Cf. Chap. Nine, Secs. c, 3 and 4, supra.
2. ROE, 52.

by the dominant monad, and the force - if we may borrow the word - which holds the society of monads together in any organ or organism. Unquestionably, Ward would reply in terms of sympathetic rapport, based on cognition and interest.[1] He says, e.g., speaking of the dualism of common thought:

> More fundamental than any seeming dualism of body and soul is the duality of subject and object in experience, and this - for spiritualistic monism - means the interaction of subjects with other subjects, transcends the opposition of person and thing. It means too, that the organism is the result of such subjective interaction, not that this interaction is the result of it; more generally still, that subjects are the prime agents in maintaining the so-called physical world, not this the prime agent by which they are passively sustained.[2]

Yet one finds it quite impossible imaginatively or conceptually to carry this general conception, in the slightest of detail, into the realm of any such society as even a comparatively simple living being would be. The doctrine of freedom interpreted as determination by interest simply will not bear the weight put upon it by supposing even a simple monadistic society making up the very lowliest of active organisms to be dominated and to be effective in that way. I wonder if, in speaking of the subject as "dominant," in objecting to the idea of a society of monads as a real

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1. Cf. ROE, 462-467.
2. ROE, 400-401.

commonwealth and insisting that it is a monarchy, Ward is not bringing in unconsciously ideas which really contradict his concepts of freedom and of determination by interest? And he tells us plainly, that on "the notion of dominance... the entire doctrine of monadism is built."[1]

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1. ROE, 211. Cf. 196, 463-464, 466-467, and Marshall, CWP, 138-139.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN
TOWARD AN EVALUATION OF WARD'S THOUGHT

A. Philosophical Orientation

1. Ward's Recognition of Its Importance

Those who achieve a point of view in life without struggle may have a certain kind of self-assurance, but they lack the capability, often, of sustained and patient criticism. Also, their own philosophy is very apt to rest on uncriticized foundations. These two charges can never be laid at the door of James Ward. The combination of pietistic and Calvinistic religion in his home, plus a "divine discontent" (inherited or transplanted from his father, doubtless) produced a ferment and a hunger in his mind, which kept him peculiarly sensitive toward any temptation to intellectual smugness or "cheap and easy" solutions of ultimate problems. This aspect of his mind and thought worked itself out, finally, in Naturalism and Agnosticism, and in one of the best of his lectures (delivered, incidentally, as the Annual Public Address before the Philosophical Union of the University of California, August 26, 1904),

"Philosophical Orientation and Scientific Standpoints."[1]

In attempting an evaluation of Ward's thought, therefore, it is perhaps of more than usual importance to see clearly out of what philosophical windows he was looking (so to speak) as he viewed the world. For his general viewpoint was strongly and intentionally determinative in his metaphysics. His own standpoint was worked out with the greatest of care, before he attempted constructive work, in his criticism of naturalism and agnostic monism. He was, indeed, extremely anxious to avoid that

> ...source of error too often overlooked in the past - I mean confusion of standpoints. Precise orientation of these various aspects of the world is one of the first duties of philosophy, and the ascertainment of the supreme and ultimate standpoint is perhaps its chief concern.[2]

2. His Own Philosophical 'Windows'

The two elements of his early environment just referred to are reflected in his mature point of view: spiritualistic empiricism. On the one hand, his profound consideration of the sciences established his fundamental conviction of the primacy of the spiritual. Mind must be ultimate. And we may note, also, that his own "ultimate standpoint" brought him back finally to his childhood belief in the supreme

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1. EIP, 182-208. Published separately, also.
2. ROE, 2.

Spirit. Probably the quest for certainty in this regard was the motive spring of all his intellectual seeking. At any rate we know that he regarded theism as tenable only on the basis of metaphysical idealism. "I take it for granted," he said in the preface to his earlier Gifford Lectures, "that till an idealistic (i.e.spiritualistic) view of the world can be sustained, any exposition of theism is but wasted labour."[1] Here then was one of the windows through which he regarded the world. He spoke of the standpoint which this entailed as the "historical", the "refined anthropomorphic," the "moral," as well as the "spiritualistic" point of view.[2]

On the other hand, this idealistic standpoint was checked and balanced by one which we may call pragmatic empiricism. It is seen, for instance, in his insistence that the only possible "beginning" for philosophy is that of our conscious experience. "...We begin where alone, as I say, we can truly <u>begin</u>, here and now with ourselves and our actual experience as historical fact..."[3]

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1. NAA, I. Cf. Sorley, "Ward's Philosophy of Religion," <u>Monist</u>, 36(1926)56-69.
2. ROE, 1-3, 11, 20, 28, 50, 52, 71, etc.
3. EIP, 193. Cf. "'In the Beginning'," 277-302. Cf., also, Stout's criticisms of Ward's empiricism, MAM, 299, and <u>passim</u>. See, <u>supra</u>, Chap. Six, Sec. A.

Doubtless it was this conviction which drove him to psychology, which, for him, was always the science of "experience."[1]

But in the long run, his idealism, through the instrumentality of the principle of continuity, triumphed in large degree over empiricism, and produced his monadism. Thus it was that he could insist:

> In the historical world we place determinate agents first, and the order and development which we observe we trace to their action and interaction. It has never been shown that we need, nor made clear that we can interpret Nature otherwise.[2]

3. The Determining Issues

It seems clear, although Ward nowhere says so, in so many words, that the dominance of the idealistic note, rather than the pragmatic-empirical, in his metaphysics, was chiefly determined by the necessity of solving certain problems which he regarded as essential issues. These problems came to a head in two questions, one psychological and epistemological, and one metaphysical: How can we explain our knowledge of the "reality" of the "external" world? And how are body and mind related? Concerning these, as we noted, he remarked that they "have continued to vex philosophic thinkers from Descartes' day to our own, nor will they cease to trouble us

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1. Supra, Chap. Six, Sec. A,1.
2. ROE, 20.

till dualism is laid to rest."[1] In that remark is the key to Ward's own philosophical orientation, and the pass-word to any pertinent general criticism. Any alternative to Ward's monadism must satisfactorily meet the test of the problems of perception and of body-mind relations.

B. Monadism and Its Alternatives

1. Principal Difficulties of Monadism

Our discussion of Ward's pluralistic spiritualism and the application of it to some of the problems of the physical world and of living beings has revealed certain inherent difficulties. These may be summarized as follows:

(i) First of all, there is the essential abstractness of panpsychism, per se. This is not to deny the validity of Ward's monumental defense of the spiritualistic standpoint, in Naturalism and Agnosticism. That defense, in my judgment, is sound and perhaps final. But there remains, nevertheless, the question as to the meaning and development of that standpoint in metaphysics. Presumably, metaphysics is to be guided by that "'philosophic spirit'" which Ward defined

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1. PP, 12.

specifically as

> ...the habit of reflecting upon one's stock of knowledges[1] in the hope of unifying them all...into such form and order as to render them an intelligible and organic whole.[2]

If so, then any system which takes one essential characteristic of our experience, one of the two chief aspects of reality,[3] and declares it to be, in fact, the other aspect, is guilty of an abstractness on a par with that of naturalism. Naturalism has simply chosen the more plausible, but less defensible, aspect to advance as primary.

(ii) This abstract quality, in my judgment, roots back in an exaggerated application of the principle of continuity in Ward's metaphysics. At this point he is following Leibniz, and, to some extent, Lotze. They lead him into the very path of abstractness that he has eschewed in naturalism. If indeed "the principle of continuity then gives us no title to infer from the distinction reached by analysis to the separate existence of the factors analyzed,"[4] as he rightly observed, neither does it warrant our flying in the face of empirical evidence. His own theory of epigenesis should have

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1. With Hamilton, Spencer and others, Ward would revive this Baconian term.
2. EIP, 210. No italics in the text.
3. See ROE, 1-3.
4. PP, 442, n.3. Note this whole passage.

been raised by him to a metaphysical general principle. It might have saved him from panpsychism!

(iii) Further, in the application of monadism to the natural world we saw the very grave practical question that arose as to the extension of the concept of psychical animation to the lower organisms and to "inanimate" nature. This is the empirical result of his intellectual abstractness. We have discussed it at some length.[1] It remains "an enormous extrapolation".[2]

(iv) And, in addition, we found, certain particular problems only very questionably solved by Ward.[3] Of such, there may be mentioned, e.g., the explanation of all fixity in nature as due to habit, the problem of physical interaction, the location of mind and dominance in a single monad, the explanation of free determination on the basis of cognition and interest.

2. Important Affirmations in Ward's Thought

On the other hand, and in spite of these difficulties, there are some affirmations of indubitable value, in Ward's thought. Among these, it seems to me, are the following.[4]

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1. See supra, Chaps. Nine, Secs. c, 3 and 4; Ten, Sec. A.
2. Broad, MPN, 645.
3. For references, see "Table of Contents."
4. For references, see "Table of Contents.

(i) He was undoubtedly correct in his assumption that any valid metaphysics must account for the teleological facts of the universe, and his conclusion that neither mechanistic naturalism nor agnostic monism can do that.

(ii) In my judgment he was correct in rejecting the solutions of the body-mind problem based on substantial dualism and singularistic monism.

(iii) A reanalysis of experience was indeed necessary in his day, and the functional viewpoint he introduced into English psychology is, in the main, valid and indispensable.

(iv) In particular, his assertion of the duality of subject and object as the fundamental duality of experience, *per se*, and his strong argument for the reality and effective activity of the subject are sound and invaluable for a valid philosophy.

(v) His arguments for a realistic solution of the problem of interaction, while "spotty", seem to me to indicate its superiority to occasionalism.

(vi) Ward makes an excellent case for his application of monadism to the problem of evolution. At least with respect to *organic* evolution, his arguments for the necessity of accounting for teleology, for the probability of the inheritance of acquired characters, and for the validity of the mnemic theory of heredity (in some form) seem valid.

(vii) His analysis of the general problem of freedom and determinism is, in the main, sound, even though his psychical theory of determination be rejected.

3. Alternatives to Monadism

a. Other Theistic Idealisms

Ward assumed a quite philosophical attitude toward the solutions of the crucial issues involved which came within the limits of possibility, as he viewed possibility. Toward mechanistic naturalism and agnostic monism - for him the alpha and omega of exploded systems of metaphysics - he was unyielding, offering no quarter at any point. But toward the "milder", theistic, spiritual singularisms[1] and toward occasionalistic idealisms, he was sympathetic, recognizing allies in a common cause. This is illustrated well in his treatment of the difficulties raised by the problem of transeunt action, where, on the one hand, he freely acknowledged his indebtedness to Lotze,[2] and on the other hand, frankly admitted that with respect to his own "natural realism" versus the occasionalistic solution, "we have no

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1. Such as those of Royce and Lotze.
2. ROE, 215-219.

means of deciding empirically between the two alternatives".[1] And at the end of his lengthy note on "Relation of Body and Mind,"we find this revealing sentence: "The only alternative left seems to be that adopted by the occasionalist; and perhaps to some this may seem preferable"!.

Again, in a note appended to the later editions of Naturalism and Agnosticism, we find this frank statement, in reply to a criticism by Prof. D. G. Ritchie:[2]

> Professor Ritchie's own conclusion, that 'the ultimate reality of all things animate and inanimate is their meaning for the one mind which is the universe in its inner aspect' is, as he surmises, 'not very different from' my own.[3]

b. Common Sense or Critical Realism

This reference to Professor Ritchie's position indicates a third alternative, in addition to absolute idealism and personalistic occasionalism, which Ward seems never seriously to have considered in detail. This appendictory note of one paragraph seems to be the only place he has discussed it. Perhaps because of its ultimate theism (or idealism) he lumped it, in his thinking, with absolute idealism. Yet today, at least, in view of the excellent work of men like Stout,

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1. ROE, 260. Note whole Chapter XII, "The Cosmology of Theism, 249-269.
2. "Nature and Mind," notes on Ward's NAA, in Phil. Rev., 9(1900)241-267. Note especially 264.
3. NAA, II, 286.

Pratt and Drake, this point of view is both independent and vocal. Let us see the all too brief and inadequate question and the substance of Ward's answer, as he recorded them: Professor Ritchie asks:

> "May not the universe be both at once, through and through mechanical when regarded in its material and spatial aspect, teleological when regarded in its spiritual aspect...? Unquestionably, provided the teleological be regarded as ultimate and supreme, provided too we are not asked to accept an irresolvable dualism of material and spiritual.[1]

So far as it goes, this question and answer are plain enough. The decision between the two positions must be made on the basis of detailed study. It is perhaps of interest to conclude this dissertation (since it is no part of its task to build a positive alternative to Ward's monadism) with an observation, particularly pertinent in view of the summary of the difficulties of monadism suggested above:[2] that critical realism in epistemology, and refined common sense in metaphysics (plus the development of the doctrine of emergent evolution since Ward's day) open possibilities of a new detailed study of the "crucial problems", such as was not possible in Ward's time. Keeping to the general viewpoint "not very different from" Ward's own, it may be possible to work out a solution which shall avoid or overcome the difficulties both of monadism and of occasionalistic

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1. NAA, II, 285.
2. <u>Supra</u>, 228-230.

personalism, while conserving the valid affirmations of both. However that may be, it is just as well for a disciple of Ward to remember that he himself begins the first page of The Realm of Ends with Bradley's remark that "in the end Reality is inscrutable," and with the observation that "Nobody now-a-days - save here and there a man of science off his beat, like Haeckel for example - has the hardihood to rush into print with a final explanation of the Universe."

SUMMARY

A. Orientation and Basic Standpoint

1. In the investigation of the relations of body and mind as viewed, e.g., in the light of the monadology of James Ward, the first task must be that of orientation.

2. Metaphysical speculation, essential as it is for this problem, must start from, and constantly be checked by, the scientifically determined facts, and must further be controlled and guided by the logic of the situation. In a word, there is no "cheap and easy" solution of the problem worth the having; and yet, in view of the difficulty of ascertaining the facts, and in view of the determinative value of metaphysical factors, any solution must remain probably tentative.

3. Rejecting, on apparently sound grounds, Cartesian substantial dualism, naturalistic realism, and agnostic and singularistic monisms, Ward's ontology is pluralistic spiritualism or personalism. He holds that reality consists of cognitive and conative beings, of various grades, whose interaction (singly or organized into societies) is purely psychical.

B. The Meaning of "Experience"

4. In seeking a solution of the body-mind and related problems, Ward's first task was the reanalysis of experience, in order to lay bare the fundamental duality in unity, in experience, of subject and object, and to establish the independent reality and effective activity of the subject of experience. Both of these "facts" of experience had been lost sight of for several centuries as a result of the Cartesian substantial dualism and its descendants.

5. Dr. John S. Marshall makes the claim - exceedingly important if true - that the problem of the presentational continuum in Ward's psychology is a problem of making clear his methodological presuppositions (which means, apparently, Ward's application of the principle of continuity); and that one need not pass beyond the level of the continuum to find Ward's pluralism transcended.

6. These claims are evidently the result of failure on Marshall's part to orient himself and carefully to distinguish the respective standpoints of science and metaphysics in Ward's thought; for the doctrine of the continuum is a scientific theory, involving only a most general use of the speculative principle of continuity, and having little or no metaphysical significance, *per se*.

C. Problems Raised by Panpsychism

7. Turning now to the consideration of particular problems of matter and the body, we find that Ward's rejection of occasionalistic idealism seems probably justified (although not all of his arguments are valid); for occasionalism seems to have little warrant in epistemology for positing any more realistic existence for persons than for things. And in meeting the problems of evolution, realism would seem to have the advantage.

8. But in the panpsychic aspect of his pluralism, we run into grave difficulties which indicate that he is not justified in his exaggerated application of the principle of continuity, whereby (following Leibniz and Lotze, and abandoning the empirical aspect of his general method) he extends the concept of psychical animation beyond limits psychologically or otherwise scientifically verifiable.

9. For example, his psychical explanation of physical interaction begins with a questionably abstract Lotzian analysis of transeunt action, and utterly ignores the wide difference in empirical and metaphysical level of the interacting bodies and the monads.

10. And his explanation of all fixity, mechanism and law in nature, on the basis of the conations and habits of the psychical beings he calls "bare monads," while not

an impossible conception, is certainly not very convincing.

D. The Philosophy of Evolution

11. Then, again, his attempt to extend the psychic explanation of evolution as creative synthesis, below the level of living organisms, at least, is open to criticism.

12. Yet his clear recognition of the teleological factors in evolution, his general position that inheritance of acquired characters (in some form, at least) is necessary and valid, and his concept of evolution as epigenetic in character, are sound, and he makes a good case for them.

E. "Mind" and "Body"

13. Concerning "mind" and "body," we find that Ward identifies the subject of experience with the dominant monad, and develops a conception of the individual organism as a society of monads in intimate "functional" relationship with their own dominant monad. To all the rest of the monads of the universe outside his own organism, the dominant monad maintains a far less intimate "foreign" relation, through the instrumentality of his subordinate monads.

14. Thus "mind," as commonly used (e.g., in speaking of the body-mind problem), is the experience of the subject or dominant monad: both his own subjective experience and his psychologically objective experience due to his psychical

interaction with his subordinates.

15. And "body" is an epistemological and metaphysical "projection" by the subject, based on that part of his psychologically objective experience due to direct relations with his subordinates.

16. Careful distinction of the various meanings of the term "objective" is absolutely necessary here; for in Ward's thought all of both "mind" and "body" (in the usual sense) is psychologically objective, except for the subjective feeling and attentive activity of the dominant monad or subject; yet only a part of "mind" and all of "body" are epistemologically objective; while the very purpose of his monadism is to guard carefully the meaning of metaphysical objectification, in order to avoid the pitfalls of those substantial fallacies which render body-mind, perception and related problems insoluble.

F. Ward's Modified Interactionism

17. In Ward's thought, then, the basic duality in experience is that of subject and object, which is the adumbration or expression, on the empirical level, of the relation of the dominant monad to his subordinates (and through them to the rest of the universe), on the metaphysical level.

18. This modified interactionism, be it noted, holds

that all interaction - including so-called body mind interaction, transeunt action, and that which is called free determination, in the organic realm - all is purely psychical relationship of monads of varying rank and position.

19. Ward's solution of the body-mind problem, therefore, will stand or fall with his concept of the extension of psychical animation to the whole range of nature; and that involves his entire metaphysics.

20. Ward himself recognized that the ultimate question was that of the meaning of all things for the supreme mind, and that there were certain reasonable alternatives to his panpsychism and his pluralism, which "to some...may seem preferable." Such are theistic absolute idealism of the "mild" type of Lotze or Royce, occasionalistic personalism, and refined common sense and critical realism.

21. Developments in philosophy, particularly in epistemology and Naturphilosophie, since Ward's day, would seem to call for a type of reexamination of the "crucial problems" of metaphysics from the realistic point of view, which Ward, naturally was not in position to undertake. This dissertation, however, pretends to be nothing more than a part of the prolegomena to such a reconsideration.

G. Conclusions

(1) Ward's philosophy was fundamentally an attempt at a metaphysical solution of two crucial problems: body-mind relations, and perception.

(2) This attempt was made necessary by the dualistic view of the disparateness of substances, and the singularistic contradiction of scientifically ascertained facts.

(3) He demonstrated that the basic duality found in experience by an adequate psychology is that of subject and object within experience, not one of matter and mind, as commonly held.

(4) Ward's psychological analysis and theoretical synthesis establish the importance and free activity of the subject, in the development of individual experience.

(5) The objective continuum is, for Ward, a purely psychological totum of presentations, analogous to the "datum self" in Brightman's thought, and the Gestalt "configuration."

(6) The doctrine of the continuum is, therefore, primarily a scientific theory, and does not have the fundamental metaphysical significance inferred by Dr. Marshall.

(7) The only ground for Ward's extension of the concept of psychical animation beyond empirical limits is the methodological principle of continuity.

(8) Ward's psychical explanation of all fixity, law,

mechanism and "transeunt action" in nature is purely hypothetical, without empirical justification.

(9) Likewise, his well-reasoned insistence upon the place and importance of the psychical element in evolution departs from any factual basis when extended to the inorganic realm.

(10) Ward's modification of the interactionist theory of body-mind relations consists in substituting the psychical interaction of monads for an interaction of mental and physical substances.

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(Note: In view of the well-nigh exhaustive bibliographies covering the work of James Ward, by Titchener (see, supra, 247,) and Marshall (CWP,178-194,) and the Memorial number of the Monist (Jan., 1926,) I have included here only those articles relevant to this dissertation or cited therein, and one or two references to brief notes or articles not listed elsewhere. I have included here all his published bound volumes, except several small separately bound articles which are now available in EIP.)

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His early education was in the public schools of Philadelphia, but was interrupted in the third year of high school by the acceptance of the position of laboratory assistant at the Randall Morgan Laboratory of Physics, of the University of Pennsylvania. After several years, having taken advantage of public and semi-public night schools, he entered the University of Pennsylvania, College Department, in Arts and Sciences, by passing the Entrance Examinations.

Again the path of his education was interrupted, in 1917-1918, for the better part of a year spent in teaching physics and other subjects in the Media, Penna., High School. Also, in conjunction with the last two years of college work, he served as Methodist Secretary, and Employment Secretary, of the University Christian Association. The degree of Bachelor of Science in Arts and Sciences was received in 1919.

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In June of 1920 he matriculated at Garrett Biblical Institute, Evanston, Illinois. During his seminary years he served two student charges, and also took several courses in the Graduate School of Northwestern University. In August, 1923, he received the degree of Bachelor of Divinity from Garrett Biblical Institute, and immediately accepted appointment as pastor of the Methodist Church at Libby, Montana. In the Autumn of 1926, he entered Boston University Graduate School, and began work for the present degree. Having been ordained into the ministry of the Methodist Episcopal Church, in 1924 and 1926, he has continued to serve churches in the New England Southern Conference of his Church. In 1929-1930, in addition to serving a church, he taught physics in the Collegiate Institute at New Haven, Connecticut, and completed a year of graduate study at Yale University. During the past few years, while serving the church at Warren, Rhode Island, he has pursued several courses of study at Brown University.

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